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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Equity agency costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs is 
a critical element of corporate governance, yet empirical research that focuses on the 
magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis sets out to furnish empirical 
evidence in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of 
equity agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a 
firm and equity agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy 
that a firm adopts.   
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of the effect of corporate ownership, 
together with other governance mechanisms including the board of directors and debt 
financing, on equity agency conflicts using a sample of the largest 500 Australian listed 
firms. The results from this analysis provide strong support for the view that equity agency 
costs are related to corporate ownership. Specifically, there is evidence of a significant 
non-linear relation between inside ownership and the proxies for equity agency costs. 
Further, the results demonstrate that other governance mechanisms, particularly board 
size, board leadership and short-term debt financing, are effective in improving the use of 
firm assets, yet they do not seem to restrain firm management from incurring excessive 
discretionary operating expenses. The effects are somewhat sensitive to firm 
characteristics such as level of investment opportunities and level of diversification.  
This thesis also extends the investigation of the corporate ownership-equity agency 
cost relation by focusing on the largest shareholder in a large sample of 9,165 listed firms 
drawn from 43 countries around the world. The results suggest that cross-sectional 
variation in equity agency costs can be partly attributable to corporate ownership. 
Specifically, there is evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relation between the 
ix 
shareholding of the largest shareholder and the agency cost proxies. The type of the largest 
shareholder, i.e. whether the largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution, is 
also important in analysis of this relation. Further, debt financing, dividend policy and 
legal origin vary in their impact on the agency cost proxies.     
This thesis also investigates the interaction between the largest shareholder and 
dividend policy using a sample of 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 countries around the 
world. Consistent with previous studies, the results suggest that firms are more likely to 
pay dividends when profitability is high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited, 
or when the largest shareholder is not an insider. Yet the magnitude of dividend payout 
tends to be smaller when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial 
institution. It is also apparent that largest shareholding and dividend payout are related and 
that, consistent with the extant literature, legal system does matter in dividend policy 
decisions. 
Together, the results imply that equity agency costs vary with corporate ownership 
though this relation remains, of course, the subject of continuing investigation in finance. 
A major contribution of this thesis is demonstrating that corporate ownership, particularly 
the largest shareholder, plays a pivotal role in controlling agency costs. Accordingly, this 
suggests the following policy implication: by improving the legal environment and 
regulatory constraints imposed on large shareholders as well as legal protection for 
minority shareholders, the efficiency gains generated from large shareholder control can 
be translated into higher firm valuation to the benefit of all shareholders in the firm. 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1: 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Equity agency1 costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs 
is a critical element of corporate governance yet empirical research that focuses on the 
magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis adds to this body of empirical 
research in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of 
agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a firm 
and agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy that a firm 
adopts.   
Berle and Means (1932) and Smith (1776), discuss the impact of the separation of 
ownership and control in a modern firm. It is clear that this separation has implications for 
the development of modern corporate governance research. As Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) note, this separation (or the dispersion of ownership) gives rise to conflicts of 
interest among various stakeholders of the modern firm. Not only do the conflicts vary 
between different stakeholders, but also the nature of the conflicts is related to the capital 
contribution and the return that each stakeholder receives from the firm. From the 
perspective of agency theory, these conflicts can be classified as managerialism (between 
shareholders and management), asymmetric information (between large, inside 
shareholders and minority, outside shareholders), debt agency (between shareholders and 
debtholders), and other agency conflicts (between managers and other parties with whom 
the firm deals) (John and Senbet 1998). By and large, all stakeholders of a firm are 
assumed to be self-interested, and thus, they are likely to pursue their own interest in a 
                                                 
1 This thesis is concerned primarily with equity agency costs and so the term “agency costs” refers to equity 
agency costs, unless stated otherwise.   
2 
way that may be detrimental to the welfare of other stakeholders. Such behaviour may 
detract from the efficient operation of a firm, and hence adversely affect the value of the 
firm.  
Corporate governance exists as a mechanism to deal with the problems that arise 
from the separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Governance 
mechanisms can be broadly characterised as being internal or external to the firm, yet they 
work interdependently in mitigating agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck, 
Shleifer and Wishny 1989).2 Among others, Jensen (1986), Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) contend that internal control mechanisms 
including the allocation of ownership, board composition, compensation packages and 
financial policies (e.g. dividend and debt targets) are important in dealing with governance 
problems, but they can not resolve these problems completely given the complexity of a 
modern firm. External mechanisms, on the other hand, act in a complementary way, and 
include takeovers and mergers, the managerial labor market and the product market 
(Jensen 1993). However, it is evident that these external mechanisms are limited in their 
effectiveness for controlling governance problems and, in fact, do carry some costs (Gillan 
2006). Given that marginal benefits and costs vary with different control mechanisms, 
profit maximizing firms are likely to choose different mixes of control mechanisms that 
best fit their specific needs.3 
Recent studies, however, cast doubt on the empirical validity of the claimed 
pervasiveness of the separation of ownership and control as noted by Berle and Means 
(1932).4 It is increasingly evident that many firms, especially those located outside the US 
                                                 
2 It is also shown true for a closely held corporation for which secondary market of shares (i.e. re-trade for 
the firm’s shares) is limited or even non-existent (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000). 
3 Refer to Kiel and Nicholson (2003). 
4 Even among large US firms, evidence has emerged indicating a modest concentration of ownership (refer 
to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan 1999). For a survey of single-
country based studies on ownership concentration, refer to Denis and McConnell (2002). 
3 
and UK, are predominantly owned by a single shareholder or a group of shareholders. 
Specifically, La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes and Shleifer (1999) provide an important cross-
country investigation into ownership structure and ultimate control using the top 20 listed 
firms from each of 27 developed countries around the world. They demonstrate that 
concentrated ownership is not uncommon in developed countries with good legal 
protection, contrary to the assumptions of Berle and Means (1932). They also observe that 
the ultimate controlling shareholders generally have control rights in excess of their cash 
flow rights,5 and that the shareholders are largely either a family or state. Similarly, 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that the ownership of firms in East Asia is 
concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders,6 and Faccio and Lang (2002), with 
respect to corporate ownership in Western Europe, note the importance of the largest 
(controlling) shareholder in this region.7 Not only is the control of large shareholders 
progressively strengthened through the use of multiple class shares, pyramid structures 
and through participation in management, but also there is little likelihood of it being 
restrained by other stakeholders. 
Large shareholders are a key focus in the corporate governance literature as they 
play an important active role in controlling agency costs (Holderness 2003). From the 
perspective of agency theory,8 holding a sizable proportion of equity in a firm (i.e. cash 
flow rights) gives these large shareholders the incentive and/or the ability to gather 
information and to monitor the management, thereby mitigating the traditional agency 
problems, including free-rider problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Demsetz 1983). 
                                                 
5 Such deviation is partly explained by increased use of different classes of shares (with different voting 
rights) in developed country firms. 
6 Interestingly, they find that the concentration of control is decreasing in the level of economic 
development. Specifically, their analysis indicates that Japan has the largest number of widely-held firms, 
followed by Korea and Taiwan.  
7 For a similar ownership study for European firms, refer to Becht and Mayer (2000). 
8 Dlugoz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006) discuss data problems in large shareholder research. 
Black (1990) provides a detailed description of various legal and regulatory limits on the exercise of power 
by large shareholders in the US. Wymeersch (2003) discusses legal impediments to large shareholder actions 
outside the US. 
4 
Apart from management monitoring, large shareholders may also gain sufficient voting 
capacity to exercise control over management, or perhaps even to oust management 
through a proxy fight or takeover (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Essentially, their superior 
monitoring and control may improve the performance of firm management, and thus may 
increase the value of their shares. Yet such “benefits of control” affect all shareholders, 
and empirical evidence partly supports the existence of shared benefits that come from 
large shareholding (Barclay and Holderness 1992).9 Specifically, Holderness and Sheehan 
(1985) and Barclay and Holderness (1991) report consistent evidence that large block 
trades are associated with abnormal stock movements. Further, cross-country studies such 
as La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (2002) suggest that the value of a firm is increasing in the shareholding of 
largest (controlling) shareholder, though single country-based studies tend to provide 
mixed evidence.10 
There are also costs associated with large shareholdings (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). It is thought that large shareholders forgo the benefits of diversification by 
investing much of their wealth in the equity of a single firm, and hence they may bear 
excessive risk (Demsetz and Lehn 1985).11 A more fundamental problem here is that high 
ownership concentration gives large shareholders the opportunity to enjoy “private 
benefits of control” to the exclusion of other stakeholders, particularly minority 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1980; Harris and Raviv 1988). It is noted that large 
shareholders “have not only a strong preference, but also the ability not to pay out cash 
flows as pro-rata distributions to all investors, but rather to pay themselves only” (Shleifer 
                                                 
9 It is also found that the stock market reacts favourably to the formation of large shareholdings (Mikkelson 
and Ruback 1985). 
10 For a recent review of studies on the ownership-firm value relation, refer to Thomsen, Pedersen and Kvist 
(2006). 
11 The fact that many firms around the world are highly concentrated suggests that the cost of under-
diversification may not as significant as the costs of the separation of ownership and control.  
5 
and Vishny 1997 p.33).12 It is also evident that the net private benefits of large 
shareholders are significant and positive. For example, based on 393 block transactions 
from 39 countries over the period between 1990 and 2000, Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
report that  the average value of private benefits accruing to block trades is 14 percent of 
the equity value of a firm.13  
Large shareholders, particularly the largest shareholder, and their influence on 
agency problems that exist within a firm are considered in this thesis. In essence, the 
primary theme of this thesis is an empirical investigation into the relation that exists 
between corporate ownership, equity agency costs and dividend policy. Specifically, this 
thesis focuses on the impact of the separation of ownership and control of Berle and 
Means (1932) and the agency problems of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The first objective 
of this thesis is to document the extent to which equity agency costs exist within a firm, 
and then to examine the effect of corporate ownership on agency costs. The second 
objective is to investigate the interaction between largest shareholder and dividend policy 
that the firm adopts.      
Such research objectives contribute to our understanding of the “consequences” of 
the structure of corporate ownership (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). As Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue, the fundamental consequence of the separation of ownership and control is 
equity agency costs, and the possible reduction in the wealth of the firm’s shareholders. 
There is a well-established strand of literature that explores the ownership-firm value 
relation, yet the extent of this relation still remains an empirical question (Thomsen et al. 
2006). Further, agency costs are critical to understanding this relation though the 
magnitude of agency costs is not easily quantified (Gillan 2006). A few studies including 
                                                 
12 Green mail and targeted share repurchases are examples of special deals for large shareholders (Dann and 
DeAngelo 1983). 
13 Earlier studies including Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) also 
attempted to quantify the private benefits of large shareholders. 
6 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) and Fleming, Heaney and 
McCosker (2005) have investigated the effect of corporate ownership on the magnitude of 
equity agency costs. Within the same traditional agency relation, corporate ownership and 
dividend policy are viewed as substitute monitoring devices used in mitigating agency 
costs (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). This thesis aims to further the 
empirical evidence concerning agency costs and the role that large shareholders, 
particularly the largest shareholders, play in the agency relation (also see Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Holderness 2003).  
The largest shareholder is a focus of this thesis as this shareholder group is 
generally viewed as a distinctive class of large shareholders, yet their role has been largely 
neglected in the existing literature (Claessens et al. 2002). With the largest holding of 
equity in a firm, they have incentive to monitor and/or ability to coordinate other 
monitoring mechanisms in improving firm management. Yet, substantial voting power 
potentially entrenches these shareholders, and as a result, firm resources may be 
expropriated for their private benefit. Attention is also directed to the type of the largest 
shareholder, i.e. whether they are an insider, a financial institution or a state. Further, 
recent research suggests the existence of a non-linear relation between corporate 
ownership and agency costs, and this relation is also studied in this thesis. In addition to 
the role of the largest shareholder, the impact of leverage, investment growth and legal 
protection are also considered here. It should be noted that the research into agency 
conflicts is predominantly confined to US firms, and thus there are challenges and 
limitations when applying this research to firms outside the US, where considerable 
differences exist in terms of the corporate environment including political, legal, and 
regulatory restrictions. A major contribution of this thesis is the international focus of the 
empirical studies.   
7 
1.2 Research Scope 
As discussed earlier, the main objective of this thesis is to conduct an empirical 
examination into the relation that exists between corporate ownership and agency costs, 
and between corporate ownership and dividend policy. This thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of existing studies in order to establish the two themes 
of research that have dominated the corporate governance literature. Specifically, the first 
part of this chapter outlines the first theme of research pertaining to the relation between 
corporate ownership and agency costs, while the second part presents the second theme 
reflecting on the interaction that exists between corporate ownership and dividend policy. 
From the perspective of traditional agency theory, the separation of ownership and control 
is thought to create potential conflicts of interest among various stakeholders of the firm. 
This gives rise to several studies (both theoretical and empirical studies) focusing on the 
extent to which this separation affects agency conflicts. In general, the results pertaining to 
this relation are inconsistent, depending on the sample and econometric technique used. A 
small number of studies, including Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003), take 
a different approach in investigating this relation by employing new proxies for equity 
agency costs. In addition, the second theme emerges from a survey of studies on dividend 
policy and its interaction with corporate ownership. It is evident that corporate ownership 
and dividend policy act as substitute monitoring devices in controlling agency problems.  
With both themes of research, the survey provided in the following chapter 
highlights the importance of large shareholders in the corporate governance of a firm. 
Specifically, the potential influence that large shareholders exert on equity agency costs as 
well as the dividend policy decision form the focus of this chapter. This has important 
implications for the development of empirical analysis that will be undertaken in the 
following chapters. 
8 
Chapter 3 conducts an empirical examination of the magnitude of equity agency 
costs and its relation to corporate ownership by focusing on large firms listed on 
Australian stock exchange for two years 2004 and 2005. Specifically, this chapter expands 
upon the work of Singh and Davidson (2003), not only focusing on the potential influence 
of corporate ownership and other governance mechanisms (e.g. board characteristics and 
debt financing), but also taking into account the existence of non-linear relations between 
equity agency costs and corporate ownership and board size. Among developed Anglo-
Saxon countries, Australia is an important country for analysis of such issues as it has a 
number of corporate governance features that distinguish it from other developed 
countries, particularly the US and UK.14  
Two proxies for equity agency costs that are commonly used by researchers in this 
area are adopted in this thesis, the ratio of annual sales to total assets and the ratio of 
discretionary operating expenses to annual sales. The analysis shows that both these ratios 
vary considerably across Australian listed firms, and that they tend to be lower than that of 
US firms or UK firms. The results are generally consistent with previous studies including 
Singh and Davidson (2003). It is found that in Australia, corporate ownership (particularly 
inside ownership) along with board size, board leadership and short-term debt financing, 
appear to provide effective means of monitoring the use of firm assets, but do not seem to 
restrain firm management from incurring greater levels of discretionary operating 
expenses. Further, there is evidence of a non-linear relation between equity agency costs 
and both inside ownership and board size.  
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of the relation between corporate ownership and 
equity agency costs to a sample of listed firms drawn from around the world.  It is 
observed that firms are increasingly controlled by a single shareholder or a shareholder 
                                                 
14 One of the obvious differences is that Australia has a small and less active market relative to the US or the 
UK. In particular, Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell (1997) point out some differences in ownership structure 
and institutional environment that exist between Australia and the US. 
9 
group. Yet, the largest shareholder, as a unique class of large shareholders, has not 
received appropriate attention in the literature. This chapter investigates not only the 
relation that exists between the largest shareholder and agency costs in a cross-country 
context, but also the potential impact of different types of the largest shareholder on this 
relation. The possibility of a non-linear relation between the largest shareholding and 
agency costs is also explored. Attention is also directed at two other governance 
mechanisms (debt financing and dividend policy) that firms may employ as well as the 
impact of the legal protection environment within which firms operate.  
The analysis reveals significant variation across firms in terms of asset utilisation 
and discretionary expenses. Importantly, such variation can be largely explained by firm 
ownership. There is evidence of a consistent and statistically significant non-linear relation 
between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and agency cost proxies (i.e. AUR and 
DER). The results also suggest that the type of the largest shareholder (i.e. whether the 
largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution) is important in the analysis of 
this relation. Finally, debt financing, dividend policy and legal origin vary in their impact 
on agency conflicts.     
Chapter 5 undertakes a further investigation into the largest shareholder and their 
interaction with the dividend policy that the firm adopts. Like large shareholders, the 
largest shareholder can exert pressure on a firm to adopt a dividend policy that reduces 
private consumption by firm management, yet they could also enforce a dividend policy 
that maximizes private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Essentially, the 
largest shareholder and dividend policy might be viewed as substitute monitoring devices. 
In examining dividend policy, there are two key decisions, (i) whether or not to pay 
dividends, and (ii) how much to pay. Utilising the model of Lintner (1956) and Fama and 
French (2002), this chapter attempts to improve our understanding of the impact of the 
10 
largest shareholders on both these dividend decisions. Further, the potential influence of 
the type of the largest shareholder and legal protection is also accounted for in the 
analysis. 
The results are generally consistent with existing studies such as Fama and French 
(2001; 2002). Specifically, firms are more likely to pay dividends when profitability is 
high, debt is low, investment opportunities are limited and when the largest shareholder is 
not an insider. The magnitude of dividend payout tends to be smaller when the largest 
shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. It is also apparent that there is a 
relation between the largest shareholding and dividend policy, and interestingly, this 
relation seems to be a two-way relation. In addition, consistent with the extant literature, 
legal system does matter in dividend policy decisions. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary and conclusions. In the traditional agency theory 
view, equity agency costs arise as a result of the separation of ownership and control. This 
thesis furnishes further evidence supporting the importance of agency costs with a 
particular focus on the impact of the largest shareholder. The results suggest that agency 
costs are manifested in the efficiency with which a firm manages its assets or controls its 
discretionary expenses and in the way in which it distributes its profits to shareholders. 
Importantly, agency costs are affected by firm ownership, particularly the largest 
shareholder. There is also evidence that the type of the largest shareholder and the legal 
protection in existence at the time vary in their impact on the relation between corporate 
ownership and agency costs. These findings suggest the need for further research into the 
impact of large shareholders, and call into question recent governance reforms that have 
been introduced around the world, with their emphasis on boards of directors and 
corporate disclosure. 
11 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, EQUITY AGENCY COSTS & DIVIDEND POLICY 
  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a trend. More firms, 
particularly in the US and the UK, began to list themselves on stock exchanges. 
Subsequently, not only were shareholders growing in number and geographically 
diversity, but their links with the management of their firms were becoming more remote. 
Studying data from large US listed firms, Berle and Means (1932) brought attention to the 
rising separation of power between the executive management of large publicly listed 
firms and their increasingly diverse shareholders. Thirty years later, in their second 
revision, they add that “the translation of the industrial wealth of the country from 
individual ownership to ownership by the large and publicly financed corporations (and) 
the divorce of ownership from control consequent on that process almost necessarily 
involves a new form of economic organisation of society” (Berle and Means 1968 p.7). 
Such ownership changes and the evolution of the modern firm have important implications 
for the development of the modern corporate governance research.  
The separation of ownership and control in a modern firm has subsequently given 
rise to seminal works in a wide range of disciplines (Tricker 2000). It is apparent that the 
most influential work among these is that of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who initially 
adopted agency theory in modelling the separation of ownership and control within the 
framework of the principal-agent relation. In their model, Jensen and Meckling postulate 
that this separation creates potential conflicts of interest among various stakeholders of the 
firm. Given the inability to costlessly write perfect contracts between stakeholders and/or 
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monitor management, these conflicts ultimately reduce the value of the firm. Yet, there are 
also benefits associated with this separation, otherwise the structure would not have 
persisted (Denis and McConnell 2002).  
These ideas essentially lead to research into extent of the separation of ownership 
and control (or the dispersion of ownership), and into how this affects agency conflicts. 
This chapter, therefore, provides a literature survey of this topic area with a particular 
focus on large shareholders (or block shareholders).15 Large shareholders are ideally 
placed to monitor management, because not only is their wealth largely sensitive to firm 
decisions, but they also have incentive to oversee the firm’s affair and the ability to 
discipline firm management. However, large shareholders also have an incentive to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (Dyck and Zingales 2004). Thus, large 
shareholders may exert influence over agency conflicts though such influence could result 
in either net wealth creation or net wealth destruction (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
This chapter follows two main research themes that have dominated previous 
studies in this area. Section 2.2 outlines the first theme pertaining to the relation between 
corporate ownership and equity agency costs. The first part of Section 2.2 briefly discusses 
theoretical agency studies in an attempt to establish the relation between ownership and 
equity agency costs, whereas the second part documents empirical evidence of this 
relation, where firm value and/or efficiency are adopted as proxies for equity agency costs. 
Section 2.3 deals with the second theme, referred to as the relation between corporate 
ownership and dividend policy.16 A review of theoretical studies from the perspective of 
agency theory is presented in the first part of Section 2.3.  The second part of this section 
then summarises the results from empirical research with an emphasis on the impact of 
                                                 
15 There are numerous ways for firm stakeholders to reduce the impact of the separation of ownership and 
control on the value of the firm. For a recent survey, refer to Denis and McConnell (2002) and Gillan (2006). 
16 Large shareholders exist partly because of the shared benefits of control and the private benefits of control. 
For a review of other impacts of large shareholders on the firm, refer to Holderness (2003) 
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large shareholders. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes with a summary of the research relied 
upon for the following chapters. 
 
 
 
2.2 Corporate Ownership and Equity Agency Costs 
2.2.1 Theoretical views  
The separation of ownership and control that Berle and Means (1932) observed 
seventy years ago is central to the economic theory of agency conflicts and the theory of 
the firm (Ross 1973; Demsetz 1983).17 The holder of equity in the firm, not only 
experiences a loss of direct control over his resources, but also cannot exercise his power 
to oversee the firm’s affair. Management, on the other hand, gains greater control of the 
firm’s resources than would exist if the owner manages the firm. Consequently equity 
agency problems arise because the interests of the equity holders and managers do not 
coincide. Agency theory attempts to explain the link between the separation of ownership 
and control and equity agency costs that exists within the firm, which it is argued is a 
nexus of contracting relationships.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide important insights into the impact of agency 
relations on the firm. In a simple world, they assume that an agency relationship is formed 
between the principal (i.e. an owner of the firm) and the agent (i.e. a manager or an 
entrepreneur). Given that both the principle and agent are utility maximisers, equity 
agency problems arise when an agent is employed to maximise the principal’s wealth even 
though such actions may reduce his utility. Both the principal and agent have a part to play 
in mitigating agency problems. The principal ought to provide the agent with incentive 
and/or to establish appropriate monitoring. Thus “monitoring costs” are imposed on the 
                                                 
17 As Jensen (1983) points out that agency theory can be classified into two streams; “principal-agent” 
theory and “positive” agency theory. The former is generally mathematical and non-empirical, and tends to 
focus on the informational aspects of agency problems. In contrast, the latter is empirically-based and largely 
deals with the effects of governance mechanisms on the agency problems. 
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principal. The agent, on the other hand, expends his resources to assure the principal that 
no activities that harm the wealth of the principal will be taken. The effort incurred in 
maintaining good relations with the principal results in “bonding costs” for the agent.18 In 
addition to these two agency costs, there are potential losses in the wealth of the principal 
arising from agent’s commitment to non-value maximization decisions (“residual losses”). 
Thus, theoretically, equity agency costs include monitoring costs borne by the principal, 
bonding costs incurred by the agent and residual losses. It is also important to note that 
these costs may be exacerbated when a large number of minority shareholders are present, 
especially in large listed firms (i.e. “free-rider” problems).19  
Jensen and Meckling discuss the effect of corporate ownership on equity agency 
costs when the principal reduces his stake of equity in the firm. It is argued that all else 
equal, the firm will set the marginal costs from monitoring and bonding activities equal to 
the marginal benefits generated by these activities. Essentially, the value of the firm is 
maximized when it operates at this equilibrium level of monitoring and bonding activities.  
They also demonstrate that large variation in agency costs exists across differing 
levels of ownership concentration. Further, they suggest that large shareholdings and 
managerial ownership play an important role in controlling agency costs. Specifically, 
decreases in managerial ownership (or increases in large shareholdings) reduce residual 
claims of the management on the firm, and thereby leading to potential misallocation of 
firm resources for their private consumption. Finally, Jensen and Meckling also argue that 
equity agency costs can be limited by imposing other control mechanisms. In particular, 
                                                 
18 Examples of these include the retention of a larger than desired equity stake by the agent, or the adoption 
of a riskier than desired compensation plan. 
19 Due to high levels of monitoring costs relative to the benefits that minority shareholders receive from their 
small fraction of firm equity, these shareholders have little incentive to engage in managerial monitoring. 
This leads to two possibilities (a) no single individual shareholder will take monitoring actions against firm 
management, or (b) large shareholders whose wealth is linked to management decisions will take such 
actions and hence, bear the costs.  
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they point out the potential monitoring role that debt plays in alleviating the agency costs 
of equity, though they note that debt may create its own agency problems.  
 Fama and Jensen (1983a) establish a broader view on the ownership-agency cost 
relation. In their view, agency problems are an outcome of the separation of residual 
claims (ownership) and decision processes (control), both of which are governed by 
incomplete, unenforceable and costly agency contracts. They argue that firms that are not 
able to control agency problems are less likely to survive in a competitive equilibrium. 
They then examine a number of non-complex forms of corporation20 in order to identify 
common characteristics that help these corporations survive in a competitive market. Their 
analysis assumes that there is specific knowledge which is important for both decision 
making and control, and it is costly to transfer among agents. If this knowledge is 
concentrated among one, or a few, agents, then firms optimally restrict their residual 
claims to important decision agents. This restriction may also substitute for other costly 
control mechanisms that are used to limit agent discretion. In addition, like Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), they analyze various ways in which managers hold enough shares to 
dominate the decision making process, and thereby allowing them to expropriate firm 
resources. From this analysis, they conclude that “without effective control procedures, 
such decision managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of 
residual claimants” (Fama and Jensen 1983a p. 304).  
Fama and Jensen (1983b) extend Fama and Jensen (1983a) by validating the effect 
of residual claims on agency problems. It is argued that as the managers are not the major 
residual claimants, they generally suffer little of the wealth effect resulting from their 
decisions, and therefore the control of firm management is critical to the firm. Even when 
holding substantial residual claims (i.e. considerable ownership of cash flow rights), 
                                                 
20 This includes proprietorships, partnerships and closed corporations. 
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managers have incentive to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of other 
stakeholders. Further, Fama and Jensen propose and discuss a number of special forms of 
residual claims that may act as effective devices in controlling agency problems.    
Jensen (1986) relates equity agency problems to the existence of excessive free 
cash flows at the discretion of firm management. It is argued that agency problems 
between managers and shareholders arise when a firm generates substantial free cash 
flows and there is insufficient monitoring in place. As Jensen notes, the problem is 
concerned with the way in which managers distribute excess cash, rather than wasting it in 
uneconomic projects. In particular, they commend the monitoring role of debt in 
controlling equity agency costs, particularly for firms with substantial free cash flows.  
Not only does debt reduce free cash flows at the discretion of managers, but also it exerts 
pressure on these managers to fulfill their promise to pay out future cash flows to the 
lenders in the form of interest and principal.  
Demsetz (1983) further discusses the agency problems that arise from the 
separation of ownership and control. He conjectures that agency problems exist in a 
modern firm with diffuse ownership when private consumption (or “shirking”) by firm 
management takes place.21 Based on the economic theory of a firm, he contends that such 
consumption may adversely affect either the level of profit maximisation or the level of 
efficiency of firm production. It is assumed that a decision by shareholders to broaden 
their ownership is made in awareness of its consequences for loosening control over firm 
management. This leads to his belief that ownership structure of a modern firm is “an 
endogenous outcome of a maximizing process in which more is at stake than just 
accommodating the shirking problem” (Demsetz 1983 p. 377). Essentially, ownership 
concentration and firm value should be unrelated. Finally, Demsetz identifies management 
                                                 
21 Holderness and Sheehan (1989) cite examples such as excessive compensation, consumption of 
perquisites, borrowing from the firm at below market interest rates or paying differential dividends.  
17 
shareholding, stock-based management income and the size of minority shareholdings as 
more important mechanisms in aligning the interests of management and shareholders.  
 
2.2.2 Empirical evidence 
2.2.2.1 Relation between corporate ownership and firm value 
As discussed above, agency theory predicts the existence of a relation between 
corporate ownership and equity agency costs. This prediction has spawned a growing 
number of empirical studies on corporate ownership and its relation to firm value.   
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide an early study using a sample of 511 US listed 
firms. In their analysis, they include three proxies of corporate ownership: the percentage 
of shares owned by top five shareholders, the percentage of shares owned by top twenty 
shareholders, and the Herfindahl index, and they also calculate accounting profit rates to 
capture firm performance. Their OLS regression results are consistent with their prediction 
of no significant relation between corporate ownership and firm performance.22 Further, 
the authors argue that corporate ownership is an equilibrium response to exogenous 
characteristics of the firm, specifically firm size, instability of firm returns, the extent of 
regulation, and level of utility. Finally, they conclude that “the structure of corporate 
ownership varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value maximization” 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985 p.1176). 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) re-examine the impact of corporate ownership on 
firms with majority shareholders. Unlike Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they choose to focus 
on majority shareholders, who own between 50.1% and 95% of the equity in the firm and 
who, it is argued, should accentuate the effect of concentrated ownership. Using a sample 
of 114 US listed firms over the period between 1978 and 1984, they document a number 
                                                 
22 Demsetz and Lehn also note that another possible cost associated with large shareholders is that these 
shareholders may have to forgo some risk-diversification gains due to their large exposure to the firm. 
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of findings. First, they document an abnormal return of 12% at time when majority blocks 
are sold, though they find little differences in firm expenditures, profitability and Tobin Q 
between firms with and without majority shareholders.23 Second, their results do not lend 
support to the claim that majority shareholders abuse their power by expropriating wealth 
from minority shareholders. Instead, they find that these shareholders not only monitor 
management teams, but also directly participate as part of them (i.e. executives or 
directors). Finally, they find that variations in their results are linked to the identity of 
majority shareholders i.e. whether they are individuals or corporations. 
The relation between corporate ownership and firm value is also studied through 
the effect of block trades or takeovers.24 For example, Holderness and Sheehan (1985) 
focus on the block trades during the period between 1977 and 1982 of six controversial 
investors who are often portrayed in the media as “corporate raiders”.  It is found that the 
stock market reacts favorably to initial block trades by these investors. This finding can be 
partly explained by the fact that large shareholders have the ability to challenge takeover 
bids made by outside raiders. In addition, they follow the corporate raider activities in the 
target firms for two years after the initial trades, and claim that these investors are capable 
of either disciplining the management or identifying under-priced stocks.   
Barclay and Holderness (1991) also use data on negotiated block trades to 
investigate whether large shareholder incentive and expertise affect firm value. It is argued 
that a block trade does not alter the level of corporate ownership, but does change the 
identity of large shareholders, who may now have different incentive and/or expertise in 
monitoring management. Their results suggest that firm value rises (i.e. increases in stock 
                                                 
23 Denis and Denis (1994) also find little evidence that majority-owned firms perform poorly in terms of 
accounting profit rates and Tobin’s Q. However, they note that majority ownership is still beneficial for 
some firms as it substitutes for other control/constraints on managerial behavior. 
24 Pound (1988) also reports evidence that in proxy contests, the probability that management will prevail 
increases in institutional ownership. Further, Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) find that the resistance to 
anti-takeover amendments by large institutional shareholders is greater when proposals reduce stockholders’ 
wealth. 
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prices) when block trades take place, and that this is more apparent when large 
shareholders who exhibit more managerial and monitoring skills. In addition, Shivdasani 
(1993) demonstrates that the presence of large shareholders, particularly with no ties to 
firm management, significantly increases the probability that a firm will be taken over. 
Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) furnish evidence of the effect of corporate 
ownership on firm value by examining the relation between large shareholder ownership 
and discounts on closed-end funds. Using a sample 138 closed-end funds for 1979, 1984, 
and  1989, they find that funds with large shareholders have a larger average discount 
(14.2%) compared to funds without large shareholders (4.1%), and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. They also report evidence of a significant and 
positive relation between the discount and both management ownership and large 
shareholder ownership. With further examination of press reports and corporate 
documents for all funds in their sample, they conclude that large shareholders are likely to 
enjoy a variety of private benefits (both pecuniary and non pecuniary benefits) from their 
control of closed-end funds. Thus, to preserve these benefits, they choose not to open the 
funds, and this partly explains the persistence of discounts for funds with large 
shareholders. 
Substantial ownership by management (or insiders) and its relation to firm value is 
also a focus in the ownership literature. At low levels of management ownership, firm 
resources are likely to be deployed to the benefit of managers rather than to the benefit of 
shareholders, resulting in a deviation from firm value-maximisation (Jensen and Meckling 
1976).25 According to the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, increases in management 
ownership may reduce this cost, and thus improve firm value. Further, Demsetz (1983) 
and Fama and Jensen (1983a) point out that managers holding a substantial portion of 
                                                 
25 Note that other mechanisms, such as market discipline, the managerial labour market, the product market, 
and the market for corporate control, may exert influence on managers to seek firm value maximisation 
(refer to Morck et al. 1988). 
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equity in the firm may have enough voting power to ensure that their position is secure. 
However, once their interests in the firm become large enough, managers may then 
become entrenched, 26 becoming insulated from external disciplining forces including 
takeovers and the managerial labour market.27 For example, Stulz (1988) demonstrate that 
not only managerial entrenchment that results from large managerial ownership precludes 
the possibility of a takeover, but it also diminishes the monitoring effectiveness of other 
(both internal and external) governance mechanisms.  
Morck et al. (1988) provide formal testing of the relation between management 
ownership and firm value. Using a sample of 371 firms from the Fortune 500 in 1980, they 
estimate a piecewise linear regression where the dependent variable is Tobin Q (i.e. firm 
value proxy) and the primary explanatory variable is management ownership. Their results 
indicate that Tobin Q first rises as management ownership increases from 0% to 5%. It 
then falls as management ownership increases to 25%, and finally rises again slightly as 
the ownership increases beyond 25%.28 They interpret these findings as being consistent 
with the convergence-of-interests hypothesis when management ownership increases 
within a low ownership range from 0% to 5%, and with the entrenchment hypothesis when 
the ownership increases beyond the 5% threshold. However, at larger levels of 
management ownership, interest alignment becomes once again important. Finally, they 
also find evidence that the presence of a founding member in the management team 
                                                 
26 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also develop a model whereby managers are able to entrench themselves by 
making manager-specific investment that increases their value to shareholders. A consequence is that 
managers not only can reduce the likelihood of them from being replaced, but they also can extract higher 
salaries and larger perquisites from the firm, as well as retain more discretion in determining corporate 
strategy. 
27 Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) provide evidence that the likelihood of top management turnover increases 
significantly in (poorly-performing) firms with low managerial ownership compared with those with higher 
managerial ownership. They conclude that larger management ownership may insulate them from internal 
monitoring. 
28 Note that these results change little when analysis is repeated with accounting profit as the proxy for firm 
value.  
21 
adversely affects Tobin Q, particularly in older firms where it is argued that the 
entrepreneurial talent of the founder might be less valuable. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) expand the work of Morck et al. (1988) by 
regressing Tobin Q on various measures of corporate ownership including management 
ownership and institutional ownership. Compared with Morck et al. (1988), they have a 
wider coverage of firms in their sample, 1,173 firms in 1976 and 1,093 in 1986. For both 
samples, their results are consistent with Morck et al. (1988) suggesting a curvilinear 
relation between management ownership and Tobin Q. Further, they also document 
evidence of a statistically positive link between Tobin Q and institutional ownership 
though they find no significant correlation between Tobin Q and large ownership.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) re-visit this relation with inclusion of the effect of 
board composition. It is argued that boards of directors, particularly outside directors, are 
forced to perform monitoring by either their legal obligations or their desire to maintain 
their reputation. Consequently, outside directors may substitute for corporate ownership in 
controlling agency problems that exist within the firm. Unlike previous studies, they 
estimate a piecewise regression in which ownership and board composition is 
endogenously determined using a panel data of 142 NYSE firms. Their results are 
generally consistent with those of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
though their results do not lend support to the proposed relation between board 
composition and firm value.  
 McConnell and Servaes (1995) expand the results of McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) by examining the links that exist between corporate ownership and debt and firm 
value. In contrast to previous studies, they conjecture that these links are subject to the 
level of firm growth opportunities. For example, increases in the level of debt may force 
managers in a high-growth firm to pass up positive NPV projects, and hence this impedes 
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future growth of the firm. It is also predicted that the link between Tobin Q and ownership 
is stronger for firms with relatively fewer growth opportunities, regardless of whether the 
equity stake is owned by management or large shareholders. Using a panel data of 1,943 
firms for three years 1976, 1986, and 1988, they regress Tobin Q against management 
ownership, large ownership and debt for high and low-growth firms. Their empirical 
results are generally consistent with their predictions. For high-growth (low-growth) firms, 
the relation between Tobin Q and debt is negative (positive). Consistent with previous 
studies, they also find evidence of a significant non-linear relation between Tobin Q and 
management ownership. There is also some evidence of a positive correlation between 
Tobin Q and large ownership. 
Mehran (1995) further analyses the effect of corporate ownership on both firm 
performance and executive compensation. Though shareholders do not directly set 
executive compensation, they elect directors whose duties under corporate law includes 
setting the level and structure of executive compensation. Using a sample of 153 
manufacturing firms, the author estimates two separate OLS regressions, one for the 
relationship between firm performance and ownership, and the other for the link between 
equity-based executive compensation and ownership. The results indicate that firm 
performance, that is proxied by both Tobin Q and return on assets, is positively related to 
the level of shareholding by the firm’s CEO.29 However, this relation seems to disappear 
in firms with shareholdings by outside directors. Consistent with McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), they observe no significant association between firm performance and large 
shareholding though there is evidence of a negative and statistically significant link 
between firm ownership and equity-based executive compensation.  
                                                 
29 Cole and Mehran (1998) also find that changes in firm performance are significantly linked to changes in 
managerial ownership. They claim that the larger the increase in managerial ownership, the greater the 
performance improvement. 
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One important assumption underlies many of the empirical studies discussed 
above, that equity ownership structure is exogenously determined. As Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) note, if ownership structure is, in fact endogenously determined, then OLS 
estimation will generate inconsistent parameter estimates,30 and incorrect observations 
pertaining to the relation between corporate ownership and firm value. Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999), explicitly recognize and attempt to address this limitation. 
Specifically, they argue that managerial compensation is endogenously determined in 
agency contracts which differ across firms in both observable and unobservable ways. 
Using panel data during the years 1982 and 1984, they find evidence to support their view 
that low managerial ownership, like managerial compensation, is endogenously affected 
by unobserved heterogeneity across firms. Further, there is little evidence of significant 
impact of managerial ownership on Tobin Q after controlling for endogeneity in 
ownership variables using an instrumental-variable approach.  
Loderer and Martin (1997), on the other hand, postulate that the relation between 
management ownership and firm value could go in either direction,31 giving rise to 
potential endogeneity in ownership. As a result, they choose to estimate simultaneous 
equations using two stage least squares (2STLS) to accommodate endogeneity in the 
ownership variables. In contrast to previous studies, they focus on a sample of 867 
acquisitions that took place during the period between 1987 and 1988, and in addition to 
Tobin Q, they also use abnormal returns as a proxy for firm performance, calculated at the 
time when the acquisition is announced. Their analysis reveals a positive, but “faint”, 
relation between management ownership and firm performance in terms of Tobin Q and 
                                                 
30 Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) observe large variations in coefficient estimates and t-statistics between 
OLS and instrumental-variable estimation as well as in their models when they are estimated using different 
sets of instrumental variables. They interpret the findings as that OLS estimates should not be dismissed, and 
that robustness tests are important when estimating an empirical model whose structure is not yet known.  
31 Evidence of the causality from firm performance to management ownership is also reported in Kole 
(1994). 
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abnormal returns from acquisitions. Yet, larger shareholding does not lead to better firm 
performance. Evidence also emerged to suggest that firms with better performance attract 
higher levels of managerial ownership.  
Cho (1998) also shares a similar view to that of Loderer and Martin (1997).  
Specifically, Cho hypothesizes that ownership structure determines firm value via its 
influence on firm investment, and in turn, firm value also affects ownership. Using a 
sample of 326 firms in 1991, they report piecewise OLS regression results consistent with 
Morck et al. (1988), suggesting a significant curvilinear relation between management 
ownership and firm investment. However, these results are no longer statistically 
significant when the analysis is repeated using a simultaneous equation estimation.32 
Instead, Cho finds that firm value positively affects management shareholdings via 
investment, but there is no evidence of a relationship in the reverse direction.  This 
suggests that firms induce their managers to increase their shareholdings at times when 
investment prospects are relatively high. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) shed further light on the ownership-performance 
relation assuming that corporate ownership is not only endogenously determined, but is 
also multi-dimensional.33 It should be noted that the latter assumption has been overlooked 
in previous studies in this area. For analysis, they focus on a subset of 223 firms randomly 
selected from the original sample used in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), which it is argued 
allows them to validate conflicting claims on the ownership-performance relation, reported 
in previous studies such as  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988). With their 
OLS estimation, they report that firm performance is negatively (positively) related to 
large shareholding (management shareholding), and these relations are statistically 
                                                 
32 However, Cui and Mak (2002) are able to confirm this curvilinear relation between managerial ownership 
and Tobin Q for firms with high R&D, even after controlling for endogeneity in the ownership variables.   
33 They also provide a brief discussion on a number of differences that are observed with the use of 
accounting profit rates as opposed to Tobin Q when used as the proxy for firm performance. 
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significant. However, they find these results insignificant when the analysis is repeated 
using 2STLS to control for endogeneity in the ownership variables. Further, they note that 
shareholders, particularly inside shareholders, choose not to hold large equity in the firm 
to avoid potential conflicts, whereas other stakeholders, particularly debtholders, are likely 
to increase their shareholdings to retain better control over the firm’s affairs.   
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) put a different spin on the relation between corporate 
ownership and firm value. Differing from previous studies, they argue that in addition to 
managerial ownership, several other alternative control mechanisms (both external and 
internal mechanisms) may also be at work. In particular, they examine seven control 
mechanisms together, and they include managerial ownership, block ownership, 
institutional ownership, board composition, debt financing, the external labor market for 
managers, and the market for corporate control. Using a sample of 400 large listed firms, 
they report evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in controlling agency 
problems.34 There is also evidence of significant influence of ownership structure on firm 
value though this influence becomes less important when controlling for endogeneity in 
ownership using 2STLS.35  
The study of corporate ownership and its relation with firm value has also been 
extended to firms located outside the US where firms face significantly different legal and 
economic circumstances. Generally speaking, evidence in this regard for non-US firms is 
ambiguous. Specifically, Craswell et al. (1997) attempt to test this relation for Australian 
listed firms. With a sample of 184 (187) firms for the year 1986 (1989), they report little 
evidence of the relationship between firm performance and institutional ownership. 
Further, they note that, though there is some evidence in support of a curvilinear 
                                                 
34 This interdependence is also confirmed in later studies such as Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998). 
35 Interestingly, across all specifications, they also observe a negative and statistically significant association 
between board independence and firm value.   
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relationship between management ownership and firm value, 36 this relation is noticeably 
unstable, especially for small firms. Similarly, for Japanese firms, Prowse (1992) fails to 
support a linear relationship between corporate ownership and accounting profit rates. 
Further, Mak and Li (2001) assume that firm ownership is not only endogenously 
determined, but is also jointly related to board structure. Using a sample of 259 
Singaporean listed firms, they estimate a system of equations adjusting for endogeneity in 
ownership variables, and they observe no significant relation between firm ownership and 
firm value as well as between board structure and firm value. 
Short and Keasey (1999), on the other hand, employ panel data analysis using 225 
UK firms over the period from 1988 to 1992. Extending the Morck et al. (1988) model, 
Short and Keasey report a statistically significant non-linear association between 
management ownership and firm performance though they admit that managers in UK 
firms tend to become entrenched at higher levels of ownership compared to their US 
counterparts. Further, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) estimate the agency costs of 
controlling minority shareholders in a panel data analysis of 309 Swedish firms during the 
period between 1991 and 1999. They find that both the return on assets and Tobin Q are 
significantly lower for firm where large voting ownership is held by controlling 
shareholders. Gorton and Schmid (1999) also demonstrate that Austrian banks with 
concentrated ownership tend to exhibit lower agency costs, as measured in terms of 
efficiency wages, and hence generate higher returns on assets. In addition, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) postulate that multiple large shareholders play an important role in 
corporate governance. Using a panel of 136 Finnish firms during the period between 1993 
and 2000, they observe that, though firm value is negatively related to large shareholding, 
this value is improved when there is a more equal distribution of voting rights among large 
                                                 
36 For Australian firms, Welch (2003) also reports limited evidence of a curvilinear relationship between 
management ownership and firm performance after adjusting for endogeneity in ownership variables. 
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shareholders. They also suggest that the identity of large shareholders is important in the 
relation that exists between firm value and large shareholder ownership. 
It is important to note that ownership structure differs among firms both within and 
across countries, and this consequently gives rise to another strand of cross-country studies 
dealing with the ownership-firm value relation. La Porta et al. (2002) focus on a sample of 
539 large firms drawn from 27 developed countries to shed light on this relation. In a 
simple OLS framework, they find that large shareholders with substantial cash-flow 
ownership positively improve the firm’s Tobin Q, and interestingly, this effect is stronger 
in countries where legal protection is weaker. This finding is in line with the incentive 
argument that Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest. They also report evidence that higher 
Tobin Q is significantly related to better legal protection, implying that the role of legal 
protection moderates potential expropriation of firm resources by management.  
Claessens et al. (2002) expand the results of La Porta et al. (2002) to firms in 
developing countries. Using a sample of 1,301 large firms drawn from 8 countries in the 
East Asian region, they estimate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the 
market-to-book ratio, and independent variables include the degree of the separation of 
ownership and control. They observe that firm value is increasing in the shareholding of 
the largest shareholder (i.e. the incentive effect), but decreasing in the separation of 
ownership and control (i.e. the entrenchment effect). In contrast to La Porta et al. (2002), 
they also argue that the effect of corporate ownership on firm value varies with the type of 
large shareholders. Specifically, they report some evidence of the incentive effect across 
all types of large shareholders, yet they are not able to confirm the entrenchment effect, 
particularly when the largest shareholder is a widely held corporation or a financial 
institution.   
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Lins (2003) also recognizes that large non-management shareholders may play an 
important role in corporate governance,37 which has been neglected in previous cross-
country studies. Estimating piecewise OLS regressions using a sample of 1,433 listed 
firms from 18 emerging countries, he reports evidence that Tobin Q is positively related to 
the shareholding of large non-management shareholders, and this relation is more 
pronounced in countries with weak legal shareholder protection. Finally, he suggests that 
large non-management shareholders may substitute for legal protection in controlling 
agency problems. Further, the author observes a significant curvilinear relation between 
managerial ownership and Tobin Q, consistent with La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens et 
al.(2002).  
Thomsen et al. (2006) provide a recent update on the relation between corporate 
ownership and firm value. They point out that, though the causal relation between 
ownership and firm value is long noted in the literature,38 it has not yet received 
appropriate attention, especially for firms outside the US and the UK. Using a sample of 
863 large firms from Continental Europe, the US, and the UK, they conduct a Granger 
causality test to assess the direction of the interaction that exists between corporate 
ownership and firm value (i.e. Tobin Q). The Granger test results indicate that for 
Continental European firms, an increase in the shareholding of large shareholders tends to 
precede a reduction in Tobin Q in the following period, but this is not true for the reverse 
direction.39 Yet, for both US and UK firms, this relation is insignificant in either direction. 
They also split the sample into two subsamples of low-and high-initial large shareholding 
in an attempt to test for non-linearity in the ownership-firm value relation. Their results 
show that though the relation between large shareholding and Tobin Q remains negative, it 
is statistically significant only for firms with high-initial large shareholding. Further, they 
                                                 
37 It is estimated that the shareholding of this group is, on average, about 20% of equity in the firm.  
38 Refer to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Zeckhauser and Pound (1990). 
39 Note that this result is sensitive to proxy choice for firm value. 
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find that this relation is not evident in either US or UK firms. For Continental European 
firms, these findings suggest that when large shareholders reduce their shareholding in the 
firm, the market tends to react favorably, which they argue high levels of private benefits 
for large shareholders exist in these firms. 
 
2.2.2.2 Relation between corporate ownership and firm efficiency. 
As discussed in Section 2.2.2.1, there is evidence of a relation between corporate 
ownership and firm value although the extent of this relation remains an empirical 
question. Equity agency costs are critical to our understanding of this relation, yet the 
magnitude of equity agency costs is not easily quantified. Some empirical studies have 
recently focused on the impact of firm ownership on how efficiently a firm manages its 
assets and/or discretionary expenses.  
Ang et al. (2000) propose a new approach to estimate the magnitude of equity 
agency costs, to better understand the ownership-agency cost relation. Based on Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), they distinguish two groups of firms, firms with zero agency-costs 
where the manager is the sole shareholder, and firms with non-zero agency costs where the 
management own less than 100% of the equity in the firm. Viewing the former group of 
firms as the reference point (or a base case), they argue that the deviation from the base 
case group implies the magnitude of agency costs that a firm incurs. They apply this rule 
for two measures of management efficiency. The first measure is the difference in 
discretionary expenses between the two groups of firms, which it is argued reflects the 
level of efficiency in controlling excessive expenses that might be directed to private 
consumption by firm management. The second measure is the difference in the ratio of 
sales to assets between the two groups, which implies the level of efficiency in the use of 
firm assets in generating sales revenue.   
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 Ang et al. then test a number of ownership-agency cost hypotheses based on 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) using a sample of 1,708 small, unlisted US firms for the year 
1992. Their analysis generally supports these hypotheses. For example, their univariate 
analysis is consistent with the hypothesis that the agency costs are higher for firms whose 
manager is not the sole shareholder. They also examine the determinants of agency costs 
in a multivariate regression framework. Based on the results from this analysis, they 
conclude that agency costs vary negatively (positively) with the level of management 
ownership (the number of non-manager shareholders). Finally, they also find evidence of a 
positive influence that banks exert on firm management.  
 Singh and Davidson (2003) extend the work of Ang et al. (2000) to a sample of 
234 large US listed firms for two years, 1992 and 1994. Unlike Ang et al. (2000), they 
consider other internal governance mechanisms as substitutes for management ownership 
in controlling agency costs, including the shareholding of outside shareholders as well as 
variables concerned with the boards of directors. In their analysis, to measure the 
magnitude of agency costs, they calculate the ratio of annual sales to total assets (or asset 
utilization), and the ratio of a firm’s selling, general, and administrative expenses to 
annual sales. Their results show that firms with high levels of management ownership are 
associated with low levels of agency costs, consistent with the alignment of shareholder 
and management interest argument. This result remains robust in a multivariate regression 
framework controlling for the effect of other governance mechanisms and firm-specific 
attributes.40  
Their analysis does not support the agency view that agency costs are related to 
large shareholding.41 However, when including the board of directors as an additional 
                                                 
40 Not only is this effect statistically significant, but it also has economic significance. In particular, for every 
1% increase in the level of management ownership, there will be an increase, around US$0.67m, in sales for 
the average firm. 
41 It is found that the coefficient for large shareholding is not statistically significant across all specifications.  
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monitoring mechanism, they find some evidence of a significant correlation between the 
board of directors and agency costs. For example, firms with larger boards tend to exhibit 
greater levels of agency costs (i.e. lower asset utilization). Further, they demonstrate that 
agency costs are significantly linked to firm characteristics, particularly firm size.  
 Fleming et al. (2005) re-visit the relation between corporate ownership and the 
magnitude of agency costs in the context of Australian small to medium size firms. While 
replicating Ang et al. (2000), they extend this work by including a broad set of shareholder 
variables (e.g. whether or not large shareholders are a family, firm manager or parent firm) 
which it is argued may capture differing incentive and/or ability of large shareholders in 
controlling agency costs. Following Ang et al. (2000), they adopt two ratios, the ratio of 
discretionary operating expenses to sales, and the ratio of annual sales to total assets, to 
proxy for agency costs that exist within a firm. They observe that the magnitude of agency 
costs varies significantly with ownership structure. Firms with higher levels of 
shareholding by management or family exhibit lower levels of agency costs (i.e. higher 
levels of asset utilization and lower levels of discretionary expenses).  
 Fleming et al. also examine the influence of ownership variables on the magnitude 
of agency costs in a multivariate regression setting. Their analysis generally supports the 
managerial alignment argument. Specifically, increases in the level of management 
ownership lead to lower likelihood of firm management allocating firm resources to non-
value maximizing activities, and thereby reducing levels of agency costs. Such findings, 
though they are based on Australian firms, are consistent with those of Ang et al (2000) 
for US firms.42 Their analysis also shows that, though agency costs decrease at high levels 
of large shareholding, these costs rise as the shareholding by parent firms increases. 
                                                 
42 They also note that this finding partly reflects the Fama and Jensen (1983a) conjecture that small firms  
may control equity agency problems more efficiently by enlisting their owners as the firm’s managers. 
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Finally, they note that the effect of corporate ownership on agency costs appears to be 
stable over time as there is little difference between their results for 1996 and 1997. 
Florackis and Ozkan (2005) extend the empirical literature on the magnitude of 
agency costs using a large sample of UK listed firms. In their examination, not only do 
they focus on the monitoring role of management ownership, but also include potential 
effects of managerial compensation, boards of directors and debt structure in controlling 
the level of agency costs that exist within a firm. Unlike previous studies, they also 
recognize the importance of the level of growth opportunities on the interaction between 
various corporate controlling mechanisms and agency costs. For analysis, they also adopt 
the two proxies for agency costs used in Singh and Davidson (2003), the ratio of sales to 
total assets and the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to annual sales.  
Their univariate analysis results are generally consistent with previous studies, 
suggesting that firm ownership, together with other governance mechanisms, help to 
mitigate agency costs. They also validate these findings in a multivariate regression 
framework controlling for firm-specific attributes. Specifically, they find that management 
shareholding leads to lower levels of agency costs, and this effect is stronger, particularly 
for the shareholding by executive directors. They also observe that ownership 
concentration, higher levels of executive compensations and/or short-term debt can exert 
significant influence on agency costs. Finally, they also note that high-growth firms are 
likely to face more serious equity agency problems, and that the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms in dealing with these problems depends on the level of growth 
opportunities. 
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2.3 Corporate Ownership and Dividend Policy  
2.3.1 Agency theories of dividend policy 
Dividend policy remains one of the more topical debates among financial 
economists. Miller and Modigliani (1961) claim that investors are indifferent to whether or 
not they receive dividends because they could create their own dividend stream by selling 
shares or borrowing against their share portfolios. Further, there are “transaction costs” 
that firms incur in maintaining an optimal tradeoff between dividend policy and 
investment policy (Easterbrook 1984). It should also be noted that dividends are taxable 
for many investors. Thus firms could choose to reduce shareholder taxes by holding and 
re-investing their profits rather than paying them out as dividends. However, as Black 
(1976) notes, the existence of dividends, despite their costs (the “dividend puzzle”), has 
given rise to several dividend policy theories.43   
 
2.3.1.1 Agency problems of free cash flows 
As discussed above, equity agency problems arise largely from ownership 
dispersion. When ownership is dispersed, the owners are separated from control of the 
firm and so the interests of different groups (i.e. managers, shareholders, debt holders) 
within the firm may conflict. One important conflict of interest may arise when firm 
management makes dividend decisions. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) note, firm 
managers may be reluctant to pay dividends as they prefer to divert firm resources to 
activities that benefit them (e.g. perquisite consumption), rather than use the resources for 
the shareholders’ benefit. Further, Jensen (1986) points out that leaving excess cash under 
the control of firm management may increase the likelihood that the firm undertakes 
negative NPV projects (“overinvestment”). Therefore, paying out dividends helps not only 
                                                 
43 Note that this thesis only focuses on agency theories of dividend policy. For a recent review of other 
theories on dividend policy, refer to Allen and Michaely (2002). 
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to reduce the free cash flow problem, which might otherwise have been wasted in non-
value maximising projects (“agency costs of free cash flow”), but also to discipline 
managers to return cash to shareholders.  
Rozeff (1982) also argues that dividends may provide a partial remedy for agency 
problems that exist between managers and shareholders. It is assumed that dividend 
payments force firms to raise external capital to finance existing or future investment, and 
that this type of finance is costly. Rozeff suggests that increased dividends lower agency 
costs, but increase the costs of external financing, and hence the dividend payout is 
optimal when the sum of these two costs is minimized. In other words, shareholders may 
demand dividends to minimize the agency costs as part of an optimal 
“monitoring/bonding” package which acts to reduce agency costs.  
Easterbrook (1984) provides another explanation for the payment of dividends 
based on two sources of agency costs. The first agency cost source is similar to that of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and this includes monitoring and bonding costs. The second 
agency cost may arise when shareholders and managers have different risk preferences. 
Risk-averse managers, who hold undiversified wealth in the firm, may take lower levels of 
risk than that demanded by shareholders who wish to enhance their returns as well as to 
prevent their wealth from being transferred to debtholders. The author also argues that 
dividends may mitigate both these costs by facilitating primary capital market monitoring 
of firm management. Unlike Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook also notes that even if dividends 
are not accompanied by the raising of external financing, the payment of dividends helps 
to adjust for differing levels of risk that exist between managers and shareholders.  
Recent theoretical studies, however, have tended to assume that cash flows are not 
verifiable, and that managerial manipulation (or diversion of cash flows), as private 
benefits, is costly. For example, Fluck (1998) contends that debt financing and outside 
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equity financing may alleviate such problems because “investors hold outside equity only 
if they are confident that their cash flow claim will be honored in the future” (Fluck 1998 
p.390). The author argues that debt financing may moderate the verification problem by 
imposing fixed payments and by giving control rights that are contingent on failure to 
make these payments timely. Yet, outside equity financing avoids this problem by giving 
shareholders unconditional control rights, one of which is the right to dismiss firm 
management if they underperform. Further, Fluck demonstrates that firm management 
chooses to pay dividends in order to avoid the potential threat of dismissal by 
shareholders, with a particular focus on the potential link between outside ownership and 
dividend payout. The author also notes that outside equity potentially helps to identify 
positive NPV projects.  
Myers (2000) not only focuses on the effect of outside equity in dealing with the 
existence of non-verification of cash flows problems, but also is interested in 
understanding the decision of a firm to go public.44 Myers assumes that dividends are paid 
for two reasons, (i) to maintain the interest (or the commitment) of outside shareholders in 
the firm until the following investment period, and (ii) to induce these shareholders to 
cooperate with firm management to avoid potential costs (“costs of collective actions”). 
Essentially, outside equity only works in alleviating non-verification problems if sufficient 
dividends are paid.  
 
2.3.1.2 Agency problems of asymmetric information (or “signaling”) 
 Dividends may convey information about the firm’s prospects, not previously 
known to the market, or dividends may be used as costly signals to moderate market 
perceptions concerning the prospect of future earnings (Bhattacharya 1979). Essentially, 
                                                 
44 The latter objective is an extension of the work of Fluck (1998). 
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larger-than-expected dividends imply higher future earnings generated from the firm’s 
investment. Since the market knows little about the current level of earnings, dividends 
may serve as credible signals, and hence are linked to positive stock price reactions (Allen 
and Michaely 2002). This partly explains why firms still pay out a large proportion of their 
earnings as dividends despite the fact that share repurchases have become a popular form 
of payout, especially after the mid-1990s (Fama and French 2001). 
John and Williams (1985) develop a theoretical model in which taxable dividends 
constitute a source of information that is related to the firm’s future earnings, but is not 
conveyed by corporate audits.45 In an asymmetric information environment, they argue 
that there is a signaling equilibrium that is associated with the payment of dividends in 
spite of potential costs such as transaction costs and taxes. They argue that in the 
equilibrium, it is optimal for corporate insiders with more favorable private information to 
pay more dividends as they could receive higher prices for their stocks from outside 
shareholders who do not have access to such information.46 Further, they note that some 
firms pay dividends while others do not, depending on the marginal benefits that insiders 
receive from distributing firm profits as dividends. 
Miller and Rock (1985) present a model in which dividend and investment policies 
jointly affect the level of informational asymmetry that exists within the firm. Like John 
and Williams (1985), they argue that dividend payments represent good signals. As noted, 
“in a world of rational expectations, the firm’s dividend (or financing) announcements 
provide just enough pieces of the firm’s sources and statements for the market to deduce 
the unobserved piece, to wit, the firm’s current earnings” (Miller and Rock 1985 p.1031). 
However, the signals perceivably become negative (or “bad”) in situations where the 
                                                 
45 Hakansson (1982) also presents a model examining the information content of dividends as an explanation 
for the prevalence and persistence of dividends.  
46 This is also true where multiple signals of dissipative dividends and investment in real and financial assets 
are included (Williams 1988). 
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market learns that the firm has tried to cheat by cutting back on investment for the 
payment of dividends (“underinvestment” problems). Further, they demonstrate that the 
lower the level of equity held by insiders, the higher the dividend payout, and the lower 
the level of investment.     
 Ofer and Thakor (1987) develop a model in which firms can signal unobserved 
firm value either via dividends or via share repurchases or via both. Unlike previous 
studies, they argue that using dividends or share repurchases as signals is costly as both 
methods are associated with deadweight losses that result from raising new external 
capital to finance future investment. They also admit that though dividends and share 
repurchases convey information about the firm, neither dominates the other under all 
circumstances.  
The theoretical studies, as discussed above, are based on either agency problems of 
free cash flows or agency problems of informational asymmetry. It, however, appears that 
these studies have rarely paid attention to the competing effects that both these agency 
problems may have on firm dividend policy. Unlike previous studies, Noe and Rebello 
(1996) propose a payout model to explain why firms pay dividends given the existence of 
these two agency problems. Initially their model assumes that in the absence of 
informational asymmetries, the firm’s payout policy is an outcome of the monitoring 
ability of large shareholders who try to minimize their losses associated with the rent-
extraction activities of firm management. Increases in dividend payouts may consequently 
curb such rent-extraction activities. However, Noe and Rebello observe changes in the 
dividend payout when relaxing the assumption of informational asymmetries between the 
firm and capital markets. Their analysis, where both agency problems and informational 
asymmetries are present, shows that firms may be forced not only to lower dividend 
payout in order to constrain managerial opportunism, but also to reduce the costs 
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associated with raising external financing. Finally, they claim that dividend policy differs 
between shareholder-controlled firms and manager-controlled firms. Regardless, they note 
that higher dividends still convey more favorable information.   
Allen et al. (2000) introduce another perspective into why firms pay dividends. 
They note a number of distinguishing characteristics of institutions as large shareholders, 
and the impact that these institutional shareholders have on dividends. Not only are 
institutions better informed, but also they have the ability to oversee the firm’s affairs, 
ensuring that the value of the firm is least affected by agency problems. Recognising these 
abilities of large institutional shareholders, they then develop a model showing that firms 
alter their dividend policy in order to attract relatively more holdings by institutional 
shareholders which can exploit their tax advantages of dividends. In their model, it is 
hypothesized that the presence of large institutional shareholders enhances the quality of 
signals that dividend payments convey about firm value, for two reasons. First, if low-
quality firms choose to use dividends to imitate signals of high-quality firms, they may 
find this strategy costly as institutional shareholders have the ability to verify these 
signals. Second, institutional shareholders provide a direct monitoring discipline over firm 
management, ensuring that the firm is well run. If firm management underperforms (i.e. 
cutback in dividends), then institutional shareholders may facilitate takeover activity by 
liquidating their block of shares. Thus, the presence of large institutional shareholders can 
add value to the firm.  
 
2.3.2 Substitution between corporate ownership and dividend policy 
As discussed above, agency theories suggest that dividend policy not only assists 
shareholders in monitoring managers, but also conveys information about firm value to 
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shareholders (“signaling”).47 It is also important to note that large shareholding may 
reduce informational asymmetries, which lowers agency costs that exist within the firm 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). The theoretical notion underlying many empirical studies in 
this area is that corporate ownership and dividend policy are substitute monitoring devices 
that firms use to reduce agency costs. 
Rozeff (1982) postulates that dividend policy should be optimally determined by 
the trade-off between equity agency costs and transaction costs. Using a large sample of 
1,000 listed US firms over the period between 1974 and 1980, he suggests that dividend 
payout ratios are not randomly distributed among firms. Rozeff also observes a negative 
and statistically significant relation between investment and dividend policy, i.e. firms 
with larger investments have lower dividend payout. Further, the author reports evidence 
of a strong relationship between dividend payout and a set of variables proxying for 
agency and transaction costs. For example, dividends increase in situations where firms 
face high levels of agency costs that result from high inside ownership or widely-dispersed 
ownership. Finally, the author notes that dividends may substitute for ownership in 
mitigating agency problems.  
Several other studies have reported evidence consistent with Rozeff (1982). For 
example, a cross-sectional analysis of dividend policy by Crutchley and Hansen (1989) 
shows their results consistent not only with dividend policy acting as a monitoring 
mechanism, but also with substitution effects between dividend payments and other 
control mechanisms, particularly management ownership and leverage. Later, Eckbo and 
Verma (1994) and Correia Da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) also suggest that 
where large shareholders can exert control over firm management, the dividend policy 
becomes less important as an additional monitoring device. Further, employing more 
                                                 
47 For stylized facts regarding payout policy, refer to Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Allen and Michaely 
(2002). 
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advanced econometric techniques, Jensen et al. (1992) confirm the monitoring role of 
dividends for US firms, and this role is little affected in the presence of other control 
mechanisms, particularly capital structure. Following Jensen et al. (1992), Farinha (2003) 
reports similar evidence for UK firms, suggesting that dividends and insider ownership are 
substitute monitoring devices. Yet, Farinha discovers that as the level of inside ownership 
continues to increase beyond a certain threshold, the entrenchment-related agency problem 
arises, and thus, there is the need for larger dividend payout.  
There is limited empirical evidence concerning whether corporate ownership and 
dividends are substitute signaling devices. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) hypothesize that 
the presence of large shareholders may result in less need for dividends as a substitute 
signal about firm value. They argue that large shareholders not only have incentive to 
devote resources to gathering information, but are also privy to corporate information 
which other shareholders do not have access to. In testing their hypothesis, they compute 
differences in dividend payout between firms with and without the presence of large 
shareholders. Though dividend payout is higher for firms with large shareholders, the 
differences are not statistically significant.   
John and Lang (1991) also test for signaling substitution between ownership and 
dividends by examining the informational role of insider trading around dividend 
announcements. Unlike previous studies, they argue that “in the efficient signaling 
equilibrium, the choice of signals (either one or the other exclusively or an optimal mix of 
the two signals) minimizes signaling costs” (John and Lang 1991 p.1362). Based on Miller 
and Rock (1985), they also demonstrate that the optimal choice of signals involves a blend 
of the two signals, insider trading and dividends. Using a sample of 265 US firms over the 
period between 1975 and 1985, they report evidence that insider trading and dividend 
changes are complementary signals, contrary to the signaling substitution argument. They 
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interpret this finding in terms of the market using insider trading information to learn 
about the information content of dividends. 
Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995) test the validity of the findings of both Rozeff 
(1982) and Easterbrook (1984) in an attempt to better understand the relation between 
large shareholding and dividend policy. As noted in Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook 
(1984), as firms adjust dividend payout toward an optimal level, transaction costs and 
agency costs are incurred.  Essentially, the optimal level of dividend payout is obtained 
when the transaction costs and agency costs are minimized. They put forward an empirical 
model which reflects a tradeoff between the two costs when the firm determines dividend 
payout. Using a sample of 341 US listed firms over the period between 1972 and 1989, 
they find that firms, with low management ownership or low ownership concentration, 
tend to have higher dividend payout. Yet, as institutional shareholdings increase, firms are 
likely to pay more dividends. These results not only hold across firms as well as within 
firms over time, but also are consistent with the view of the traditional agency theory.48 
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) have recently documented a number 
of important responses with respect to the determinants of dividend payout from their 
surveys and interviews of 384 financial executives. First, it is noted that maintaining 
dividend levels is as an important priority as other investment decisions. Managers are 
hesitant to cut dividends in order to avoid consequent resentment, particularly from large 
shareholders. Second, most executives involved in their survey do not view dividend 
payout as a substitute monitoring device, contrary to the view of the traditional agency 
theory.49 Third, though dividends convey valuable information about the firm, they are not 
used as a signal to separate a firm from its competitors. Fourth, institutions are not 
attracted to high dividend-paying stocks, and as a result, managers tend to use dividends to 
                                                 
48 According to the traditional agency theory, dividend policy is a function of ownership structure.  
49 They also note that these executives might not admit that they are monitored and forced to pay out 
dividends.  
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attract individual investors in spite of their tax disadvantage. Finally, they conclude that 
there is little evidence to support the role of both agency and signaling considerations in 
the decision to pay dividends, at least from the perspective of the firm managers included 
in their survey.50  
 
2.3.3 Relation between large shareholders and dividend policy  
As discussed in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, dividend policy is linked to agency 
problems that result from the separation of ownership and control. Among shareholders, 
large shareholders with greater vested interest in the firm play an important role in 
moderating agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). It is clear that large shareholders 
not only have incentive to devote their resources to monitoring firm management, but also 
they have greater ability to gather information about the firm. However, large shareholders 
also create their own agency problems. Thus, a number of empirical studies have shown 
some interests in the relation between large shareholders and dividend policy. 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) are among early studies on this issue. Computing 
dividend payout for US firms, they do not find significant differences in the payout 
between firms with and without large shareholders. Consequently, they conclude that 
ownership concentration and payout policy should not be considered as alternative forms 
of monitoring. Unlike Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Jensen et al. (1992) argue that firm 
ownership and dividends are endogenous to firm-specific attributes. With the use of a 
system of equations based model and a sample of 565 US firms over two years 1982 and 
1987, they report evidence of a significant and  negative effect of inside ownership on 
dividend payout. They also note that the benefits of dividend payments in reducing agency 
costs are relatively smaller for firms with higher levels of inside ownership. 
                                                 
50 They also find evidence that the link between dividends and earnings that Litner (1956) observed has 
weakened and that tax considerations play a secondary role. 
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Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera and Raymond (1999) take a different approach in 
examining the relation between large shareholding and dividend policy. Unlike previous 
studies, they argue that agency costs are minimized when financial decisions (i.e. dividend 
policy) and ownership structure are jointly determined. Following Jensen et al. (1992), 
they develop an empirical model which allows for simultaneity of dividend payout, 
leverage, inside ownership and institutional ownership in controlling agency problems. 
Using a sample of 812 industrial US listed firms for two years 1987 and 1993, they 
suggest that institutional ownership is a substitute for dividends as a monitoring device. 
Further, they observe a statistically significant U-shaped relation between inside 
ownership and dividend payout. 
Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) analyze the role of institutional ownership in 
relation to dividend payout within the context of well-established dividend models such as 
Lintner (1956), Waud (1966) and Fama and Babiak (1968). Using UK panel data for the 
period between 1988 and 1992, they find a positive relation between institutional 
ownership and dividend payout across all these dividends models. They also observe that 
this relation is stronger when firms have high levels of earnings. Finally, they also 
examine the impact of management ownership on dividend payout, and consistent with 
previous studies, their results suggest that management ownership significantly reduces 
the dividend payout. 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) also conduct an investigation into the monitoring 
role of institutional shareholders on payout policy. Unlike previous studies, they examine 
both the effect of institutional shareholdings on different forms of payout as well as the 
effect of these forms of payout on institutional shareholdings. Using annual payout and 
institutional holdings data in the period between 1980 and 1996, they document a number 
of findings regarding the effect of institutional investors on firm payout policy. First, 
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suggest that institutions are likely to invest in dividend-paying firms as they observe a 
relatively higher level of institutional holdings with dividend-paying firms. Second, using 
a vector autoregression specification, they find little evidence to support the notion either 
that higher dividends motivate higher levels of institutional ownership or that higher levels 
of institutional holdings lead to increases in dividend payout. In contrast, there is evidence 
of a positive and significant relation between institutional holdings and share repurchases. 
Khan (2006) further investigates the impact of corporate ownership on dividend 
policy with an emphasis on the monitoring role of financial institutions. It is noted that 
many previous studies, particularly for UK firms, focus on shareholdings above 5% of 
equity in the firm, when examining the effect of corporate ownership.51 Yet, in his study, 
Khan has a wider coverage of firms whose registered shareholding is above 0.25% of total 
equity. He notes that the majority of shareholdings in the hands of financial institutions, 
particularly for UK firms, tend to be smaller than 3%. Using a sample of 330 UK listed 
firms over the period between 1985 and 1997, he observes that there is a negative and non-
linear relation between the shareholdings of the top 5 largest shareholders and dividend 
payout.52 Further, there is evidence of a positive (negative) relation between dividends and 
shareholdings by insurance companies (individuals). This implies that shareholders are 
using dividend policy either as a substitute for management discipline, or to expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders or to cater for their individual tax preferences. 
Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2006) provide another approach in investigating 
the relation between large shareholding and dividend payout by testing the effect of 
common share block trades on dividend payout. They first hypothesize that large corporate 
shareholders prefer cash dividends to retained earnings to a greater extent than other types 
                                                 
51 It is important to note that in many countries, by law, firms are not required to report investors whose 
shareholding is below 5% of total equity.  
52 This result is robust to the use of the shareholding of the largest one, three or ten shareholders as the proxy 
for ownership concentration. 
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of large shareholders, including individual shareholders. To test this hypothesis, they 
employ two sets of block-trade data. The first set of data includes all block trades in which 
the sellers are individuals and the buyers are corporations over the period between 1978 
and 1997, while the second set covers a sample of 317 US listed firms randomly selected 
for the year 1995. Comparing dividend payout before and after block trades, they find 
little, or no, increase in dividend payout after these trades take place. Further, their 
regression analysis suggests that the presence of large shareholders, particularly when they 
are a corporation, does not lead to increases in dividend payout. Overall, they reject the 
hypothesis that large corporate shareholders are inclined to invest in high dividend-paying 
stocks and may force firm management to disgorge dividends.   
It has been argued that dividend payout is linked to legal protection of firm 
stakeholders, i.e. this link is a function of both the existence of the law and the quality and 
the enforcement of the law.  Legal protection gives shareholders certain powers to protect 
their wealth against non-value maximizing investment choices and/or expropriation by 
firm management. Essentially, legal protection can provide an effective remedy to agency 
problems, and hence may affect the way in which firms pay dividends.  
La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000b) are the first to conduct a 
cross-country study on the effect of legal protection on the firm’s dividend policy. In 
examining this effect, they develop two testable agency models of dividends. The first 
model (“outcome model”) assumes that dividend payout is an outcome of an effective 
system of legal protection of shareholders. Dividends are paid because minority 
shareholders can effectively exert their legal power to extract cash from the firm. The 
second model (“substitute model”) views dividends and legal protection as substitute 
monitoring mechanisms. This view is based on the need of the firm to raise external 
capital to finance its existing or future investments. A good reputation for decent treatment 
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of minority shareholders may not only facilitate external capital raising, but also make it 
less costly, especially for firms which operate in countries with weak legal protection. 
Contrary to the first model, the second model predicts that dividends should be higher in 
countries with weak legal protection of shareholders.  
Using a sample of 4,103 dividend-paying listed firms drawn from 33 countries, La 
Porta et al. show that there is considerable variation in dividend payout between high and 
low legal protection regimes (common vs. civil law systems). Their analysis generally 
provides support for the outcome agency model of dividends. Finally, they also suggest 
that the firm’s growth prospects significantly strengthen the relation between dividends 
and legal protection.53 This means that in strong protection countries, (minority) 
shareholders are likely to use their powers to extract more cash as dividends, especially 
when the prospect of future growth is low. 
Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) extend the work of La Porta et al. (2000b) by 
relating dividend payouts to controlling shareholders. As La Porta et al. (2000b) suggest, 
dividends are important in limiting either non-value maximizing investment choices or 
expropriation by firm management or both. While La Porta et al. (2000b) argue that such 
expropriation is subject to how effective legal protection is, Faccio et al. contend that it is 
dependent on how controlling shareholders control the firm via a chain of intermediate 
firms. In other words, if a firm is tightly controlled, then outside shareholders may be alert 
to the possibility of expropriation, and hence the firm may be forced to increase dividends.  
Faccio et al. focus on listed firm ownership structure in two regions (Western 
Europe and East Asia) and report a number of differences that exist between the two 
regions. Specifically, Western Europe has a markedly smaller proportion of firms 
controlled by pyramids or cross-holdings, and controlling shareholders in European firms 
                                                 
53 It is noted that their analysis provides little evidence on the effect of taxes on dividend policy.  
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are less likely to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders compared to those in 
Asian firms. They report evidence that tightly controlled European firms pay more 
dividends than those in East Asia. Further, they claim that firms with multiple controlling 
shareholders increase dividends in Europe, but decrease them in Asia. They also note that 
additional monitoring introduced by other controlling shareholders could help to curb 
expropriation of minority shareholder wealth, but it is also possible that these shareholders 
may collude with the largest shareholder to achieve expropriation of minority shareholder 
wealth. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) point out that many firms, particularly those located 
outside the US and the UK, are owned by a single large shareholder or a group of large 
shareholders. This motivated them to focus on the role that the largest shareholders might 
play in a dividend payout setting. Unlike previous studies, they argue that dividend payout 
may signal the severity of conflicts that exist between the large, controlling owner and 
small, outside shareholders. They examine a sample of 266 German firms, and find that 
while increasing the control exercised by the largest shareholder reduces dividend payout, 
increasing the control exercised by the second largest shareholder boosts the payout. They 
also note that the effects are not linear. Further, in an analysis of 736 dividend change 
announcements over the period between 1992 and 1998, they find that the market reacts 
negatively when agency conflicts are likely to exist within the firm. 
Gugler (2003) extends the work of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), testing for the 
effects of different types of largest shareholder, i.e. whether the largest shareholder is a 
family, a bank or a foreign firm or a state, on the firm’s payout policy. Unlike Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003), they examine dividend policy in relation with two key decisions, 
investment and research and development, using a system of simultaneous equations. 
Their analysis is based on a panel data consisting of 214 non-financial Austrian firms over 
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the period between 1991 and 1999. They report evidence that firms with a family as the 
largest shareholder do not “smooth” dividends, and are less reluctant to cut dividends, and 
they are also associated with lower dividend payouts. The reverse is true for firms where 
the largest shareholder is the state. It is also found that dividend smoothing is marginally 
important only when the largest shareholder is either a bank or a foreign firm. Finally, they 
report a negative and statistically significant relation between dividends and the level of 
investment expenditures and R&D expenditures that the firm makes. This re-enforces the 
traditional agency view that firms that do not have good investment prospects optimally 
pay out dividends.  
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) also analyse a large panel of UK firms to test 
the impact of the voting power of largest shareholder on the firm’s payout policy. They 
argue that controlling large shareholders are willing to trade off agency costs of free cash 
flows against the risk of underinvestment, and hence they will enforce payout policy that 
optimally balances these two costs. Their analysis shows that the presence of large 
shareholders significantly weakens the positive link between dividend payout and firm 
profitability. Further, there is also evidence of a negative and statistically significant 
relation between the voting power of large shareholders and payout ratios across different 
types of large shareholders. Finally, they repeat their analysis with a particular focus on 
the largest and second largest shareholder, and they find little change in their results. 
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter provides a review of both theoretical and empirical studies that deal 
with the impact of corporate ownership, with particular attention directed to equity agency 
costs and dividend policy. There are two major themes that emerge from the existing 
literature.  
First, there are theoretical explanations for the agency problems (i.e. conflicts of 
interest among various stakeholders) that result from the separation of ownership and 
control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). One common view that emerges from these studies is 
that ownership concentration and managerial ownership provide a partial remedy to 
agency problems. In other words, the more concentrated the ownership and/or the higher 
shareholding of firm management, the lower equity agency costs. This interpretation gives 
rise to two strands of empirical studies.  
The first strand of empirical studies models agency problems in relation to the 
value of the firm. Yet, empirical evidence is mixed at best, and it is rather sensitive to 
sample used and estimation technique (Thomsen et al. 2006). The second strand includes a 
limited number of recent empirical studies that have attempted to measure the magnitude 
of agency costs. It is argued that equity agency costs are partly reflected in the level of 
efficiency with which managers use the firm’s assets and/or control its expenses. 
Empirical evidence that has emerged from these studies tends to support the existence of 
costly equity agency conflicts that arise from the separation of ownership and control.  
Second, agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership and control also 
affects the way that a firm distributes its profits to shareholders, particularly in the form of 
dividend payout. Essentially, a firm uses dividend payout to substitute for monitoring, and 
both the incentive for and the effectiveness of this policy decision are linked to the 
separation of ownership and control. Further, agency theorists argue that there is an 
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interaction between large shareholders and dividend policy, based upon agency cost and 
signalling arguments. Empirical evidence generally supports the existence of this 
ownership-dividend relation.     
Finally, it is important to note that the majority of these studies have not paid much 
attention to the role of large shareholders, particularly the largest shareholders, in 
controlling agency costs. Largest shareholders are particularly singled out in this thesis, 
because they can, to some degree, insulate themselves from many of the well known 
monitoring mechanisms through their control of voting rights (with or without 
proportionate cash-flow rights) (Claessens et al. 2002). The impact of the largest 
shareholder should be taken into consideration alongside the notion that firms are likely to 
adopt a mixture of governance mechanisms in dealing with their agency problems 
(Holderness 2003). 
51 
 
CHAPTER 3: 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY AGENCY COSTS:  
AN AUSTRALIAN STUDY 54  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
There are four studies that have attempted to estimate the cost of equity agency 
conflicts in recent years. The first by Ang et al. (2000) measures equity agency costs for 
small to medium US firms, and this analysis is replicated for small to medium Australian 
firms by Fleming et al. (2005). The analysis of the impact of agency relationships on 
larger firms has been dealt with by Singh and Davidson (2003) for large US listed firms 
and by Florackis and Ozkan (2005) for large UK firms, and this chapter adds to this 
literature with an analysis of large Australian firms. Given the institutional and market 
differences that exist between the small Australian equity market and the very large 
developed US and UK equity markets, it is important to undertake a separate analysis of 
larger listed Australian firms. Further, this chapter expands upon the work of Singh and 
Davidson (2003) with a focus on the influence of a broader set of governance mechanisms 
(i.e. corporate ownership, board characteristics and debt financing) on equity agency 
conflicts. 
Equity agency conflicts arise when the interests of managers and shareholders 
diverge, and this should be manifested in the level of efficiency with which managers use 
the firm’s assets and manage discretionary operating expenses. Poorly committed or 
motivated mangers tend to be associated with less efficient asset use and higher levels of 
discretionary operating expenses. Thus, the asset utilisation ratio and the operating 
                                                 
54 This chapter is largely based on the paper, entitled “Corporate boards, ownership and agency costs: 
evidence from Australia”, presented at the 13th Multinational Finance Society conference, and submitted to 
Pacific-Basin Finance journal. 
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expense ratio are likely to reflect perquisite consumption and negative net present value 
investment, and hence capture the extent of equity agency conflicts that may exist between 
managers and shareholders. This may not be the case for other measures such as market-
based excess returns and level of free cash flows. Excess returns reflect both the costs and 
benefits that arise from the use of agents and thus will give little insight into the costs that 
might arise from of agency conflicts. Free cash flows are extremely difficult to proxy 
because of the need to capture all positive net present value projects that are available to 
the firm. Though there are proxies for free cash flows, these are usually historical 
measures, and while accurately reflecting the past may provide little indication of future 
behaviour which is critical to estimating the costs that arise from equity agency 
relationships.  Further, free cash flows reflect the characteristics of the firm or industry 
(for example value or growth), rather than something that can be controlled by 
management. For these reasons, we focus on the asset utilisation ratio and the operating 
expense ratio. Both are reasonably accurate measures of management efficiency, and both 
focus on characteristics of the firm that managers can have a direct impact on.   
Unlike Singh and Davidson (2003), this chapter does not limit the sample to firms 
with a minimum level of sales. Instead, it includes a sample of the largest 500 firms listed 
on the ASX based on market capitalisation as December 2004. In doing so, it ensures that 
a wide range of (large and small) firms are included in the sample. Furthermore, it is 
conjectured that the impact of inside ownership and board size on equity agency costs is 
non-linear, based on the existing theories and empirical analysis (Morck et al. 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes 1990; Bhagat and Black 1999). The importance of debt financing 
in controlling equity agency conflicts with a focus on the firm’s short-term debt as well as 
its total debt is also considered here (Florackis and Ozkan 2005).   
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This chapter has implications for the implementation of governance 
recommendations and best practice that the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council put forward in March 2003. The council recommended that a board 
composed of a majority of independent outside directors and led by an independent 
chairman should be the model adopted by the top 500 firms listed on the ASX.  As a 
result, this study focuses on the largest 500 firms listed on the Australian stock exchange 
using cross-sectional regressions for both years 2004 & 2005. The inclusion of these two 
years provides time for the recent ASX governance code to settle in while also allowing 
some assessment of the stability of the cross-sectional estimates that are estimated in each 
of the two years (also see Florackis and Ozkan 2005).  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews existing studies to 
establish a theoretical framework for latter analysis. Section 3.3 describes the sample and 
data that are employed in the analysis. Section 3.4 briefly explains the methodological 
approach and then discusses the results obtained from the analysis. A summary with some 
remarks is presented in Section 3.5. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
It was claimed that conflicts of interest arise out of the separation of ownership and 
control (Berle and Means, 1932). As documented in Chapter 2, many studies have 
attempted to describe situations in which conflicts of interest are likely to arise, to analyse 
potential agency costs that the firm incurs, and to examine the effect of governance 
mechanisms on the firm’s agency costs. This section briefly reviews the literature in 
preparation for the analysis that follows.  
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3.2.1 Corporate ownership 
Shareholders with substantial holdings (or large shareholders) allegedly play an 
important role in monitoring the firm’s management, and hence affect the level of agency 
conflicts (Holderness 2003). Large shareholders have better access to information on 
managerial performance and more resources to remove managers who do not maximise 
shareholder wealth (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 1997; Mak and Li 2001). Yet, as 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) note, the presence of large shareholders has costs as well as 
benefits (also see Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Specifically, large shareholders are likely to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders, especially in an environment where legal 
protection for minority shareholders is weak.  
Empirical evidence concerning the impact of large shareholders, however, is 
mixed. For example, based on a sample of 511 large US corporations, Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) conclude that there is no significant relationship between large shareholding and 
accounting profit rates for their sample firms (also see Thomsen et al. 2006). Yet 
Holderness and Sheehan (1985), and Barclay and Holderness (1989; 1991) report positive 
excess returns generated around the announcement date when large outside block trades 
are undertaken. Using more advanced econometric techniques, Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) initially observe a negative (positive) link between outside ownership (inside 
ownership) and firm performance when assuming that corporate ownership is exogenous. 
However, these links are no longer statistically insignificant when they address the 
endogeneity issue in ownership structure as suggested by Demsetz (1983).  
 
3.2.2 Managerial incentives  
It is a common view that managers generally maximise their own well-being (e.g. 
personal wealth, job security, and prestige), while shareholders are interested in 
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maximising the value of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). It has been argued that 
increasing the proportion of equity owned by firm management could help alleviate 
conflicts of interest that exist between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Morck et al. 1988). It is generally argued that at low levels of managerial equity 
ownership, there is personal incentive for the managers to engage in investment projects 
and to adopt financing policies that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. 
However, as managerial ownership increases, the interests of managers and shareholders 
become more aligned. The literature does note that there is also a potential threat to 
shareholders if managers become entrenched.      
Empirical research suggests that the allocation of equity to firm managers can 
influence firm value. The influence of managerial ownership on firm value seems to be 
non-linear, though the extent of this influence varies across studies. Using a piecewise 
regression technique, Morck et al. (1988) show that the firm’s value, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q, significantly increases at low levels of managerial equity ownership (0-5%), 
but then decreases, and finally rises when managerial ownership grows beyond 25%. 
Using two years of data and with a larger sample, McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a 
significant non-linear relation between management ownership and firm value. To validate 
their results, they then replicate the model of Morck et al. (1988), and find somewhat 
different results, which they argue may be attributed to a firm size effect. McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) extend the work of McConnell and Servaes (1990) by examining the 
impact of both ownership structure and debt financing on potential agency conflicts. 
Consistent with many earlier studies, they observe a significant quadratic relation between 
management ownership and firm value though this relation allegedly varies across 
different subgroups.       
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3.2.3 Boards of directors 
Fama (1968) postulates that a balanced board, including inside and outside 
directors, is likely to reduce potential conflicts of interest resulting from the separation of 
ownership and management, and hence should create value for shareholders. Fama and 
Jensen (1983a) add that outside directors, who are independent of management, have 
reputation-based incentives to monitor the firm’s managers and to limit the ability of 
managers to pursue their own interests at the expense of other stakeholders. Further, 
Weisbach (1988) argues that outside directors are more vigilant in replacing poorly 
performing management, and hence may increase firm value. Empirical research, 
however, provides mixed evidence of the relation between board composition and firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Kiel and Nicholson 2003). Early studies 
suggest that board composition, i.e. the proportion of outside directors, is negatively 
correlated with firm performance, whereas recent studies find that share prices tend to 
respond positively to appointments of new outside director(s) to the board (Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 1990, 1997).  
Board size and leadership is also critical to agency conflicts that exist within a firm 
(Bhagat and Black 1999). Essentially, individual directors contribute different sets of skills 
and expertise to the board, and thus as the board of a firm grows, the monitoring ability of 
the board also improves. Such benefits, however, may be outweighed by reduced effort 
and cooperation, ineffective communication and poor decision-making when the board 
starts getting too large (John and Senbet 1998). Specifically, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
contend that smaller boards work more effectively, while Jensen (1993) proposes that 
there should be no more than 10 directors present on the board at a time. Yermack (1996) 
observes that firms with a smaller board tend to generate better market returns. In addition, 
the separation of the position of chairman and CEO is thought to strengthen the 
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monitoring ability of the board as an independent chairman may lead to greater 
independence from the firm’s management (Shivdasani and Yermack 1998; Arthur 2001). 
Yet such separation is costly (Brickley, Cole and Jarrell 1997). 
  
3.2.4 Debt financing 
 Debtholders are important stakeholders who provide alternative and/or 
complementary monitoring of management (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). On one hand, 
there is incentive for debtholders to monitor the firm’s management to minimise the cost 
of financial distress. On the other hand, there is a view that leverage reduces free cash 
flows as it may force the firm’s managers to pay out free cash flows, thus restraining firms 
from investing in positive NPV projects. Based on both these arguments, Stulz (1990) 
suggests that debt financing has dual effects on the value of firm. Increasing debt 
financing may boost the monitoring of management, but it may also limit the number of 
positive NPV investment projects that a firm can undertake. Further, McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) demonstrate that the impact of debt financing on agency conflicts vary 
across firms, depending on the level of investment opportunities. Recently, Fleming et al. 
(2005) also attempt to relate debt financing to controlling agency costs though they fail to 
confirm statistical significance for this relation.  
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3.3 Data and Sample 
3.3.1 Data 
 
The data used in the analysis consists of the 500 largest firms, based on market 
capitalisation, listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) as at December 2004.55  
Data are then collected for this group of firms for two years 2004 and 2005. This sample 
covers all industries including financials and utilities which are often excluded in previous 
studies. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the sample by GICS industry classifications. The 
final sample accounts for 96% of the (ASX) total market capitalisation, and is quite 
representative of the population across all industries. The accounting data were collected 
primarily from Connect4, Aspect Huntley’s FinAnalysis and DatAnalysis. The 
diversification variable was calculated using industry information obtained from the 
OSIRIS database (Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing). 
 
 
Table 3. 1:  Sample firm GICS industry classifications 
GICS Industry Total Market 
Capitalisation 
(AUD'000) 
Sample % of 
Sample 
(%) 
% of 
Population 
(%) 
Sample  to 
Population 
(%) 
Consumer & Staples $47,207,081   23   4.60 3.70 47.92 
Consumer Discretionary $48,197,666   68 13.60 10.32 50.75 
Energy $24,980,722   19   3.80 5.32 27.54 
Financials $281,863,812  112 22.40 16.80 51.38 
Health Care $19,825,068   52 10.40 8.47 47.27 
Industrials $61,007,243   68 13.60 12.10 43.31 
Information Technology $6,257,899    31   6.20 10.25 23.31 
Materials $135,769,599  107 21.40 29.04 28.38 
Telecommunication Services $45,172,000   11   2.20 2.47 34.38 
Utilities $9,382,832    9   1.80 1.16 60.00 
 Total (Sample) $679,663,922 500    
 Total (Population) $704,826,037      
This table provides a summary of sample firm GICS industry classifications based at December 2004. Sample is the 
number of firms included in the sample by GICS industry. % of Sample is the percentage of sample firms to the total 
number of firms in the sample. % of Population is the percentage of firms listed on the ASX by GICS industry. Sample 
to Population is the percentage of the number of sample firms to the total number of firms listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange by GICS industry. 
 
 
                                                 
55 Of the firms, 226 non-financial firms are included in the sample used in Chapter 4. 
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Ownership structure and board characteristic variables were hand collected from 
2004 and 2005 annual reports where these data were not available in electronic form. 
Where data were not available from the sources cited above, data were hand collected 
from alternative data sources such as the annual reports wherever possible. A series of 
checks and filters were applied to the data before conducting formal analysis. Extreme 
values were identified and then crosschecked with alternative sources, particularly annual 
reports and company websites to remove errors where possible. The following section 
briefly describes all variables of interest that are employed in the analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Dependent variables – proxies for equity agency costs 
Two proxies that have generally been used to reflect the level of equity agency 
conflicts are adopted here (Singh and Davidson 2003). The first proxy is the ratio of 
annual sales to total assets (AUR), seen as a measure of asset utilisation that captures how 
efficiently the firm’s assets are used. A low AUR is associated with inefficient use of the 
firm’s assets, which could be attributable either to a lack of commitment or effort from 
management or to insufficient monitoring. Hence, AUR is inversely related to the level of 
equity agency conflicts that exist between managers and shareholders as it tends to reflect 
asset management efficiency, particularly when compared across firms.   
The second agency cost proxy is the ratio of discretionary operating expenses to 
total sales (DER). For this study, discretionary operating expenses are defined as operating 
expenses incurred at the discretion of firm management including Selling, General and 
Administration expenses.56 A relatively high DER ratio suggests that firm management 
                                                 
56 DER excludes the cost of goods sold, interest expenses, leasing and hiring expenses, depreciation, and bad 
debt expenses. In some cases, there is insufficient information to accurately identify which expenses/costs 
are to be excluded from the estimate of DER. Though I have crosschecked information with several 
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incurs a high level of controllable operating expenses. This may arise from unnecessary or 
wasteful activities, and it could act as a signal that firm management is expropriating 
wealth from shareholders by diverting resources (via increased operating expenses) for 
their personal perquisite consumption (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Thus, it is expected that 
DER is positively linked to equity agency costs.  
A filter of plus or minus four standard deviations is applied to both agency cost 
proxies, AUR and DER, to reduce potential outlier effects before undertaking formal 
analysis. Further, given evidence of significant non-normality in both the variables, AUR 
and DER, log transformation is applied to both of these variables. Hence, the natural log 
form of the variables, LN_AUR and LN_DER, is used in tests of equity agency conflicts 
in the multivariate analysis that follows.57 
 
3.3.3 Independent variables 
Table 3.2 contains definitions of selected variables used in this analysis. Two 
measures of corporate ownership, outside block ownership (BLOCK) and inside 
ownership (INSOWN), are included in the analysis. Equity agency conflicts may change 
with the extent of outside shareholding dispersion. The more dispersed the outside 
shareholding, the greater the level of control that insiders may exercise over the firm, and 
so the greater the magnitude of equity agency costs. Hence, it is expected that outside 
block ownership is positively (negatively) linked to AUR (DER). Further, inside 
ownership potentially aligns the interests of owners and managers, and thus reduces 
                                                                                                                                                   
databases as well as having visited websites of companies for verification, I expect that DER is 
overestimated for some firms in the sample. 
57 It should be noted that some care needs to be taken in interpretation of the magnitude of estimated 
coefficients when taking the natural log of independent variables because when using the log of a dependent 
variable (Y) regressed on an independent variable (X), the estimated coefficient is now equal to 
1/Y*d(Y)/d(X) (instead of d(Y)/d(X)). Thus, the log transformation affects the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient, but not the sign of the coefficient given that Y is non-negative. 
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potential agency conflicts. Hence, it is predicted that this proxy has a positive (negative) 
influence on AUR (DER). 
Prior theoretical work posits that three board characteristics, i.e. board 
composition, board size and board leadership structure, could capture the monitoring 
ability of the board (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988, 1991). The ratio of independent 
outside directors to the total number of directors on the board (IODIR) is used to proxy for 
the composition of the board. A dummy variable (ICHAIR) takes a value of 1 where the 
chairman is an independent outside director, and 0 otherwise. Both proxies IODIR and 
ICHAIR are indicative of the level of independence of the board. For firms with an 
independent chairman and high proportion of independent directors on the board, there 
should be lower agency conflicts (i.e. higher AUR and lower DER) than otherwise for an 
identical firm. As board size (BSIZE) increases, there should be more resources available 
to monitor management, but this may also create “shirking” or “free-rider” problems 
among members of the board. Hence, BSIZE could have a dual effect on agency costs (i.e. 
positive effect or negative effect), and the net effect depends on which of these two effects 
dominate.  
Ang et al. (2000) focus on the monitoring role of banks in small business financing 
though this role is largely dependent on the banks’ incentives. Bank financing may be less 
prevalent among publicly listed firms as they have wider access to other sources of 
financing. The total debt to total asset ratio (TDEBT) is used to capture the impact of bank 
monitoring (Singh and Davidson 2003). Further, debt financing may induce additional 
monitoring of firm discretionary expenses, yet it reduces free cash flows that would 
otherwise be available for “advantageous” investment (Stulz 1990). Because of this trade-
off, TDEBT may have a dual effect on equity agency costs. In addition, the structure of 
debt may also matter (Florackis and Ozkan 2005). Specifically, short-term debt may exert 
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more pressure on management to perform due to the regular reviews that accompany 
short-term debt contracts and firm working capital. Thus, the firm’s short-term debt to 
total debt ratio (SDEBT), ignored in Singh and Davidson (2003), is included in this 
analysis to assess the impact of firm debt structure on equity agency costs.  
 
Table 3. 2:  Variable definition 
AUR (Asset utilisation ratio) the ratio of annual sales to total assets. 
DER (Discretionary operating 
expense ratio) 
the ratio of discretionary operating expenses to total sales. 
LN_AUR natural log of AUR 
LN_DER natural log of DER 
BLOCK 
 
The percentage of ordinary shares held by shareholders who own 
5% or more of these shares 
INSOWN the percentage of ordinary shares held by the board 
BSIZE  the number of directors on the board 
LN_BSIZE natural log of BSIZE 
IODIR  the ratio of the number of independent outside directors to the total 
number of directors on the board 
ICHAIR dummy variable equals to 1 where the chairman is independent, 
and 0 otherwise 
SDEBT the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. 
TDEBT the ratio of total debt to total assets 
FSIZE natural log of annual sales  
FDIVER dummy variable equals to 0 except when the firm’s primary and 
secondary SIC codes are drawn from different SIC divisions 
FMKB 
 
The ratio of the book value of total assets less shareholder equity 
plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets. 
LN_FMKB natural log of FMKB 
DFIN dummy variable equals to 1 for financial firms and 0 otherwise 
INDUSTRY  
 
a set of dummy variables for ten GICS industry classifications 
(refer to Table 3.1) 
Agency conflicts vary across low and high growth firms as these firms have 
different levels of free cash flows and/or informational asymmetry (McConnell and 
Servaes 1995). Specifically, high growth firms tend to have lower levels of free cash 
flows, and thus the agency conflicts that exist within these firms are relatively lower. At 
the same time, these firms operate in an environment of high information asymmetry, and 
this makes the monitoring of firm management more difficult. Therefore, the market to 
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book ratio (FMKB) is used to proxy for the level of growth options in the firm. Finally, 
firm size (FSIZE), a dummy variable for diversification (FDIVER), and a set of industry 
dummies (INDUSTRY) are also included to control for confounding effects. 
 
3.3.4 Sample 
Tables 3.3 & 3.4 report descriptive statistics for the largest 500 Australian listed 
firms for two years 2004 and 2005. Broadly speaking, there are minor differences in the 
mean AUR and DER for two years 2004 and 2005. The AUR for year 2004 (2005) ranges 
from a minimum of 0.0003 (0.0002) to a maximum of 5.7667 (4.6683), with an average of 
0.8385 (0.8147), whereas DER for year 2004 (2005) varies considerably within a 
minimum of 0.0010 (0.0012) and a maximum of 0.9703 (0.8935). Further, it is found that 
Australian listed firms exhibit a lower average AUR and average DER than US firms 
included in Singh and Davidson (2003). Corporate ownership for year 2004 (2005) is 
dispersed among these 500 largest firms with an average of 41.14% (40.87%) of total 
outstanding shares held by large outside shareholders holding more than 5%. The inside 
ownership distribution of the sample firms is positively skewed as evidenced by large 
differences between mean and median values for both years 2004 and 2005. 
The average proportion of independent outside directors of 0.6052 (0.6271) for 
year 2004 (year 2005) suggests that most of the sample firms have a majority of 
independent directors on their board with an average board size consisting of 6 directors. 
Though the level of firm debt varies considerably across firms, there is little difference 
between 2004 and 2005. Yet, there are large differences between the mean and median for 
sales, total assets and market capitalisation, which suggests significant skewness in the 
distribution of the size of the firms included in the sample.  
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Table 3. 3:  Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Median Max Min SE of Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Year 2004 (N =500)               
AUR 0.8385 0.5552 5.7667 0.0003 0.0407 1.7946 3.9006 
DER 0.1763 0.1153 0.9703 0.0010 0.0076 1.7430 3.0552 
INSOWN (%) 16.7578 8.1302 91.1058 0.0001 0.8972 1.2801 0.8980 
BLOCK (%) 41.1426 41.3450 99.7180 0.0000 0.9583 0.0708 -0.5325 
BSIZE 6.3000 6.0000 15.0000 3.0000 0.0937 0.9396 0.9659 
IODIR 0.6052 0.6000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0091 -0.6213 0.1343 
TDEBT 0.1975 0.1746 1.0738 0.0000 0.0080 1.3659 2.7027 
SDEBT 0.3332 0.2243 1.0000 0.0000 0.0149 0.8203 -0.6389 
FMKB 2.1128 1.4164 23.1403 0.4886 0.0892 4.3735 30.2695 
Annual Sales (AUD’ million)       874.64            94.21      29,692.45         0.0050          130.73 6.69 50.74 
Total Assets (AUD’ million)    3,979.59          147.95    404,390.00         3.7730       1,208.96 11.25 135.60 
Market Capitalisation (AUD’ million)    1,359.32          166.01      78,032.26       37.0000          206.52 7.02 53.50 
ROA (%) 2.10 5.61 51.97 -2.06 0.88 -4.02 30.16 
Panel B. Year 2005 (N =500)               
AUR 0.8147 0.5409 4.6683 0.0002 0.0406 1.8442 3.7390 
DER 0.2208 0.1527 0.8935 0.0012 0.0088 1.3084 1.1010 
INSOWN (%) 14.6891 4.0281 90.2700 0.0000 0.8971 1.5034 1.4928 
BLOCK (%) 40.8760 40.7500 99.7200 0.0000 0.9454 0.0941 -0.4518 
BSIZE 6.5100 6.0000 16.0000 3.0000 0.0980 1.0801 1.6337 
IODIR 0.6271 0.6667 1.0000 0.0000 0.0084 -0.6134 0.1552 
TDEBT 0.2230 0.1962 1.3499 0.0000 0.0090 1.6342 4.7683 
SDEBT 0.3293 0.2131 1.0000 0.0000 0.0149 0.8753 -0.5877 
FMKB 2.0297 1.5108 14.9797 0.0262 0.0764 3.8416 20.5276 
Annual Sales (AUD’ million)    923.01          102.17      33,222.52           0.002      139.64 7.02 56.56 
Total Assets (AUD’ million) 4,644.61     195.27    419,588.00            3.94   1,353.49 10.71 119.63 
Market Capitalisation (AUD’ million)    2,120.37    203.17    109,918.66            2.32       381.64 8.59 84.25 
ROA (%) 1.01 5.64 63.62 -4.03 1.42 -6.34 62.23 
This table contains descriptive statistics for variables of interest that are used in the analysis of the 500 largest Australian listed firms for both years 2004 & 
2005. Refer to Table 3.2 for variable definition. 
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Table 3. 4:  Correlation coefficients 
 AUR DER BLOCK INSOWN IODIR BSIZE TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER 
Panel A. Year 2004                   
DER -0.134*  1         
BLOCK  0.123* -0.031  1        
INSOWN  0.225*  0.052  0.376*  1       
IODIR -0.070  0.021 -0.165* -0.456*  1      
BSIZE  0.053  0.028  0.096* -0.193*  0.304*  1     
TDEBT -0.028 -0.089*  0.022 -0.090*  0.149*  0.148*  1    
SDEBT  0.199*  0.036  0.052  0.137* -0.111* -0.123* -0.241*  1   
FSIZE  0.421* -0.132*  0.098* -0.087**  0.278*  0.562*  0.239* -0.114*  1  
FDIVER  0.126*  0.047  0.067  0.022  0.044  0.109*  0.062 -0.060  0.173*  1 
FMKB -0.037  0.173*  0.040  0.125* -0.116* -0.149* -0.245*  0.087** -0.374* -0.044 
Panel B. Year 2005                   
DER -0.180*  1         
BLOCK  0.123* -0.049  1        
INSOWN  0.195*  0.034  0.308*  1       
IODIR -0.024  0.040 -0.085** -0.364*  1      
BSIZE  0.055  0.048  0.128* -0.177*  0.299*  1     
TDEBT  0.016 -0.074**  0.047 -0.062  0.094*  0.107*  1    
SDEBT  0.198* -0.033  0.077**  0.044 -0.074** -0.03 -0.202*  1   
FSIZE  0.392* -0.089*  0.130* -0.067  0.288*  0.512*  0.139* -0.100*  1  
FDIVER  0.133*  0.035  0.076**  0.02  0.053  0.067 -0.032  0.010  0.175*  1 
FMKB  0.052  0.054  0.071  0.065 -0.059 -0.066 -0.077**  0.147* -0.270* -0.025 
This table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficients for selected variables used in this analysis for both years 2004 & 2005.  * (**) indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% (10%) level.  
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Univariate analysis 
 This analysis is based on the conjecture that corporate ownership, board structure, 
firm characteristics affect the efficiency with which management uses firm assets and 
controls firm operating expenses. In this analysis, the full sample is first divided into a 
number of subgroups on the basis of above and below median values of the variables of 
interest. It should be noted that subgroups with above the median values are termed “high” 
subgroups, while subgroups with below the median values are referred to as “low” 
subgroups. Tests are then conducted for statistically significant differences in the mean 
and median AUR and DER across these subgroups. The same tests are repeated for two 
further classifications: diversified vs. non-diversified firms, and financial vs. non-financial 
firms. The results for the univariate analysis for 2004 and 2005 are reported in Table 3.5.      
 Panel A of Table 3.5 shows a number of interesting results for AUR. First, for both 
2004 and 2005, the subgroup high INSOWN has a higher mean AUR than that of low 
INSOWN, and the differences in the mean and median AUR for these two subgroups are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. A similar finding is evident for the high and low 
BLOCK subgroup comparisons. Second, firms with larger BSIZE tend to have higher 
AUR than those with smaller BSIZE, and the difference is statistically significant. Third, 
debt financing, particularly short-term debt, does seem to matter in controlling for agency 
conflicts. Specifically, it is shown that the subgroup high SDEBT has a higher mean AUR 
than that of low SDEBT, with the differences being statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Fourth, the AUR ratio also varies markedly with firm characteristics. For example, mean 
AUR for the high FSIZE subgroup (low FSIZE subgroup) for 2004 and 2005 are 1.1607 
(0.4217) and 1.1071 (0.5224) respectively, and the mean and median differences are 
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statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, it is evident that diversified firms and non-
financial firms tend to have higher levels of AUR.     
 Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the results for DER. Across both years 2004 and 2005, 
there are differences in the mean and median DER for subgroups high and low INSOWN 
(BLOCK) though they are statistically insignificant. The results also show that the high 
BSIZE subgroup has higher DER than that of the low BSIZE subgroup, and this suggests 
that firms with larger BSIZE are less efficient in controlling their discretionary operating 
expenses than those with smaller BSIZE. Further, the results indicate statistically 
significant differences in the mean and median DER across subgroups of high and low 
FSIZE as well as subgroups of high and low FMKB.  
 In short, for both 2004 and 2005, there are a number of statistically significant 
differences in the mean and median AUR and DER across various subgroup 
classifications. These results are consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003) for large US 
listed firms, and Florackis and Ozkan (2005) for large UK listed firms. Importantly, the 
differences are also economically significant. Specifically, with a mean AUR difference of 
0.3048 (0.2725) for year 2004 (year 2005), the sales of a median-size firm with total assets 
of US$147,190,995(US$195,276,000) are approximately US$44,863,815(US$53,212,710) 
different between high and low INSOWN subgroups.  
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Table 3. 5:  Mean agency cost comparison  
  Mean (AUR) 
of above 
variable 
median 
Mean (AUR) 
of below 
variable 
median 
Diff. 
mean 
t-statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
Mean (AUR) 
of above 
variable 
median 
Mean (AUR) 
of below 
variable 
median 
Diff. 
mean 
t-statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
  Year 2004 Year 2005 
Panel A. Asset utilisation (AUR) 
INSOWN 0.9909 0.6861 0.3048 3.79* 0.9504 0.6780 0.2725 3.39* 
    (-4.01)*    (-3.10)* 
BLOCK 0.9271 0.7499 0.1773 2.18* 0.8914 0.7375 0.1539 1.90** 
    (-2.54)*    (-2.64)* 
BSIZE 0.8794 0.7800 0.0994 1.20 0.8687 0.7251 0.1436 1.77** 
    (-2.42)*    (-1.98)* 
IODIR 0.8055 0.8859 -0.0804 -0.97 0.7924 0.8376 -0.0452 -0.56 
    (-0.82)    (-0.39) 
SDEBT 1.0000 0.6770 0.3230 4.03* 0.9589 0.6717 0.2871 3.58* 
    (-4.12)*    (-2.77)* 
TDEBT 0.8019 0.8750 -0.0731 -0.90 0.8068 0.8226 -0.0158 -0.19 
    (-1.39)    (-1.03) 
FMKB 0.9178 0.7591 0.1587 1.95** 0.9077 0.7218 0.1859 2.30* 
    (-1.27)    (-2.45)* 
FSIZE 1.1607 0.4217 0.7390 9.82* 1.1071 0.5224 0.5847 7.60* 
    (-10.88)*    (-8.84)* 
DIV vs. Non-DIV 
1.1546 0.7970 0.3576 2.83* 1.1483 0.7710 0.3773 3.00* 
    (-3.77)*    (-3.78)* 
Fin vs. Non-Fin 
0.3093 0.9948 -0.6855 -7.44* 0.2972 0.9676 -0.6704 -7.28* 
     (-8.11)*    (-8.28)* 
Panel B. Discretionary operating expense (DER) 
INSOWN 0.1802 0.1724 0.0078 0.51 0.2157 0.2260 -0.0103 -0.58 
    (-0.68)    (-0.73) 
BLOCK 0.1681 0.1845 -0.0164 -1.08 0.2125 0.2292 -0.0167 -0.95 
    (-0.07)    (0.00) 
BSIZE 0.1877 0.1600 0.0276 1.78** 0.2239 0.2157 0.0082 0.45 
    (-2.89)*    (-0.90) 
IODIR 0.1783 0.1734 0.0049 0.31 0.2216 0.2200 0.0017 0.09 
    (-1.15)    (-0.46) 
SDEBT 0.1905 0.1621 0.0284 1.87** 0.2183 0.2234 -0.0051 -0.29 
    (-2.32)*    (-0.34) 
TDEBT 0.1679 0.1847 -0.0168 -1.10 0.2052 0.2365 -0.0313 -1.79** 
    (-0.15)    (-1.37) 
FMKB 0.2034 0.1492 0.0542 3.61* 0.2442 0.1975 0.0466 2.68* 
    (-3.58)*    (-1.89)** 
FSIZE 0.1563 0.2021 -0.0458 -3.01* 0.2012 0.2405 -0.0393 -2.25* 
    (-1.32)    (-1.74)** 
DIV vs. Non-DIV  0.1982 0.1734 0.0247 1.04 0.2400 0.2183 0.0217 0.79 
    (-2.08)*    (-1.39) 
Fin vs. Non-Fin 0.1585 0.1815 -0.0231 -1.27 0.2256 0.2194 0.0061 0.29 
     (-2.53)*    (-0.10) 
This table reports univariate analysis for different subgroups for both years 2004 & 2005. Panel A presents the analysis 
results for AUR, while Panel B contains the test results for DER. The t-statistics for differences in mean ratios assume 
unequal variance. The Mann-Whitney U-test is reported in parentheses. Negative Mann-Whitney U-test statistics indicate 
that the rank sums are lower than their expected values.  * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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3.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
This section undertakes a further examination of the effect of corporate ownership, 
together with other governance mechanisms (board characteristics and debt financing), on 
AUR & DER in a multiple regression setting. Corporate ownership includes outside block 
ownership and inside ownership, while other potential monitoring devices are proxied by 
board characteristics (i.e. board size, the proportion of independent directors on the board, 
whether or not the chairman is independent), and debt financing (i.e. short-term debt and 
total debt). In addition, firm size, the level of diversification, the level of firm growth 
options and industry dummies are added to control for potential confounding effects.  
The multivariate analysis involves six specifications. The first five specifications 
examine corporate ownership and other governance mechanisms individually, while the 
last specification tests the impact of the interaction of these mechanisms on AUR & DER, 
with and without INDUSTRY dummy variables. Following Singh and Davidson (2003), 
the full multivariate model of analysis can be expressed as follows: 
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Where ACOSTS refers either to LN_AUR or LN_DER. Model (3.1) is estimated 
using the OLS procedure adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White 1980).  
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3.4.2.1 Impact on asset utilisation (AUR) 
Table 3.6 reports the estimation results of model (3.1) for LN_AUR. For each year, 
the first five rows of Table 3.6 examine the influence of corporate ownership, together 
with board characteristics, and debt financing, on LN_AUR separately, while the last row 
focuses on the full model as per equation (3.1). In examining the effect of corporate 
ownership for both years 2004 and 2005, Rows (1) & (7) of Table 3.6 show that the 
coefficient for BLOCK is negative, but not statistically significant, while the coefficient 
for INSOWN is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Similar results for 
BLOCK and INSOWN, when INSOWN2 included, are reported in Rows (2) & (8) of 
Table 3.6. Further, for both years 2004 and 2005, the coefficient for INSOWN2 is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that though high BLOCK 
has little effect on AUR, INSOWN plays an important role in improving AUR. However, 
as INSOWN increases, the rate of improvement starts to decline, consistent with potential 
“entrenchment” effects as documented in existing studies such as Morck et al. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990; 1995).   
For board characteristics, the coefficient for IODIR is negative, and the coefficient 
for ICHAIR is positive, and both coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level 
(Rows (3) and (9) of Table 3.6). This suggests that firms with more independent outside 
directors are likely to use their assets less efficiently than those with fewer independent 
outside directors. In contrast, it appears that firms with a board that is led by an 
independent chairman are able to use their assets more efficiently. In addition, for both 
years 2004 and 2005, the coefficients for LN_BSIZE (LN_BSIZE2) are positive (negative) 
and statistically significant at the 5% level (Rows (4) and (10) of Table 3.6).58 It can be 
interpreted that BSIZE has an impact on the way a firm uses its assets. Up to a point, 
                                                 
58 It should be noted that both models 4(10) and 6(12) were re-estimated including LnBSIZE and LnBSIZE2 
. The results suggest that large LnBSIZE changes between year 2004 and 2005 may be attributed to a 
spurious correlation between LnBSIZE and lnBSIZE2 when the twos are included in the regression analysis. 
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larger boards tend to use their assets more efficiently, yet as BSIZE becomes larger, the 
level of efficiency in the use of firm assets begins to decrease. These results provide 
support for the view that increases in board size could facilitate the monitoring function of 
the board, yet as boards become larger, many difficulties may also arise, particularly in 
communication and decision making (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Yermack 1996). 
For debt financing, the results for both years 2004 & 2005, reported in Rows (5) 
and (11) of Table 3.6, are also worth noting. The coefficient for TDEBT is negative 
though it is not statistically significant, while the coefficient for SDEBT is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that short-term debt significantly 
enhances AUR, reducing agency conflicts that exist within the firm.  
The coefficient for FSIZE is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
across all specifications for both years 2004 and 2005. Compared to small firms, large 
firms appear to be more efficient in the use of their assets. This can partly be explained by 
the fact that large firms have access to a wider range of resources in mitigating agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. Further, it is observed that firms with high 
FMKB is more efficient in the use of their assets.  
The coefficient estimates for the full model (3.1) including all governance 
mechanisms (i.e. corporate ownership, board characteristics and debt financing) are little 
changed from those in the separate analyses just discussed (Rows (6) & (12) of Table 3.6). 
The coefficient estimates for BLOCK, INSOWN and BSIZE are generally consistent with 
those of Singh and Davidson (2003). The results also suggest a non-linear relation 
between INSOWN and AUR, and between BSIZE and AUR.59 The results also show that 
though IODIR and ICHAIR are somewhat linked to AUR, there is still a mixed message 
with respect to the effect of the monitoring ability of an independent board on AUR.  
                                                 
59 This is an important contribution of this analysis as previous studies in this area have focussed on linear 
relationships with little attempt to model the non-linear relationships that have been noted in the agency 
theory literature. 
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Further, consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003), the analysis demonstrates that 
TDEBT is negatively associated with AUR though its estimated coefficient is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. Yet SDEBT has significant influence on 
asset utilisation.  
 
3.4.2.2 Impact on discretionary operating expense (DER) 
Following Singh and Davidson (2003), the above multivariate analysis is repeated 
for the second proxy for equity agency costs LN_DER, and the results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 3.7. Panels A and B of Table 3.7 are constructed in a similar manner to 
Table 3.6. Specifically, Panel A reports the estimation results of model (3.1) for year 2004, 
while Panel B presents those of model (3.1) for year 2005.  The results for Australian 
listed firms are generally consistent with those of Singh and Davidson (2003). 
A relation is predicted to exist between corporate ownership proxies (i.e. BLOCK 
and INSOWN) and DER. The results from the analysis generally support this prediction 
though in some cases, statistical significance is not evident (Rows (1), (2), (7), and (8) of 
Table 3.7). Across all specifications for board characteristics (Rows (3), (4), (9), and (10) 
of Table 3.7), the coefficients for IODIR, BSIZE and ICHAIR are positive, but they are 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level. It appears that the board characteristics do not 
serve as a significant deterrent to DER. Yet, there is still evidence of a non linear relation 
between BSIZE and DER, particularly for the year 2004. 
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Table 3. 6:  Multivariate analysis for asset utilisation (AUR) 
  
Intercept BLOCK INSOWN INSOWN2 IODIR LN_BSIZE LN_BSIZE2 ICHAIR TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER LN_FMKB
Industry 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Adj R2 (%) F-stat 
Sign  + + - ? + - + ? ? ? ? ?    
 Panel A. Estimation for year 2004                         
(1) -9.2642* -0.0019 0.0175*        0.3914* 0.0484 0.4066* Yes 60.76 53.64 
 (-18.83) (-0.77) (7.30)        (13.89) (0.35) (4.15)    
(2) -9.4837* -0.0009 0.0347* -0.0003*       0.3978* 0.0620 0.4075* Yes 61.38 51.27 
 (-19.07) (-0.35) (5.63) (-3.41)       (14.14) (0.45) (4.22)    
(3) -7.8596*    -1.1948* -1.3641*  0.2563*   0.4897* 0.1138 0.4760* Yes 64.29 58.08 
 (-17.06)    (-4.70) (-7.21)  (2.42)   (16.26) (0.89) (4.91)    
(4) -13.1384*    -1.1986* 4.5211* -1.6375* 0.2299*   0.5000* 0.0647 0.5187* Yes 66.03 58.67 
 (-10.80)    (-4.96) (3.60) (-4.57) (2.24)   (16.50) (0.52) (5.53)    
(5) -9.0536*        -0.0195 0.8439* 0.3786* 0.0899 0.3937* Yes 59.76 51.44 
 (-18.50)        (-0.07) (5.23) (13.48) (0.68) (4.13)    
(6) -13.5863* 0.0008 0.0211* -0.0002* -0.6442* 4.1869* -1.5065* 0.2669* 0.0267 0.6488* 0.4930* 0.0853 0.4623* Yes 69.27 51.31 
 (-11.63) (0.35) (3.60) (-2.23) (-2.58) (3.49) (-4.45) (2.72) (0.11) (4.60) (16.29) (0.77) (5.10)    
 Panel B. Estimation for year 2005                         
(7) -9.5554* -0.0011 0.0156*        0.3963* -0.0335 0.2888* Yes 52.49 38.26 
 (-18.25) (-0.34) (5.38)        (14.08) (-0.20) (2.59)    
(8) -9.7876* 0.0000 0.0338* -0.0003*       0.4036* -0.0506 0.2879* Yes 52.99 36.37 
 (-18.41) (-0.01) (4.19) (-2.71)       (14.22) (-0.30) (2.62)    
(9) -8.0678*    -1.3251* -1.3482*  0.0726   0.4987* -0.0532 0.3951* Yes 56.07 41.18 
 (-16.99)    (-4.41) (-6.87)  (0.43)   (15.77) (-0.35) (3.61)    
(10) -10.4447*    -1.3182* 1.2763 -0.7156** 0.0555   0.5019* -0.0610 0.3988* Yes 56.36 38.97 
 (-7.91)    (-4.40) (0.89) (-1.87) (0.33)   (15.76) (-0.39) (3.64)    
(11) -9.3537*        0.1428 0.4894* 0.3855* -0.0424 0.2711* Yes 50.70 35.62 
 (-18.71)        (0.41) (2.27) (14.04) (-0.23) (2.27)    
(12) -10.6491* 0.0013 0.0236* -0.0002* -0.9224* 0.6290 -0.5269 0.1075 0.3724 0.4996* 0.5033* -0.0741 0.3389* Yes 58.21 31.70 
 (-8.30) (0.42) (3.05) (-2.23) (-3.02) (0.45) (-1.42) (0.63) (1.14) (2.45) (15.97) (-0.48) (3.07)    
This table reports the estimation results of model (3.1) for LN_AUR. Panel A contains the results for year 2004 while Panel B presents the results for year 2005. Refer Table 3.2 for variable 
definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 3. 7:  Multivariate analysis for discretionary operating expense (DER) 
  
Intercept BLOCK INSOWN INSOWN2 IODIR LN_BSIZE LN_BSIZE2 ICHAIR TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER LN_FMKB
Industry 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Adj R2 (%) F-stat 
Sign  - - + ? - + - ? ? ? ? ?    
 Panel A. Estimation for year 2004                         
(1) -2.4607* -0.0033 0.0025        0.0037 0.2923* 0.2363* Yes 7.70 2.88 
 (-5.82) (-1.38) (1.03)        (0.17) (2.30) (2.67)    
(2) -2.3473* -0.0038 -0.0064 0.0002       0.0003 0.2853* 0.2358* Yes 8.11 2.84 
 (-5.40) (-1.57) (-1.01) (1.61)       (0.01) (2.26) (2.70)    
(3) -2.6056*    0.1650 0.2168  0.0861   -0.0228 0.2766* 0.2208* Yes 8.03 2.81 
 (-6.26)    (0.61) (1.07)  (0.79)   (-0.86) (2.11) (2.50)    
(4) -4.9207*    0.1633 2.7979* -0.7182** 0.0745   -0.0183 0.2551** 0.2396* Yes 8.87 2.93 
 (-3.55)    (0.60) (1.96) (-1.77) (0.69)   (-0.67) (1.94) (2.61)    
(5) -2.4389*        -0.1686 0.0665 -0.0007 0.2878* 0.2152* Yes 7.42 2.77 
 (-5.78)        (-0.60) (0.46) (-0.03) (2.23) (2.37)    
(6) -4.9860* -0.0039 -0.0038 0.0001 0.2327 2.8941* -0.7295** 0.0868 -0.1926 0.0720 -0.0173 0.2578* 0.2296* Yes 10.11 2.56 
 (-3.58) (-1.60) (-0.54) (1.43) (0.78) (1.98) (-1.75) (0.80) (-0.71) (0.51) (-0.64) (1.99) (2.51)    
 Panel B. Estimation for year 2005                         
(7) -1.8500* 0.0004 0.0004        -0.0104 0.2527* 0.0548 Yes 6.62 2.45 
 (-5.06) (0.15) (0.17)        (-0.55) (1.97) (0.60)    
(8) -1.7667* 0.0000 -0.0061 0.0001       -0.0131 0.2589* 0.0551 Yes 6.83 2.36 
 (-4.73) (0.00) (-0.96) (1.09)       (-0.68) (2.04) (0.60)    
(9) -2.0488*    0.1459 0.0953  0.2753*   -0.0266 0.2464** 0.0453 Yes 7.87 2.75 
 (-5.38)    (0.51) (0.51)  (1.98)   (-1.23) (1.87) (0.50)    
(10) -2.3293**    0.1467 0.4051 -0.0845 0.2733*   -0.0263 0.2455** 0.0457 Yes 7.89 2.58 
 (-1.92)    (0.51) (0.31) (-0.23) (1.97)   (-1.20) (1.86) (0.51)    
(11) -1.7497*        -0.2740 -0.1466 -0.0097 0.2444** 0.0654 Yes 7.01 2.60 
 (-4.77)        (-1.09) (-1.03) (-0.51) (1.89) (0.74)    
(12) -2.5375* 0.0002 -0.0041 0.0001 0.2215 0.7297 -0.1655 0.2977* -0.3343 -0.1663 -0.0304 0.2367** 0.0480 Yes 8.83 2.20 
  (-2.05) (0.10) (-0.65) (1.12) (0.78) (0.54) (-0.44) (2.16) (-1.37) (-1.21) (-1.36) (1.81) (0.54)    
This table reports the estimation results of model (3.1) for LN_DER. Panel A contains the results for year 2004 while Panel B presents the results for year 2005. Refer Table 3.2 for variable 
definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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The results also show that the coefficient for FSIZE is negative and significant 
across all specifications, which suggests that larger firms have relatively smaller DER. It is 
also found that firms with higher FMKB and greater FDIVER are associated with 
relatively larger DER. Perhaps, this finding is intuitive as it is not easy to monitor or 
control excessive discretionary expenses when the level of growth opportunities or the 
level of diversification is high.  
 
3.4.3 Robustness tests  
  This section describes further analysis undertaken to assess the robustness of the 
reported results. First, model (3.1) is re-estimated using two alternative proxies for firm 
size, the natural log of the firm’s total assets and market capitalisation. The results are 
generally consistent with those of the original analysis (refer to Panels (A) and (B) of 
Table 3.8). Further, a closer examination of the FSIZE effect is undertaken, for both years 
2004 and 2005, by splitting the full sample into two subsamples, large firms only and 
small firms only. Model (3.1) is then re-estimated for the two subsamples, and the results 
are reported in Panels (C) and (D) of Table 3.8. Though almost all coefficients have the 
coefficient signs that are consistent with expectations, not all of these estimated 
coefficients are found to be statistical significant, especially for small firms.  
Second, the inclusion of financial firms in the sample may bias our results. Model 
(3.1) is expanded to include a dummy variable DFIN to test the extent of the effect of 
financial firms in the sample. The results from this analysis for both years 2004 and 2005, 
reported in Panel A of Table 3.9, suggest that financial firms tend to have lower AUR and 
DER. It is also found that the addition of DFIN has little impact on the original results, 
with the coefficients for corporate ownership, board characteristics and debt financing 
being similar to those reported in the original analysis. Further, model (3.1) is re-estimated 
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for the non-financial firm subsample for both years 2004 and 2005, and there is little 
difference from what is observed for the full sample firms (refer to Panel B of Table 3.9).    
Third, there is a possibility that a high correlation between BSIZE and FSIZE 
causes some biases on the results. Following Singh and Davidson (2003), for both years 
2004 and 2005, both these variables are orthogonalised by replacing FSIZE with the 
residuals obtained by regressing FSIZE on LN_BSIZE. The results are essentially 
unchanged (refer to Panel C of Table 3.9).  
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter provides an empirical investigation into the effect of corporate 
ownership, along with other governance mechanisms such as board characteristics and 
debt financing, on two measures of firm efficiency, AUR and DER. It is argued that these 
variables may reflect the cost of equity agency conflicts that arise from the separation of 
shareholders and managers. This study employs a sample of the 500 largest Australian 
listed firms for two years 2004 and 2005. 
Univariate analysis indicates that both measures of firm efficiency (AUR and 
DER) vary noticeably across the sample firms. Compared with Australian small and 
medium enterprises (Fleming et al. 2005), the top 500 Australian listed firms included in 
the sample tend to have a lower average AUR, but they incur a higher average DER. 
Further, agency costs that exist in large Australian firms are lower than those reported for 
large US or for UK firms (Singh and Davidson 2003; Florackis and Ozkan 2005).    
The multivariate analysis results are not only consistent with Singh and Davidson 
(2003), but also suggest that governance mechanisms jointly affect equity agency costs 
(also see Cremers and Nair 2005). As expected, inside ownership is critical to combating 
agency costs. There is evidence of a non linear relation between inside ownership and 
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agency costs, particularly in terms of AUR. Further, it appears that firms with large 
shareholding are better in controlling their discretionary expenses.  
Board characteristics have important effects on equity agency costs. There is 
evidence suggesting that an independent board, i.e. a board with a high proportion of 
independent outside directors present on the board, is associated with better use of firm 
assets. Further, firms with larger boards are associated with more efficient use of assets, 
but at the same time, they incur higher levels of discretionary expenses. Perhaps, this 
finding underlies the common view that board size varies with firm-specific factors and 
institutional environment in which firms operate (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). 
Imposing a “one size fits all” board, with the majority of seats held by outside directors, 
may be suboptimal for, at least, some firms in the study.   
Debt financing, particularly short-term debt, has limited influence on management 
behaviour, consistent with previous studies. Specifically, Ang et al. (2000) claim that debt 
financing plays an alleviating role, whereas Singh and Davidson (2003) argue that it has 
an aggravating one. In addition, there is evidence that larger firms are more efficient in 
their use of assets and in controlling excessive discretionary expenses by firm 
management. The results also show that firms with higher FMKB are associated with 
greater levels of AUR.  Yet high levels of growth also create the opportunity for 
management to expropriate firm resources, with higher levels of DER found for growth 
firms, implying more severe monitoring problems for these firms. Finally, there is also 
evidence of a positive and significant relation between FDIVER and DER, added to the 
controversial debate as whether diversification destroys or creates value (Denis et al. 1997; 
Jiraporn, Kim, Davidson and Singh 2006). In this case, diversification appears to destroy 
value through increased levels of discretionary operating expenses.   
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Table 3. 8:  Robustness test - firm size effect 
  
Intercept BLOCK INSOWN INSOWN2 IODIR LN_BSIZE LN_BSIZE2 ICHAIR TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER LN_FMKB Adj R
2 
(%) F-stat 
Panel A. FSIZE = Total assets (N=500)                       
              
A1. Asset utilisation (AUR)              
“2004” -7.4870* 0.0051 0.0199* -0.0001 0.2083 3.8005* -0.9365* 0.2470** 0.3798 0.7371* 0.0461 0.2612 -0.1842 34.36 11.91 
 (-4.07) (1.56) (2.06) (-0.80) (0.54) (2.24) (-1.98) (1.78) (1.02) (3.78) (0.93) (1.33) (-1.38)   
“2005” -7.3639* 0.0049 0.0202* -0.0001 0.1936 3.8495* -0.9548* 0.2465** 0.4081 0.7482* 0.0616 0.2558 -0.2430* 34.41 11.94 
 (-4.35) (1.51) (2.09) (-0.81) (0.50) (2.27) (-2.02) (1.78) (1.09) (3.82) (1.11) (1.30) (-1.98)   
             
             
A2. Discretionary operating expense (DER)             
“2004” -5.4655* -0.0042** -0.0033 0.0001 0.1848 2.9668* -0.7760* 0.0910 -0.2080 0.0756 0.0109 0.2489** 0.2657* 10.02 2.53 
 (-4.02) (-1.73) (-0.46) (1.26) (0.65) (2.37) (-2.22) (0.89) (-0.75) (0.52) (0.30) (1.71) (2.70)   
“2005” -5.5378* -0.0043** -0.0030 0.0001 0.1717 3.0101* -0.7942* 0.0924 -0.1992 0.0825 0.0220 0.2458** 0.2506* 10.06 2.54 
 (-4.43) (-1.76) (-0.42) (1.24) (0.61) (2.40) (-2.27) (0.90) (-0.72) (0.57) (0.53) (1.69) (2.77)   
           
Panel B. FSIZE = Total market capitalisation (N=500)                     
B1. Asset utilisation (AUR)              
“2004” -5.5531* 0.0058 0.0178 -0.0001 0.0939 1.1015 -0.2209 0.2985 0.5060 0.3201 0.0603 0.2726 -0.0181 27.52 8.64 
 (-2.69) (1.50) (1.57) (-0.53) (0.20) (0.56) (-0.41) (1.43) (1.32) (1.37) (1.10) (1.15) (-0.13)   
“2005” -4.8920* 0.0059 0.0166 -0.0001 0.1653 1.0334 -0.1716 0.3016 0.5208 0.2935 0.0245 0.2870 -0.0680 27.36 8.57 
 (-2.32) (1.54) (1.46) (-0.45) (0.36) (0.53) (-0.32) (1.44) (1.35) (1.25) (0.42) (1.21) (-0.49)   
             
             
B2. Discretionary operating expense (DER)             
“2004” -2.7571* 0.0000 -0.0039 0.0001 0.1686 0.6904 -0.1774 0.2869* -0.3422 -0.1591 -0.0083 0.2177 0.0665 8.47 2.10 
 (-2.16) (-0.01) (-0.56) (0.97) (0.59) (0.57) (-0.54) (2.22) (-1.44) (-1.10) (-0.24) (1.49) (0.76)   
“2005” -2.8919* -0.0001 -0.0037 0.0001 0.1553 0.7063 -0.1875 0.2859* -0.3431 -0.1536 -0.0011 0.2147 0.0725 8.46 2.10 
  (-2.22) (-0.02) (-0.52) (0.94) (0.54) (0.58) (-0.57) (2.21) (-1.44) (-1.06) (-0.03) (1.47) (0.84)    
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Intercept BLOCK INSOWN INSOWN2 IODIR LN_BSIZE LN_BSIZE2 ICHAIR TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER LN_FMKB Adj R
2 
(%) F-stat 
Panel C. Large firms only (N=250)                         
C1. Asset utilisation (AUR)              
“2004” -6.4739* -0.0022 0.0187* -0.0001 -0.8690* 1.5430 -0.6874** 0.3074* -0.4671 0.6944* 0.2284* 0.2120* 0.5645* 60.71 16.77 
 (-3.36) (-0.82) (2.23) (-1.13) (-2.65) (1.06) (-1.72) (2.60) (-1.34) (3.95) (3.89) (1.92) (3.67)   
“2005” -6.7144* -0.0057 0.0218* -0.0002 -0.9519* 1.8443 -0.6249 0.0616 -0.1527 0.5860* 0.2041* 0.0524 0.5888* 50.89 11.25 
 (-3.09) (-1.52) (2.31) (-1.49) (-2.96) (1.09) (-1.50) (0.33) (-0.50) (2.77) (3.21) (0.31) (4.27)   
             
C2. Discretionary operating expense (DER)             
“2004” -7.0239* -0.0025 -0.0186 0.0004* 0.1447 5.7411* -1.4798* 0.1467 -0.1454 0.0232 -0.0436 0.3823* 0.4872* 15.59 2.00 
 (-2.61) (-0.75) (-1.59) (2.23) (0.33) (2.53) (-2.35) (0.99) (-0.40) (0.11) (-0.64) (2.49) (2.89)   
“2005” -2.1299 0.0055** -0.0151 0.0003 0.5677 0.1787 -0.0650 0.4648** 0.1658 -0.2266 -0.0403 0.2821** 0.1712 12.60 1.56 
  (-0.95) (1.65) (-1.48) (1.58) (1.28) (0.09) (-0.12) (1.70) (0.54) (-1.10) (-0.67) (1.68) (1.24)    
Panel D. Small firms only (N=250)                         
D1. Asset utilisation (AUR)              
“2004” -12.3443* 0.0034 0.0041 0.0001 -0.4452 -1.1150 0.2196 0.2265** 0.1524 0.3334** 0.6720* 0.1611 0.6014* 76.69 35.71 
 (-6.65) (1.07) (0.52) (-0.14) (-1.39) (-0.50) (0.31) (1.85) (0.49) (1.91) (16.45) (0.55) (6.35)   
“2005” -10.9716* 0.0053 0.0112 -0.0001 -0.7155 -1.7756 0.1448 -0.0004 0.6310 0.2356 0.6614* -0.1877 0.3310* 58.88 15.54 
 (-4.20) (1.17) (0.94) (-0.81) (-1.51) (-0.62) (0.18) (0.00) (1.24) (0.71) (13.68) (-0.51) (2.24)   
D2. Discretionary operating expense (DER)             
“2004” -2.3789 -0.0054 0.0033 0.0001 0.1421 -0.5402 0.3642 -0.0024 -0.0789 0.0103 -0.0122 0.1379 0.1356 16.81 2.19 
 (-1.31) (-1.59) (0.37) (0.13) (0.33) (-0.27) (0.62) (-0.02) (-0.19) (0.05) (-0.28) (0.63) (1.20)   
“2005” -2.5294 -0.0036 0.0048 0.0000 -0.0503 0.0032 0.1389 0.2614 -0.6482** -0.2670 0.0053 0.3363 -0.0205 21.05 2.89 
  (-1.58) (-1.06) (0.60) (-0.01) (-0.13) (0.10) (0.26) (1.78) (-1.93) (-1.48) (0.16) (1.67) (-0.18)    
This table reports the estimation results of model (3.1). Panel A and Panel B reports the results when Total Assets and Total market capitalisation are used to proxy for FSIZE respectively. Panel C 
reports the results for large firms only whose annual sales is above the median, while Panel D provides a summary of results for small firms only whose annual sales is below the median sales. Refer 
Table 3.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 3. 9:  Other robustness tests 
  
Intercept BLOCK INSOWN INSOWN2 IODIR LN_BSIZE LN_BSIZE2 ICHAIR TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER LN_FMKB DFIN Adj R
2 
(%) F-stat 
Panel A. All firms (N=500)                             
A1. Asset utilisation (AUR)               
“2004” -12.9715* -0.0009 0.0260* -0.0002** -0.7359* 4.3954* -1.5542* 0.2952* 0.0565 0.6122* 0.5008* 0.1163 0.3515* -0.9032* 66.59 74.52 
 (-12.01) (-0.39) (3.93) (-1.95) (-2.76) (3.78) (-4.83) (3.05) (0.22) (4.49) (25.25) (0.85) (4.36) (-8.28)   
“2005” -10.3914* 0.0007 0.0277* -0.0002** -0.9338* 0.9502 -0.6201 0.1219 0.4370 0.5635* 0.5306* -0.0189 0.3447* -1.0872* 56.20 47.97 
 (-7.47) (0.24) (3.27) (-1.87) (-2.71) (0.64) (-1.55) (0.77) (1.51) (3.21) (20.78) (-0.11) (3.30) (-7.62)   
              
              
A2. Discretionary operating expense (DER) 
“2004” -4.9770* -0.0046** -0.0013 0.0001 0.2609 3.3644* -0.8369* 0.0919 -0.2719 0.0721 -0.0329 0.2469** 0.1443** -0.2068** 7.41 2.99 
 (-4.39) (-1.93) (-0.19) (1.31) (0.93) (2.75) (-2.47) (0.90) (-1.01) (0.50) (-1.58) (1.71) (1.70) (-1.80)   
“2005” -2.8506* -0.0014 -0.0037 0.0001 0.2338 1.2286 -0.2785 0.2506** -0.3562 -0.1708 -0.0357** 0.2493** 0.1190 -0.0462 3.87 1.50 
 (-2.51) (-0.57) (-0.54) (1.22) (0.83) (1.02) (-0.85) (1.93) (-1.51) (-1.19) (-1.72) (1.70) (1.40) (-0.40)   
                 
                 
                 
Panel B. Non-financial firms only (N=386)                         
B1. Asset utilisation (AUR)               
“2004” -13.3355* -0.0020 0.0175* -0.0001 -0.5752* 3.6003* -1.3505* 0.2439* -0.3744 0.6572* 0.5685* -0.0259 0.3848*  73.20 84.90 
 (-12.37) (-0.85) (2.63) (-0.78) (-2.11) (3.14) (-4.27) (2.45) (-1.32) (4.74) (27.72) (-0.20) (4.42)    
“2005” -9.4456* -0.0008 0.0214* -0.0002 -0.8845* -0.4529 -0.2610 0.1418 0.1207 0.6939* 0.5636* -0.1347 0.1451  60.77 48.15 
 (-6.41) (-0.26) (2.31) (-1.05) (-2.28) (-0.29) (-0.62) (0.87) (0.36) (3.69) (21.65) (-0.75) (1.23)    
B2. Discretionary operating expense (DER) 
“2004” -5.9173* -0.0045** -0.0056 0.0002 -0.0450 3.8963* -1.0102* 0.0877 -0.0628 0.0616 0.0024 0.2815** 0.3344*  8.20 2.77 
 (-4.82) (-1.73) (-0.73) (1.46) (-0.15) (2.98) (-2.81) (0.77) (-0.20) (0.39) (0.10) (1.90) (3.38)    
“2005” -3.1842* -0.0014 0.0022 0.0001 -0.0622 1.5426 -0.3962 0.2576** 0.1214 -0.0744 -0.0286 0.3340* 0.1626**  4.61 1.50 
  (-2.58) (-0.54) (0.28) (0.42) (-0.19) (1.18) (-1.13) (1.90) (0.43) (-0.47) (-1.32) (2.23) (1.65)    
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Intercept BLOCK INSOWN INSOWN2 IODIR LN_BSIZE LN_BSIZE2 ICHAIR TDEBT SDEBT FSIZE FDIVER LN_FMKB DFIN Adj R
2 
(%) F-stat 
Panel C. Orthogonalisation estimation (N=500)  
C1. Asset utilisation (AUR)               
“2004” -8.9870* 0.0008 0.0211* -0.0002** -0.6442* 6.5836* -1.5065* 0.2669* 0.0267 0.6488* 0.4930* 0.0853 0.4623* 69.27 51.31 
 (-8.67) (0.35) (3.25) (-1.84) (-2.47) (5.70) (-4.76) (2.82) (0.10) (4.91) (23.34) (0.63) (5.21)    
“2005” -5.5488* 0.0013 0.0236* -0.0002** -0.9224* 2.8368** -0.5269 0.1075 0.3724 0.4996* 0.5033* -0.0741 0.3389* 58.21 31.70 
 (-4.09) (0.43) (2.78) (-1.82) (-2.64) (1.91) (-1.32) (0.68) (1.27) (2.86) (18.79) (-0.41) (3.20)    
C2. Discretionary operating expense (DER) 
“2004” -5.1475* -0.0039** -0.0038 0.0001 0.2327 2.8100* -0.7295* 0.0868 -0.1926 0.0720 -0.0173 0.2578** 0.2296* 10.11 2.56 
 (-4.60) (-1.64) (-0.54) (1.33) (0.83) (2.25) (-2.13) (0.85) (-0.70) (0.50) (-0.76) (1.77) (2.40)    
“2005” -2.8455* 0.0002 -0.0041 0.0001 0.2215 0.5964 -0.1655 0.2977* -0.3343 -0.1663 -0.0304 0.2367** 0.0480 8.83 2.21 
  (-2.37) (0.10) (-0.65) (1.12) (0.78) (0.44) (-0.44) (2.16) (-1.37) (-1.21) (-1.36) (1.81) (0.54)   
                 
This table reports the estimation results of model (3.1). Panel A reports the results for all firms including DFIN dummy variables. Panel B reports the results for non-financial firms only. Panel 
C reports the results for orthogonalisation estimation. Refer Table 3.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
LARGEST SHAREHOLDER AND EQUITY AGENCY COSTS:  
AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 60 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Much of the literature on equity agency conflicts that exist between shareholders 
and managers is based on the notion of widely dispersed ownership. This notion was 
originally established by Berle and Means (1932), and has been propagated by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1982).  However, recent literature has provided 
evidence that firms, except for Anglo-American firms, are often controlled by a single 
shareholder or a shareholder group (La Porta et al. 1999 for developed country firms; 
Becht and Mayer 2000 for European firms; Claessens et al. 2000 for East Asian firms). 
Firms with large shareholders, rather than widely dispersed shareholder groups, are 
more numerous than the initial US based research suggests. For example, across the 43 
countries included in the final sample that is used in this chapter, more than 60% of the 
firms are rated by OSIRIS as having a level of ownership concentration greater than 
24.99% (independence indicator equal to B or C). Indeed, the largest shareholder, on 
average, holds more than 30% of total shares in their firm. It is also important to note that 
the shareholding of the second and third largest shareholders decreases rapidly relative to 
the largest shareholder. This suggests that control is concentrated in the hands of the 
largest shareholder due to the absence of other large shareholders with similar 
shareholdings, especially for firms located outside the UK and the US. 
                                                 
60 This chapter is largely based on the paper, entitled “Largest shareholder and equity agency costs: 
international evidence”, submitted to Journal of Corporate Finance. 
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Investors with large ownership stakes (or large shareholders) play an important 
role in the Jensen and Meckling (1976) equity agency relation as they have the ability to 
monitor management and to influence the strategic decisions of the firm so as to ensure 
that firm value is maximized.61 Large shareholders, however, may be costly for the firm 
(Holderness 2003). The effect of large shareholders on equity agency costs has been 
documented in the recent literature (Ang et al. 2000 and Fleming et al. 2005 for small to 
medium firms; and Singh and Davidson 2003 and Florackis and Ozkan 2005 for listed 
firms). The studies generally show a negative association between ownership and equity 
agency costs, yet the impact of the largest shareholder on this relation has not been 
investigated. 
This chapter extends this strand of literature by not only focusing on the largest 
shareholder, but also investigating the extent of the relation that exists between the largest 
shareholder and equity agency conflicts in a large cross-country analysis. Further, it has 
recently been documented that different classes of large shareholders have differing ability 
to exercise control or to monitor management, or have differing incentives to align their 
interests with those of the other stakeholders (Claessens et al. 2002; Gugler and Yurtoglu 
2003).62 Thus, the impact of different types of largest shareholder on this relation is also 
considered here to furnish further evidence of the links that exist between ownership and 
agency costs.  
Corporate finance theory has identified several policy choices that may influence 
agency conflicts, two of which are examined in this study: debt financing and dividend 
                                                 
61 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that large shareholders have substantial economic incentive to reduce 
agency conflicts and to maximize firm value. Further, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.54) state that “large 
shareholders thus address the agency problem in that they have both a general interest in profit 
maximization, and enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected”.  
62 Prior research suggests that it is important to distinguish types of large shareholders when examining 
agency conflicts (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003). 
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policy.63 First, debt financing not only induces additional monitoring by debt holders, but 
it also exerts pressure on the firm in the way that it manages its cash flows (Stulz 1990). 
The structure of debt may also matter (Florackis and Ozkan 2005). Short-term debt 
increases pressure on management to perform due to the more regular reviews that 
accompany short-term debt contracts and the impact of short-term debt on firm working 
capital. Hence, this study includes the ratio of short-term debt to total debt as a proxy for 
debt structure. Second, dividend policy may serve as another control mechanism over the 
agency conflicts. Rozeff (1982) conjectures that dividend payments are part of the firm’s 
optimal monitoring/bonding package, while Jensen (1986) argues that increased dividends 
may alleviate agency conflicts that result from excessive free cash flows. In addition, it is 
argued that agency conflicts vary with how well shareholders and other stakeholders are 
protected by the law, including the effectiveness of their legal enforcement. In low legal 
protection environments, concentrated ownership may be an effective disciplining 
mechanism that limits expropriation of corporate wealth by management (La Porta, 
Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2000a).  
This chapter shows that different levels of efficiency exist in the use of firm assets 
and in the control exercised over discretionary expenses across a large sample of 9,165 
firms drawn from 43 countries.64 Importantly, such cross-sectional variation in the 
efficiency of asset utilization and the level of discretionary expenses incurred by 
management can largely be attributed to firm ownership. Specifically, firms with 
substantial ownership by the largest shareholder are more efficient not only in the use of 
their assets, but also in curbing discretionary expenses by firm management. Further, the 
analysis demonstrates that firms subject to the common law based legal systems exhibit 
greater levels of asset utilization and lower levels of discretionary expenses than those of 
                                                 
63 Refer to Gillan (2006) for a recent survey of literature on corporate governance mechanisms. 
64 Previous studies concentrating on equity agency costs have tended to focus on a single country for listed 
firms such as Singh and Davidson (2003) for the US; and Florackis and Ozkan (2005) for the UK.  
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civil law. This is consistent with the view that the common law system is associated with 
better corporate governance including greater investor protection (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 2000a; Claessens et al. 2002; Lins 2003). 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of the literature 
establishing that a relation exists between corporate ownership and equity agency 
conflicts. Section 4.3 describes the sample and data used in the analysis. Section 4.4 
reports the results of univariate analysis, while Section 4.5 discusses further analysis in a 
multivariate framework. A summary is presented in Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
4.2.1. Large shareholders 
Shareholders with substantial holdings can help to align the interests of the firm’s 
management with its shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).65 It is thought that these 
shareholders have better access to, and/or incentives to collect, information on managerial 
performance and to remove managers who do not maximize shareholder wealth. Empirical 
evidence, however, is mixed in this regard (Holderness 2003). For example, based on a 
sample of 511 large US corporations, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) conclude that there is no 
significant relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rates for 
their sample firms (also refer to Holderness and Sheehan 1988; Mehran 1995; Thomsen et 
al. 2006).66 Yet Holderness and Sheehan (1985) and Barclay and Holderness (1989; 1991) 
report positive excess returns generated around the announcement date when large outside 
                                                 
65 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model, where it is argued that takeovers can be successful only 
when the bidder has already acquired a large minority ownership position in the firm. Thus, all else equal, 
they predict that the presence of a large blockholder is likely to exert a positive effect on the market value of 
a firm. 
66 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use three different measures of ownership concentration: the fraction of shares 
held by the five largest shareholders, the fraction of shares held by the 20 largest shareholders, and a 
Herfindahl index of ownership concentration. The results based on all of these proxies are similar. Though 
they also focused on the effect of institutional shareholders, they did not examine the differences that exist 
between the different types of shareholders.  
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block trades are undertaken. Using more advanced econometric techniques, Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) observe a statistically insignificant link between outside ownership 
(inside ownership) and firm performance when they address the possibility that ownership 
structure and performance are not endogenous as suggested by Demsetz (1983) (also see 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Mak and Li 2001; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003). In contrast to 
these single country-based studies, cross-country studies consistently produce evidence of 
a positive and statistically significant link between large shareholding and Tobin Q 
(Claessens et al. 2002; La Porta et al. 2002; Lins 2003).   
So far, it has assumed that the agency relations between managers and large 
shareholders are of the same type, irrespective of the nature of the shareholder. 
Shareholders are typically individuals, families, widely held corporations, financial 
institutions or the state. It is apparent that different types of large shareholder have 
different incentives and/or abilities to exercise control over firm management, and hence 
they differ in their impact on equity conflicts (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2002). 
Specifically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) conjecture that inside controlling shareholders 
are likely to be directly involved in the operational management of the firm, which gives 
them discretion over management decisions (Cho 1998; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit 2006). Though such direct involvement may give rise to 
entrenchment effects, it may also facilitate the monitoring of firm management, and hence 
lead to lower agency costs (Morck et al. 1988). It is noted that when large shareholders are 
either widely held corporations or financial institutions, the agency relation becomes more 
complicated because the managers of these corporations or institutions are agents 
themselves (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Grinstein and Michaely 2005; Khan 2006).67 
Further, Faccio (2003) examines firms with large shareholders who are governments or 
                                                 
67 Pound (1988) discusses three main incentives of institutional investors in a firm, and provides empirical 
evidence of an active role for institutional investors in monitoring firm management. 
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politically connected, and argues that the presence of these shareholders benefits firms, 
especially those in countries with high levels of corruption, low protection of property 
rights, or non-democratic government. The benefits include better access to debt 
financing, taxation and market power for example. Yet, the author fails to produce 
evidence that the presence of large state shareholders improves overall firm performance.   
 
4.2.2 Debt financing 
 Debt can act as a self-enforcing governance mechanism. It is argued that debt 
forces firm managers to generate adequate cash to meet interest and principal obligations, 
and this reduces perquisite consumption and wasteful negative NPV projects (Agrawal and 
Knoeber 1996). Further, to protect their interest in the firm, debtholders regularly monitor 
the firm’s management in order to alleviate financial distress costs. Thus, debt financing 
potentially mitigates potential agency costs of free cash (Jensen 1986). 
Stulz (1990) conjectures that debt financing has a dual effect on the value of the 
firm. In other words, debt financing may introduce additional monitoring of management 
as well as reduce free cash flows at the discretion of firm management, however it may 
also restrict the funds available for positive NPV investment projects that a firm can 
undertake.68 McConnell and Servaes (1995) show that debt financing, proxied by a ratio of 
the market value of long-term debt to the replacement cost of assets, is a fundamental 
determinant of firm value (Tobin’s Q). Their results, however, are conditional on firm 
growth options. For high growth (low growth) firms, an increase in firm debt is associated 
with a decrease (an increase) in firm value. Further, it is also evident that debt structure is 
important to the agency relation. As discussed in Chapter 3, the analysis of the largest 500 
                                                 
68 Refer to Mayers (1977) for the “underinvestment” problem of debt financing.  
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Australian firms over two years 2004 and 2005 demonstrates that short-term debt 
financing is effective in improving the use of firm assets.69 
 
4.2.3 Dividend policy 
 Dividend policy serves as another control over the agency conflicts (Easterbrook 
1984). Increases in dividend payouts can lower the cash that management controls, and 
thereby reduce the opportunity for firm management to invest in negative NPV projects 
(Rozeff 1982; Jensen 1986). Recently, in a survey of 384 financial executives, Brav et al. 
(2005) conclude that firms that are committed to pay out dividends are likely to reduce the 
excess free cash flow problem. In other words, higher dividends are associated with lower 
“agency costs of free cash flows”.  
 Dividend payout may also force firms to seek external financing (raising new 
capital or issuing new debt) from financial markets. This imposes further management 
monitoring by capital markets because outside shareholders are given the opportunity to 
examine the condition of the firm more closely at these times (Easterbrook 1984). In 
particular, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) introduce a model of firm valuation in which 
dividend policy acts as a self-imposed discipline that potentially substitutes for large 
shareholders in monitoring firm management. However, empirical studies do not 
unanimously support this view. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) produce little evidence to 
support the argument that large shareholders and dividend policy are alternative 
mechanisms of monitoring. Yet, Crutchley et al. (1999) examine the interdependence 
among four agency control variables: leverage, dividends, insider ownership and 
institutional ownership, and find evidence that institutional ownership is a substitute for 
the other three variables, including dividends, in mitigating agency problems.  
                                                 
69 Fleming et al. (2005) also report some evidence of the impact of debt financing on equity agency conflicts 
for small to medium Australian enterprises. 
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4.2.4 Research focus 
The largest shareholder is viewed as a unique class of large shareholders in the 
recent literature (Claessens et al. 2002). Like large shareholders generally, the largest 
shareholder has an incentive to monitor the firm intensively because their wealth is 
directly affected by management decisions. They not only have the means to interfere with 
managerial decision making, but also face high costs when their reputation for not 
expropriating minority shareholders is damaged. Claessens et al. (2002) examine a sample 
of 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian countries and suggest that firm 
value improves as the shareholding of the largest shareholder increases, consistent with the 
existence of positive incentive effects (also refer to Lins 2003).70 In contrast, using a panel 
data for 309 Swedish firms during the period between 1991 and 1999, Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003) find that both return on assets and Tobin Q are significantly lower for 
firms with voting ownership dominated by controlling shareholders. In addition, Wruck 
(1989) demonstrates that when firms announce a private placement of new equity, firm 
value increases non-monotonically with the shareholding of the six largest shareholders.71 
Therefore, the relation between ownership and agency costs appear to vary with the 
shareholding by the largest shareholder. 
The previous research leaves unanswered several questions concerning the largest 
shareholder. Are there differences in the level of agency costs that exist within and across 
particular groups of largest shareholder, or within and across countries? Can such 
differences be linked to firm governance structures such as firm ownership (particularly 
the largest shareholder and its type), debt financing and dividend policy? Finally, what is 
                                                 
70 McConnell and Servaes (1990) also report a positive linkage between the ownership by the largest outside 
shareholder and Tobin’s Q for NYSE and AMEX firms in both years 1976 and 1986, however, they fail to 
confirm the statistical significance of this link.  
71 Large shareholders may also generate substantial costs. The costs of large holdings and entrenchment are 
formalized in the model of Stulz (1988), which predicts a non-linear relation between managerial ownership 
and firm value.  
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the extent of these links? These questions are essentially the focus of this chapter as the 
answers to these questions have implications for the understanding of corporate 
governance, particularly the impact of corporate ownership.  
 
4.3 Data and Sample 
4.3.1 Data 
The data used for the analysis is obtained from the OSIRIS (Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing) for two years 2004 and 2005. In 2005, OSIRIS began to include 
information on major shareholders in terms of broad classifications such as institutions, 
state, publicly listed companies, individuals, employees and managers. For the year 2005, 
there are initially 23,400 listed firms included in the OSIRIS February 2006 disk, with 
7,320 firms that do not have information on share ownership. Matching these firms with 
those that are included in the OSIRIS February 2005 disk gives a matched sample of 
14,214 firms for both years 2004 and 2005. The construction of the sample is described in 
Table 4.1. 
Panel A of Table 4.1 outlines the steps taken in the construction of the final 
sample. The original matched sample of 14,214 firms is reduced through exclusion of 
those firms with incomplete data, firms with SIC code between 6000 and 6900,72 and 
those with total sales, total assets or total market capitalization less than US$2 million. As 
a result of this filtering process, the final sample consists of 9,615 listed firms drawn from 
43 countries around the world for two years 2004 and 2005. Not all the firms in this 
sample report their discretionary expenses, leaving 8,185 firms with discretionary 
expenses data for both years 2004 and 2005, and 980 firms for which discretionary 
expenses information is not available for both years. Panel B of Table 4.1 describes the 
                                                 
72 It includes financial firms and banks. 
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impact of the filtering rules on the countries included in the sample with a reduction from 
123 countries to 43 countries in the final sample. Generally speaking, the final sample has 
a wider coverage of firms and countries than previous studies such as La Porta et al. 
(2000b) or Claessens et al. (2000).     
 
Table 4. 1:  Sample construction 
Panel A. Firms in the sample 
   
14,214  Listed firms active on both OSIRIS Data Disks February 2005 & February 2006. 
 -  1,994  Firms where shareholder & ownership data are incomplete. 
-  1,658  Firms whose primary SIC code lies between 6000 and 6900. 
-  1,359  
Firms whose total assets, total sales or market capitalisation in years 2004 & 2005 are 
less than US$2 million. 
   -     38  Firms in countries with less than 5 firms. 
    9,165  Firms in the final sample. 
       980  Firms that have zero DER in both years 2004 and 2005. 
 
Panel B. Countries in the sample 
  123  Countries on OSIRIS Data Disk February 2006. 
-   49  Countries excluded due to insufficient shareholder and ownership data. 
-   31  Countries that do not meet other data criteria. 
    43   Countries in the final sample. 
Panel A describes how firms are eliminated and reports the number of firms remaining in the final sample.  
Panel B outlines how countries are eliminated and reports the number of countries remaining in the final 
sample 
 
The shareholding and the identity of all shareholders are then obtained from the 
OSIRIS February 2005 and 2006 disks for each of the firms in the study. The largest 
shareholder is then identified using the total (direct and indirect)73 holding of ordinary 
(voting) shares reported in OSIRIS for each firm. The largest shareholder is defined as that 
largest shareholder in the firm who holds at least 5% of the firm’s total shares. Largest 
shareholders are then categorized into three subgroups, (1) inside largest shareholder 
(Large_INSD) who are materially linked to the firm and include employees, managers, 
directors, individuals or families, (2) financial institutional largest shareholder 
                                                 
73 According to OSIRIS database, indirect ownership by the largest shareholder refers to as the shareholding 
by the largest shareholder in the firm via intermediate entities.  
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(Large_FIN)74 including financial institutions such as banks, financial companies, 
insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds and, (3) state largest shareholder 
(Large_STATE) including government and state-owned entities.  
The Herfindahl index is also calculated as an alternative proxy for the level of 
ownership concentration (ConOWN) (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). A number of filters are 
then applied to cap the Herfindahl value within a range of 0 and 1. Further, for each firm, 
the OSIRIS independence indicator, which reflects variations in the level of ownership 
concentration (independence indicator A, B and C), are also obtained from OSIRIS as a 
further proxy for ownership concentration (for more information, refer to Appendix 4.1). 
For firm information, accounting variables such as total sales, discretionary 
expenses, total assets, market capitalization, total equity, ordinary dividends, short-term 
debt and long-term debt are also collected for both years 2004 and 2005. It should be 
noted that all these variables are measured in US dollars. Table 4.2 provides a list of 
definitions of the variables that are used in the analysis. Following Lins (2003), in order to 
reduce the effect of accounting outliers, the accounting variables are windsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles by replacing observations lying outside the 1st and 99th percentile 
range with values at the 1st and 99th percentiles respectively. The following subsection 
briefly describes all variables of interest used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Dependent variables – proxies for equity agency costs 
As discussed in Chapter 3, two proxies for equity agency costs are chosen, 
consistent with previous studies as follows (Ang et al. 2000; Singh and Davidson 2003).  
Asset utilization AUR, calculated as the ratio of net sales to total assets, is adopted as the 
first proxy. This measure indicates the level of efficiency in the use of a firm’s assets. In a 
                                                 
74 One of the reasons that this study focuses on financial institutions is that they have dominated the 
ownership structure of firms around the world (Li, Moshirian, Pham and Zein 2006). 
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traditional agency context, the higher the AUR the more efficiently assets are allocated 
and managed in generating income for the firm (i.e. increasing level of sales for each 
dollar invested in the firm’s assets). This result can be partly related either to the level of 
commitment and performance of firm management or the level of monitoring of 
management or both. Thus, it could be argued that low AUR reflects relatively high levels 
of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Ang et al. 2000).    
Discretionary expenses DER, estimated as the ratio of discretionary operating 
expenses to total sales, is the second proxy for equity agency costs adopted here.75 
Relatively high DER implies that the firm has incurred high levels of discretionary 
spending, not directly related to income-generating activities, which may adversely affect 
the wealth of shareholders. A relatively high DER tends to signal the possibility that firm 
management is expropriating wealth from shareholders by diverting firm resources (via 
increased operating expenses) for negative NPV projects or for their personal perquisite 
consumption (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Therefore, DER provides a direct proxy for the 
level of equity agency costs. Indeed, it is expected that firms with high levels of agency 
costs are likely to exhibit relatively high DER.  
It should be noted that there is considerable non-normality in the AUR and the 
DER data. As a result, log transformation of both AUR and DER is applied to reduce the 
level of non-normality and the natural log of LN_AUR and LN_DER is used for all 
multivariate analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Using the OSIRIS definition, the total discretionary expenses item does not include the cost of good sold, 
interest expense, depreciation, or abnormal costs. Despite that, the data may not yet exclude all non-
discretionary expenses and hence it may not reflect the true level of firm discretionary expenses. However, it 
is feasible that as scaled by total assets, DER provides a good approximate measure. 
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Table 4. 2:  Variable definition 
AUR  
(Asset utilisation ratio)  
the ratio of total sales to total assets 
LN_AUR natural log of AUR 
DER 
(Discretionary expense ratio) 
the ratio of discretionary expenses to total sales 
LN_DER natural log of DER 
LargeOWN 
 
total ownership (direct and indirect ownership) held by the 
largest shareholder. 
LargeOWN2 squared value of LargeOWN 
LargeTYPE set of dummy variables for various types of the largest 
shareholder: financial institutions (Large_FIN), insiders 
(Large_INSD) or government (Large_STATE). 
ConOWN 
(Ownership Concentration)  
sum of squared shareholdings held by all shareholders that are 
included in OSIRIS data base. 
SecondOWN dummy variable, set equal to 1 for firms whose shareholding of 
the second largest shareholder exceeds 5%, and 0 otherwise. 
IndepTYPE set of dummy variables for OSIRIS Independence (A, B and C)  
SDEBT ratio of short term debt to total debt 
TDEBT ratio of total debt to total assets 
DivPay dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that pays dividends and 0 
otherwise. 
DivA ratio of total ordinary dividends to total assets 
FSIZE  natural log of total sales  
FMKB 
 
ratio of the book value of total assets less shareholder equity 
plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets  
LN_FMKB natural log of FMKB 
  
ComLaw dummy variable equal to 1 for common law countries and 0 
otherwise. 
INDUSTRY  
 
set of dummy variables, one for each of the ten GICS industry 
classifications. One industry is dropped in multivariate analysis 
where the intercept term is maintained.   
COUNTRY set of dummy variables, one for each of 43 countries in the final 
sample. One country is dropped in multivariate analysis where 
the intercept term is maintained.   
 
 
4.3.3 Independent variables 
The independent variables are split into two main groups: governance and control. 
The governance group, includes variables proxying for firm ownership, debt financing and 
dividend policy, whereas the control group includes variables such as firm size, growth 
options and dummy variables for industry and country effect. 
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For each firm, the shareholding of the largest shareholder (LargeOWN) is 
calculated based on ownership data provided in the OSIRIS disks. It is apparent that the 
level of equity agency conflict varies with the shareholding controlled by the largest 
shareholder. Based on previous studies, a non-linear relation between LargeOWN and the 
two proxies for agency costs is expected (see Morck et al. 1988; Jensen et al. 1992). In 
other words, as LargeOWN increases, the largest shareholder has increased incentive to 
align their interests with that of the managers and other shareholders (“incentive effects”), 
and hence mitigate agency conflicts in the firm. However, as LargeOWN continues to 
increase beyond a certain threshold, there is also incentive for the largest shareholder to 
entrench themselves, and as a result, they may not act in the best interests of other 
stakeholders, particularly minority shareholders (“entrenchment effects”), leading to 
increased agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
The type of the largest shareholder matters because different types of largest 
shareholder may differ in the way they deal with agency conflicts, and are often associated 
with particular firm characteristics. For example, for 2,980 firms in East Asia, Claessens et 
al (2000) detect some differences in firm characteristics among different groups of 
controlling shareholders (i.e. widely held corporations, family, the state or financial 
institutions). Second, the literature suggests that different types of the largest shareholder 
have not only different expertise and abilities to exercise control, but also differing 
incentives to monitor the firm’s management (Claessens et al. 2002). Thus, this study 
focuses on three main types of largest shareholders: insiders, financial institutions and the 
state. Corresponding to each type are the dummy variables, Large_INSD, Large_FIN and 
Large_STATE respectively (see Table 4.2). Based on the literature, there is some 
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uncertainty about the actual impact of each type of the largest shareholder classifications 
on the level of agency costs.76  
The ratio of the total debt to total assets (TDEBT) is chosen as a proxy for debt 
financing (Singh and Davidson 2003). As discussed earlier, an increase in firm debt is 
associated with increased monitoring of management from financial markets, which may 
help to lower agency costs. However, high debt also requires greater levels of repayment 
(interest and principal), which then reduces free-cash flows and limits investment 
opportunities for the firm (Stulz 1990). Thus, the effect of TDEBT on the selected agency 
cost variables is uncertain.  
The ratio of short-term debt to total debt ratio (SDEBT) is also included in the 
analysis. Short-term debt can serve to lessen agency costs because firm management faces 
more regular monitoring pressures as the short-term debt is rolled over. However, previous 
studies dealing with the impact of agency costs have tended to ignore the effect of debt 
structure on agency costs. The inclusion of this ratio may help to gain a better 
understanding of the impact of debt structure (Florackis and Ozkan 2005).  
Two proxies for dividend policy: the ratio of ordinary dividends to total assets 
(DivA) and a dummy variable (DivPay), are adopted in this study. It is argued that a firm 
that is committed to pay dividends tends to have lower levels of agency costs (Rozeff 
1982; Easterbrook 1984). Hence, it is expected that a negative relation exists between 
dividend payout and agency costs.77 It should be noted that in the analysis, lagged values 
are used as instruments for dividend policy to avoid potential endogeneity problems that 
may occur with these variables.  
                                                 
76 For example, examining the effect of family control on firm value for Continental European firms, 
Barontini and Caprio (2005) argue that family can have both negative and positive effects, and find that 
family control is positive for firm value. In contrast, Claessens et al. (2002) indicate that family ownership 
leads to more conflicts with other stakeholders, and hence may limit firm growth. It is noted that “fierce” 
monitoring of management may reduce managerial incentives and non-contractible investments, and hence, 
may impose further costs on the firm (Burkart et al. 1997).  
77 This relation will be examined in the following chapter.    
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For control purposes, the natural log of total sales is used to proxy for firm size. 
The market to book ratio (FMKB) is also used as a proxy for the level of growth options. 
It is argued that the agency relation is affected by firm growth as firms with different 
levels of growth exhibit different levels of free cash flow and/or information asymmetry 
(McConnell and Servaes 1995). Specifically, firms with high growth are often associated 
with low free cash flows, and are thus less likely to have agency problems such as 
underinvestment and/or excessive consumption by management. However, high-growth 
firms, particularly those with high levels of diversification, normally operate in an 
environment where high information asymmetry exists, which in turn makes the 
monitoring of management more difficult and costly. Finally, a set of industry dummies 
(INDUSTRY) and country dummies (COUNTRY) are included to control for 
unobservable industry and country effects. 
 
4.3.4 Sample  
 The final sample for analysis consists of 9,165 listed firms in 43 countries around 
the world for two years 2004 and 2005. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of ownership 
and types of the largest shareholder. It is shown that the sample of common law countries 
largely consists of firms with fairly diverse shareholdings, having an OSIRIS 
Independence indicator A.  Indeed, about 52% (year 2004) of the sample, compared with 
32% (year 2004) of the sample falling into this classification for civil law countries. This 
is in line with the literature that identifies low levels of ownership concentration among 
common law firms (La Porta et al. 1999). Interestingly, the largest shareholder is 
commonly a financial institution, on average 21% (for civil law countries) and 32% (for 
common law countries). This is consistent with increased evidence that financial 
institutions dominate ownership structure in firms around the world (Li et al. 2006). 
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Further, the largest shareholder, who is an insider, also accounts for a reasonable 
proportion of the final sample, whereas there are few firms with a largest shareholder who 
is either government or state.78 There is also evidence of statistically significant variation 
between these differences (see the last two lines of Table 4.3). 
Table 4.4 reports the mean distribution for the dependent and independent 
variables by country and by legal origin for the two years, 2004 and 2005. The results for 
the two years, 2004 and 2005, are similar in most respects. Common law firms exhibit 
higher levels of both AUR and DER than civil law firms. For example, for the year 2005, 
average AUR (DER) for firms in common law countries is 1.0891 (0.4092), whereas for 
civil law firms it is 1.0072 (0.2813) respectively. It is also clear that common law firms 
tend to be larger (in terms of total assets), generate more sales, have higher growth 
opportunities (FMKB), pay higher dividends (DivA), and are less dependent on debt 
financing (TDEBT & SDEBT) than civil law firms.  Each of these sample characteristics 
is consistent with previous studies (La Porta et al. 2000b). In most cases, these differences 
are both statistically and economically significant. 
  
 
 
                                                 
78 With OSIRIS database, I was unable to identify either the ultimate owner of a firm or the beneficial owner 
of an investment/fund trust. This is a limitation of this study. This is particularly evident in the case of 
Singapore where it is evident that some Singaporean firms are controlled by the government through its 
investment arm, Temasak. It is unlikely that commercial databases like OSIRIS will solve this problem 
given the current disclosure requirements that are in place around the world. 
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Table 4. 3:  Types of largest shareholder and OSIRIS independence indicators 
   Year 2004 Year 2005 
  OSIRIS Independence Largest shareholder type OSIRIS Independence Largest shareholder type 
Country #Firms %_A %_B %_C %_FIN %_INSD %_STATE %Others %_A %_B %_C %_FIN %_INSD %_STATE %Others
Panel A. OSIRIS independence and types of largest shareholder. 
Argentina 11 0.00% 18.18% 81.82% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 90.91% 0.00% 18.18% 81.82% 18.18% 0.00% 0.00% 81.82%
Austria 38 21.05% 31.58% 47.37% 5.26% 15.79% 2.63% 76.32% 31.58% 23.68% 44.74% 7.89% 13.16% 2.63% 76.32%
Belgium 80 23.75% 37.50% 38.75% 23.75% 8.75% 0.00% 67.50% 26.25% 37.50% 36.25% 20.00% 7.50% 0.00% 72.50%
Brazil 18 16.67% 22.22% 61.11% 33.33% 0.00% 5.56% 61.11% 16.67% 5.56% 77.78% 38.89% 0.00% 5.56% 55.56%
Chile 13 15.38% 38.46% 46.15% 15.38% 0.00% 0.00% 84.62% 23.08% 23.08% 53.85% 23.08% 0.00% 0.00% 76.92%
China    973  15.93% 46.56% 37.51% 9.97% 0.00% 0.10% 89.93% 16.34% 46.56% 37.10% 10.59% 0.10% 0.31% 89.00%
Denmark 72 41.67% 40.28% 18.06% 38.89% 15.28% 1.39% 44.44% 48.61% 30.56% 20.83% 40.28% 12.50% 0.00% 47.22%
Finland 90 51.11% 32.22% 16.67% 27.78% 20.00% 6.67% 45.56% 51.11% 35.56% 13.33% 27.78% 15.56% 7.78% 48.89%
France    437 26.09% 34.78% 39.13% 11.67% 26.09% 0.69% 61.56% 28.15% 31.12% 40.73% 11.90% 26.09% 0.69% 61.33%
Germany    330 30.00% 32.12% 37.88% 7.88% 29.09% 1.52% 61.52% 32.73% 32.73% 34.55% 9.09% 25.15% 1.21% 64.55%
Greece 73 23.29% 42.47% 34.25% 4.11% 57.53% 2.74% 35.62% 27.40% 38.36% 34.25% 4.11% 57.53% 2.74% 35.62%
Indonesia 18 11.11% 16.67% 72.22% 5.56% 5.56% 0.00% 88.89% 16.67% 5.56% 77.78% 11.11% 5.56% 0.00% 83.33%
Italy    140 28.57% 17.14% 54.29% 12.86% 38.57% 9.29% 39.29% 25.71% 19.29% 55.00% 13.57% 35.71% 7.86% 42.86%
Japan    317 53.94% 28.08% 17.98% 34.07% 0.63% 0.63% 64.67% 54.89% 27.13% 17.98% 34.38% 0.63% 0.63% 64.35%
South Korea    904 55.53% 37.61% 6.86% 4.42% 68.81% 0.22% 26.55% 53.98% 39.82% 6.19% 3.76% 65.49% 0.22% 30.53%
Mexico 19 31.58% 36.84% 31.58% 5.26% 42.11% 0.00% 52.63% 31.58% 42.11% 26.32% 5.26% 42.11% 0.00% 52.63%
Netherlands 98 58.16% 24.49% 17.35% 38.78% 11.22% 2.04% 47.96% 61.22% 23.47% 15.31% 41.84% 12.24% 0.00% 45.92%
Norway 80 51.25% 40.00% 8.75% 27.50% 10.00% 11.25% 51.25% 52.50% 37.50% 10.00% 32.50% 8.75% 12.50% 46.25%
Philippines 20 15.00% 30.00% 55.00% 35.00% 5.00% 0.00% 60.00% 15.00% 35.00% 50.00% 40.00% 5.00% 0.00% 55.00%
Poland 13 46.15% 46.15% 7.69% 15.38% 0.00% 15.38% 69.23% 38.46% 38.46% 23.08% 7.69% 0.00% 15.38% 76.92%
Portugal 41 39.02% 21.95% 39.02% 26.83% 7.32% 0.00% 65.85% 39.02% 31.71% 29.27% 29.27% 4.88% 0.00% 65.85%
Russia  9 0.00% 66.67% 33.33% 44.44% 0.00% 11.11% 44.44% 11.11% 44.44% 44.44% 33.33% 0.00% 11.11% 55.56%
Spain 91 59.34% 25.27% 15.38% 21.98% 7.69% 0.00% 70.33% 59.34% 20.88% 19.78% 18.68% 14.29% 0.00% 67.03%
Sweden    147 53.06% 37.41% 9.52% 23.13% 18.37% 0.68% 57.82% 53.74% 36.73% 9.52% 28.57% 9.52% 0.00% 61.90%
Switzerland       98 36.73% 21.43% 41.84% 24.49% 20.41% 5.10% 50.00% 50.00% 21.43% 28.57% 18.37% 22.45% 5.10% 54.08%
                
CiviLaw mean  32.18% 33.04% 34.78% 20.27% 16.33% 3.08% 60.32% 34.61% 29.86% 35.54% 21.21% 15.37% 2.95% 60.48%
                
 100 
   Year 2004 Year 2005 
  OSIRIS Independence Largest shareholder type OSIRIS Independence Largest shareholder type 
Country #Firms %_A %_B %_C %_FIN %_INSD %_STATE %Others %_A %_B %_C %_FIN %_INSD %_STATE %Others
Australia    310 77.42% 13.55% 9.03% 55.81% 6.13% 0.00% 38.06% 69.03% 20.00% 10.97% 52.90% 6.77% 0.00% 40.32%
Bermuda 97 22.68% 30.93% 46.39% 22.68% 20.62% 0.00% 56.70% 22.68% 32.99% 44.33% 25.77% 26.80% 0.00% 47.42%
Canada    173 58.96% 24.28% 16.76% 34.68% 21.39% 0.00% 43.93% 61.27% 22.54% 16.18% 34.10% 20.23% 0.00% 45.66%
Cayman Islands 25 36.00% 32.00% 32.00% 16.00% 8.00% 0.00% 76.00% 28.00% 36.00% 36.00% 24.00% 16.00% 0.00% 60.00%
Hong Kong 58 13.79% 29.31% 56.90% 24.14% 18.97% 0.00% 56.90% 15.52% 32.76% 51.72% 18.97% 27.59% 0.00% 53.45%
India    117 60.68% 17.95% 21.37% 23.08% 10.26% 0.85% 65.81% 58.12% 18.80% 23.08% 22.22% 12.82% 0.85% 64.10%
Ireland 22 90.91% 4.55% 4.55% 63.64% 9.09% 0.00% 27.27% 77.27% 18.18% 4.55% 63.64% 13.64% 0.00% 22.73%
Israel 33 45.45% 27.27% 27.27% 21.21% 18.18% 3.03% 57.58% 51.52% 24.24% 24.24% 21.21% 21.21% 3.03% 54.55%
Luxembourg 11 27.27% 36.36% 36.36% 18.18% 0.00% 9.09% 72.73% 45.45% 18.18% 36.36% 36.36% 0.00% 18.18% 45.45%
Malaysia    163 49.69% 30.06% 20.25% 25.15% 25.15% 1.23% 48.47% 47.85% 33.13% 19.02% 22.09% 24.54% 1.23% 52.15%
New Zealand 22 31.82% 36.36% 31.82% 45.45% 18.18% 4.55% 31.82% 36.36% 31.82% 31.82% 54.55% 18.18% 4.55% 22.73%
Peru  7 42.86% 0.00% 57.14% 14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 85.71% 42.86% 0.00% 57.14% 14.29% 0.00% 0.00% 85.71%
Singapore    153 54.90% 20.26% 24.84% 39.87% 28.76% 0.00% 31.37% 48.37% 24.18% 27.45% 41.83% 26.80% 0.00% 31.37%
South Africa 74 36.49% 36.49% 27.03% 25.68% 5.41% 2.70% 66.22% 37.84% 31.08% 31.08% 32.43% 9.46% 2.70% 55.41%
Taiwan 18 72.22% 27.78% 0.00% 22.22% 5.56% 5.56% 66.67% 66.67% 27.78% 5.56% 5.56% 5.56% 11.11% 77.78%
Thailand 46 47.83% 34.78% 17.39% 13.04% 10.87% 0.00% 76.09% 47.83% 34.78% 17.39% 15.22% 8.70% 4.35% 71.74%
United Kingdom    779 81.51% 14.38% 4.11% 57.77% 20.80% 0.13% 21.31% 81.00% 15.02% 3.98% 55.20% 18.61% 0.13% 26.06%
United States 2,927 76.63% 16.36% 7.00% 51.62% 33.45% 0.89% 14.04% 77.42% 15.89% 6.70% 50.32% 32.90% 0.00% 16.77%
                
ComLaw mean  51.51% 24.04% 24.46% 31.92% 14.49% 1.56% 52.04% 50.84% 24.30% 24.86% 32.81% 16.10% 2.56% 48.52%
                 
Full sample 9,165 37.99% 29.91% 32.10% 23.88% 15.13% 2.61% 58.38% 39.23% 28.00% 32.77% 24.91% 15.35% 2.89% 56.86%
Panel B. Tests for the significance of mean differences. 
Mean diff.  19.33%*-9.01%**-10.32%**11.64%* -1.84% -1.52% -8.28%** 16.23%* -5.56%* -10.67%** 11.61%* 0.73% -0.39% -11.96%
t-stats  2.88 -1.80 -1.86 2.47 0.17 -0.27 -2.16 3.07 -2.62 -1.80 2.54 -0.42 -1.43 -1.37 
This table reports the mean distribution of firm ownership concentration and types of the largest shareholder. Panel A reports the characteristics of corporate ownership by country and legal 
system, while Panel B reports tests of mean differences across subgroups of common law firms and civil law firms.  * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
 
 
 101 
Table 4. 4:  Sample mean distribution 
  Year 2004 Year 2005 
Country AUR DER Total assets 
(US$ 000') 
Total sales 
(US$ 000')
FMKB SDEBT 
(%) 
TDEBT 
(%) 
DivA AUR DER Total assets 
(US$ 000') 
Total sales 
(US$ 000')
FMKB SDEBT 
(%) 
TDEBT 
(%) 
DivA 
Panel A. Country means 
Argentina 0.5270 0.1668 1,043,195 421,546 1.09 49.51 45.91 0.0002 0.6185 0.1646 1,058,349 520,497 1.03 60.04 40.40 0.0124 
Austria 1.1143 0.3674 1,550,986 1,180,286 1.08 47.32 26.98 0.0089 1.1662 0.3370 1,927,221 1,478,460 1.24 45.10 26.48 0.0130 
Belgium 1.1904 0.3174 1,111,749 1,199,101 1.33 36.35 23.74 0.0185 1.2011 0.3585 1,370,866 1,364,581 1.52 34.71 22.98 0.0275 
Brazil 0.7401 0.1941 4,999,096 3,185,731 1.30 34.50 38.87 0.0294 0.7865 0.2034 6,201,828 4,056,715 1.35 33.58 34.44 0.0228 
Chile 0.5231 0.1645 2,411,817 783,680 1.50 26.06 31.48 0.0610 0.5953 0.1705 2,502,133 950,459 1.68 25.03 28.21 0.0662 
China 0.5965 0.2142 368,072 260,193 1.80 81.00 31.67 0.0132 0.6441 0.2221 417,688 333,980 1.50 82.36 33.69 0.0121 
Denmark 1.1665 0.3733 1,177,598 988,088 1.51 33.07 26.91 0.0170 1.1749 0.3848 1,399,255 1,160,187 1.67 34.23 25.89 0.0203 
Finland 1.3116 0.4870 1,745,200 1,745,640 1.53 29.48 24.43 0.0355 1.4113 0.4520 1,863,441 1,944,113 1.67 33.07 23.29 0.0373 
France 1.1501 0.4135 3,243,841 2,737,498 1.39 38.91 20.94 0.0111 1.1731 0.3802 3,780,907 3,026,061 1.49 39.48 20.98 0.0138 
Germany 1.2304 0.4546 4,414,190 3,441,148 1.31 43.83 23.04 0.0106 1.2922 0.4223 4,910,809 3,868,610 1.39 37.66 22.72 0.0123 
Greece 0.7952 0.1935 881,231 572,630 1.34 52.14 30.35 0.0129 0.8018 0.1929 1,010,235 694,123 1.18 49.22 29.41 0.0120 
Indonesia 1.1786 0.1760 735,251 754,711 1.34 38.04 23.29 0.0303 1.2638 0.1885 740,786 814,690 1.68 43.37 23.95 0.0308 
Italy 0.7700 0.3203 4,261,255 2,578,012 1.31 44.56 25.99 0.0114 0.8007 0.3230 4,593,146 2,970,813 1.35 44.96 25.40 0.0105 
Japan 1.0901 0.1850 7,141,299 6,406,182 1.26 49.75 23.42 0.0065 1.1199 0.1775 7,252,037 6,617,520 1.29 47.80 21.47 0.0074 
South Korea 1.0185 0.1827 736,042 629,439 0.95 58.30 21.76 0.0000 1.0912 0.1754 907,316 848,985 0.91 60.63 22.31 0.0000 
Mexico 0.7650 0.2162 4,559,129 3,071,703 1.13 26.18 27.09 0.0230 0.7844 0.2540 5,588,259 3,902,021 1.27 20.73 24.81 0.0179 
Netherlands 1.5115 0.4448 2,829,434 3,133,565 1.34 30.16 25.06 0.0187 1.5166 0.4140 3,125,974 3,465,213 1.55 31.73 21.89 0.0217 
Norway 1.1059 0.5076 1,495,854 1,256,131 1.65 28.77 29.37 0.0152 1.1159 0.5312 1,642,627 1,494,270 1.94 24.92 27.81 0.0331 
Philippines 0.6482 0.4432 905,133 499,797 0.89 28.04 27.50 0.0123 0.6759 0.4402 962,024 578,195 0.94 36.08 26.56 0.0138 
Poland 1.0507 0.2470 1,485,509 1,181,749 1.21 33.78 15.48 0.0045 1.0773 0.2363 1,879,690 1,682,758 1.27 45.17 11.68 0.0184 
Portugal 0.7828 0.2635 2,070,695 1,147,551 1.15 45.05 38.88 0.0124 0.8088 0.3210 2,413,329 1,295,231 1.22 41.64 36.56 0.0121 
Russia 0.7276 0.3370 5,941,945 4,138,886 1.30 46.62 16.98 0.0098 0.8670 0.2793 6,885,696 6,086,807 1.37 24.28 18.24 0.0095 
Spain 0.7589 0.4041 4,907,660 2,965,215 1.49 38.61 28.64 0.0153 0.7400 0.3512 5,765,930 3,527,090 1.64 37.79 27.64 0.0185 
Sweden 1.1795 0.4853 1,551,306 1,479,389 1.64 33.41 24.01 0.0218 1.2126 0.4085 1,720,176 1,734,215 1.81 31.93 22.73 0.0281 
Switzerland  1.0968 0.4154 2,096,508 1,622,334 1.45 30.48 23.96 0.0131 1.1379 0.3681 2,206,529 1,865,707 1.47 30.26 23.46 0.0186 
                 
CiviLaw mean 0.9623 0.2923 2,154,406 1,758,887 1.38 50.73 25.65 0.0107 1.0072 0.2813 2,391,758 1,990,015 1.36 50.90 25.70 0.0121 
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  Year 2004 Year 2005 
Country AUR DER Total assets 
(US$ 000') 
Total sales 
(US$ 000')
FMKB SDEBT 
(%) 
TDEBT 
(%) 
DivA AUR DER Total assets 
(US$ 000') 
Total sales 
(US$ 000')
FMKB SDEBT 
(%) 
TDEBT 
(%) 
DivA 
Australia 1.0938 0.3494 599,988 538,625 1.75 29.02 18.30 0.0263 1.0463 0.1814 695,791 636,337 1.79 30.50 17.79 0.0287 
Bermuda 0.9776 0.4274 737,467 644,278 1.54 54.21 20.61 0.0331 0.9752 0.3450 849,215 788,693 1.56 53.58 22.78 0.0270 
Canada 0.9209 0.3388 1,778,328 1,284,216 1.52 23.40 21.37 0.0073 0.9486 0.3630 2,013,144 1,539,568 1.61 25.90 20.82 0.0093 
Cayman Islands 0.6137 0.4276 995,734 379,982 1.64 49.69 24.53 0.0185 0.6568 0.3010 1,087,248 493,379 1.33 51.77 26.51 0.0268 
Hong Kong 0.5458 0.4291 3,466,888 1,155,845 1.39 46.58 19.99 0.0265 0.5598 0.4204 3,802,086 1,405,470 1.39 40.29 19.59 0.0276 
India 1.0310  389,065 350,584 1.88 21.80 24.03 0.0273 1.0494  462,771 440,013 2.11 20.54 24.30 0.0304 
Ireland 1.4641 0.2542 1,335,361 1,342,967 1.51 37.85 26.71 0.0129 1.4921 0.2615 1,572,439 1,636,247 1.77 35.08 30.08 0.0152 
Israel 0.6737 0.6049 580,979 344,450 1.82 45.78 28.38 0.0053 0.7031 0.5437 642,860 401,049 1.81 34.86 26.57 0.0259 
Luxembourg 0.7830  4,559,066 3,926,730 1.04 26.79 26.40 0.0073 0.8715  5,645,850 4,662,935 1.13 24.80 20.95 0.0160 
Malaysia 0.7226 0.2411 549,958 256,649 1.31 45.97 24.90 0.0253 0.7471 0.2166 597,430 293,863 1.30 48.68 25.22 0.0235 
New Zealand 0.8792 0.6997 854,322 563,431 1.68 17.26 28.55 0.0389 0.8950 1.0081 933,076 620,986 1.83 28.54 31.29 0.0431 
Peru 0.7719  255,572 181,046 0.75 31.62 27.18 0.0199 0.8575  275,954 211,465 0.77 28.89 21.61 0.0241 
Singapore 0.9717  553,732 336,200 1.44 51.60 18.11 0.0206 1.0276  590,510 389,454 1.40 50.76 18.46 0.0192 
South Africa 1.4033  878,324 973,482 1.38 40.23 12.24 0.0296 1.4115  1,186,408 1,206,256 1.53 36.64 11.85 0.0326 
Taiwan 0.7907  2,883,589 1,833,442 1.58 37.71 21.11 0.0140 0.9174  3,601,670 2,577,707 1.46 42.54 20.12 0.0065 
Thailand 0.9432 0.2095 537,061 371,212 1.56 44.48 25.85 0.0303 1.0711 0.2328 589,599 466,145 1.31 41.69 25.15 0.0367 
United Kingdom 1.2342 0.4906 2,051,608 1,721,027 1.78 35.89 22.65 0.0213 1.2509 0.4756 2,231,538 1,958,534 1.86 37.42 22.10 0.0208 
United States 1.0751 0.4130 2,994,828 2,268,192 1.98 30.78 27.70 0.0071 1.0980 0.4067 3,215,994 2,569,281 1.91 25.15 27.11 0.0087 
                 
ComLaw mean 1.0695 0.4178 2,311,021 1,760,085 1.84 19.73 25.15 0.0134 1.0891 0.4092 2,503,996 2,008,279 1.82 23.41 24.72 0.0147 
                 
Full sample 1.0212 0.3565 2,240,446 1,759,545 1.63 45.96 25.37 0.0122 1.0522 0.3467 2,453,418 2,000,049 1.61 42.78 25.16 0.0135 
Panel B. Tests for the significance of mean differences. 
Mean diff. 0.1072* 0.1255* 156,615 1,198 0.46* -31.00* -0.50 0.0028* 0.0819* 0.1279* 112,238 18,264 0.46* -27.49* -0.97* 0.0026* 
t-stats 7.06 12.17 0.60 0.01 18.88 -44.16 -1.26 4.33 5.29 11.98 0.40 0.09 21.18 -38.48 -2.45 4.00 
This table contains descriptive statistics of the final sample for both years 2004 & 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. Panel A reports means for variables of interest by country and 
legal system, while Panel B reports mean differences across subgroups of common law firms and civil law firms. It should be noted that mean DER are not reported for some countries due to 
data availability. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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4.4 Univariate Analysis 
 This section tests for differences in asset utilization (AUR) and discretionary 
operating expenses (DER) within and across various subgroups of firms. As outlined in 
Chapter 3, previous studies have predominately involved a single country-based 
examination such as Singh and David (2003) for US listed firms, and Florackis and Ozkan 
(2005) for UK listed firms. With a sample of 9,165 listed firms from 43 countries around 
the world, this chapter provides an international analysis of the impact of equity agency 
costs.   
There are three main analyses of AUR and DER for two years 2004 and 2005. 
Initially, all continuous variables (LargeOWN, ConOWN, SDEBT, TDEBT, FMKB, and 
FSIZE) are split into two subgroups around the median value. The first subgroup, called 
the HIGH subgroup, includes firms with variable value that exceeds the median for that 
variable. The second subgroup, termed the LOW subgroup, contains values below the 
median.79 The difference in both the mean and median across these subgroups is these 
analysed for each variable. For both years 2004 and 2005, the results are then tabulated by 
firm characteristics (Table 4.5), by firm ownership (Table 4.6) and by largest shareholder 
(Table 4.7).  
Table 4.5 largely confirms prior expectations that there are differences in AUR and 
DER among different subgroups for both years 2004 and 2005. For example, for the year 
2004, firms in the subgroups High LargeOWN or ConOWN exhibit lower DER 
(0.3174/0.3192) than those in Low subgroups (0.3967/0.3923), and both mean and median 
differences are statistically significant (Panel B of Table 4.5).80 This suggests that 
concentrated ownership may allow large shareholders to better monitor agency costs 
incurred by management. Further, there is also evidence that firms with High SDEBT or 
                                                 
79 It is noted that this approach is not applied to non-continuous variables such as DivPay, ComLaw, 
IndepTYPE and LargeTYPE. 
80 For AUR, similar results are obtained though they are not statistically significant. 
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Low TDEBT, or High FSIZE are more efficient in the use of their assets (i.e. higher AUR) 
and in managing their discretionary expenses (i.e. lower DER). Finally, firms in common 
law countries are likely to incur higher levels of discretionary expenses, though they make 
more efficient use of their assets, with have higher levels of AUR, than those in civil law 
countries.  
 Table 4.6 repeats the above univariate analysis based on firm ownership 
concentration. Specifically this analysis focuses on the other two proxies for ownership 
concentration: ConOWN and IndepTYPE, and also use ComLaw to test if these 
differences are linked to legal origin. Panel A of Table 4.6 reveals that across both years 
2004 and 2005, regardless of legal origin, Low ConOWN firms exhibit lower AUR than 
High ConOWN firms, and that both mean and median differences are statistically 
significant. This finding still holds when this analysis is repeated with the OSIRIS 
IndepTYPE data. It is also shown that common law firms normally have higher AUR than 
civil law firms for all subgroups. Further, Panel B of Table 4.6 suggests that DER is higher 
for low ownership concentration firms, particularly those domiciled in common law 
countries.  
Table 4.7 examines whether differences in agency costs are attributable to the 
largest shareholder for 2004 and 2005. The results show significant differences in the use 
of firm assets. For example, firms with Low LargeOWN are associated with lower AUR 
compared with those in High LargeOWN, and this result is robust to legal origins. Overall, 
there are certainly variations in the degree of efficiency that firms achieve in the use of 
their assets and in the management of their expenses. Importantly, there is a link between 
firm ownership (i.e. the largest shareholder) and the proxies for equity agency costs (AUR 
and DER). 
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Table 4. 5:  Agency costs and firm characteristics 
  Year 2004 Year 2005 
  Mean of 
above 
variable 
median 
Mean of 
below 
variable 
median 
Mean diff. Diff. t-
statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
Mean of 
above 
variable 
median 
Mean of 
below 
variable 
median 
Mean diff. Diff. t-
statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
Panel A. Asset utilisation (AUR) 
LargeOWN 1.0208 1.0215 -0.0007 -0.04 1.0549 1.0495 0.0055 0.35 
    (-0.04)    (-0.47) 
ConOWN 1.0230 1.0194 0.0036 0.23 1.0610 1.0439 0.0170 1.08 
    (-0.08)    (-1.25) 
SDEBT 1.0562 1.0009 0.0553 3.43* 1.1036 1.0152 0.0884 5.53* 
    (-2.96)    (-5.83) 
TDEBT 0.9033 1.1391 -0.2359 -15.38* 0.9308 1.1737 -0.2429 -15.59* 
    (-16.05)    (-17.08) 
FMKB 1.0105 1.0318 -0.0213 -1.37 1.0749 1.0295 0.0455 2.88* 
    (-2.95)    (-2.06) 
FSIZE 1.1756 0.8667 0.3089 20.33* 1.2083 0.8961 0.3121 20.21* 
    (-22.53)    (-22.35) 
Panel B. Discretionary operating expenses (DER) 
LargeOWN 0.3174 0.3967 -0.0793 -7.56* 0.3081 0.3860 -0.0779 -7.17* 
    (-7.47)    (-7.42) 
ConOwn 0.3192 0.3923 -0.0731 -6.96* 0.3121 0.3795 -0.0674 -6.19* 
    (-5.18)    (-5.58) 
SDEBT 0.2919 0.3951 -0.1032 -9.54* 0.2942 0.3861 -0.0919 -8.38* 
    (-13.83)    (-11.88) 
TDEBT 0.3611 0.3515 0.0096 0.91 0.3582 0.3345 0.0236 2.17* 
    (-1.62)    (-1.84) 
FMKB 0.4044 0.3078 0.0966 9.22* 0.4049 0.2891 0.1158 10.70* 
    (-10.78)    (-14.59) 
FSIZE 0.2399 0.4734 -0.2334 -22.87* 0.2270 0.4667 -0.2397 -22.67* 
    (-20.87)    (-23.35) 
This table reports univariate analysis for subgroups. Panel A presents analysis results for AUR, while Panel 
B contains test results for DER. The t-statistics for differences in mean ratios assume unequal variance. The 
Mann-Whitney U-test is reported in parentheses. Negative Mann-Whitney U-test statistics indicate that the 
rank sums are lower than their expected values. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) 
level. 
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Table 4. 6:  Equity agency costs and ownership concentration 
  Low 
ConOwn 
High 
ConOwn 
Indep_A Indep_B Indep_C Low ConOwn vs.  
High ConOwn 
Indep_A vs.
Indep_B 
Indep_A vs.  
Indep_C 
Indep_B vs.  
Indep_C 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A. Asset utilisation (AUR) 
  A1. Year 2004                 
       CiviLaw mean  0.9413 0.9819 0.96067 0.95229 0.97771 -0.0406* 0.0084 -0.0170 -0.0254 
       (-2.05) (0.37) (-0.69) (-0.97) 
       ComLaw mean 1.0108 1.1264 1.04839 1.15761 1.06314 -0.1156* -0.1092* -0.0148 0.0945* 
       (-5.03) (-3.59) (-0.39) (2.07) 
       Mean diff.  -0.0695* -0.1446* -0.0877* -0.2053* -0.0854*     
  (-3.24) (-6.44) (-3.80) (-6.68) (-2.24)     
  A2. Year 2005           
       CiviLaw mean  0.9829 1.0309 1.02419 1.00725 0.98329 -0.0479* 0.0169 0.0409** 0.0240 
       (-2.35) (0.71) (1.65) (0.89) 
       ComLaw mean 1.0337 1.1394 1.06938 1.15231 1.11282 -0.1057* -0.0829* -0.0434 0.0395 
       (-4.54) (-2.71) (-1.14) (0.86) 
       Mean diff.  -0.0508* -0.1085* -0.0452* -0.1451* -0.1295*     
  (-2.35) (-4.71) (-1.94) (-4.55) (-3.42)     
Panel B. Discretionary operating expenses (DER) 
  B1. Year 2004           
       CiviLaw mean  0.2917 0.2928 0.3125 0.29287 0.26519 -0.0012 0.0196 0.0473* 0.0277* 
       (-0.11) (1.50) (3.86) (2.21) 
       ComLaw mean 0.4365 0.3988 0.43302 0.39186 0.34848 0.0377* 0.0412 0.0845* 0.0434 
       (2.11) (1.71) (2.68) (1.39) 
       Mean diff.  -0.1448* -0.1060* -0.1205* -0.0990* -0.0833*     
  (-9.20) (-7.69) (-7.04) (-5.19) (-4.62)     
  B2. Year 2005           
       CiviLaw mean  0.2852 0.2776 0.30513 0.26944 0.26429 0.0076 0.0357* 0.0408* 0.0052 
       (0.73) (2.81) (2.98) (0.41) 
       ComLaw mean 0.4342 0.3841 0.42107 0.39184 0.34628 0.0501* 0.0292 0.0748* 0.0456 
       (2.70) (1.17) (2.26) (1.30) 
       Mean diff.  -0.1490* -0.1065* -0.1159* -0.1224* -0.0820*     
    (-9.01) (-7.63) (-6.68) (-6.29) (-3.91)     
This table reports univariate analysis for different subgroups of ownership concentration by legal origin. Panel A presents analysis results for AUR while Panel B contains test results for DER. 
The t-statistics for differences in mean ratios assume unequal variance. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 4. 7:  Equity agency costs and largest shareholder      
    Low 
LargeOwn 
High 
LargeOwn
Large_INSD 
(%) 
Large_FIN 
(%) 
Large_STATE 
(%) 
LowLargeOwn 
vs. 
 HighLargeOwn
Large_INSD 
vs. 
 Large_FIN  
Large_INSD 
vs. 
Large_STATE
Large_FIN 
 vs.  
Large_STATE 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A. Asset utilisation (AUR) 
  A1. Year 2004               
       CiviLaw mean  0.9389 0.9857 1.0673 0.9801 0.6789 -0.0468* 0.0872* 0.3884* 0.3012* 
       (-2.36) (2.78) (4.92) (3.49) 
       ComLaw mean 1.0236 1.1154 1.1620 1.0423 0.7710 -0.0918* 0.1198* 0.3910* 0.2712* 
       (-3.99) (4.32) (2.70) (2.06) 
       Mean diff.  -0.0847* -0.1297* -0.0948* -0.0622** -0.0921      
  (-4.01) (-5.68) (-3.05) (-1.78) (-1.11)      
  A2. Year 2005            
       CiviLaw mean  0.9947 1.0197 1.1156 1.0164 0.7103 -0.0250 0.0992* 0.4054* 0.3062* 
       (-1.23) (3.03) (4.75) (3.35) 
       ComLaw mean 1.0484 1.1297 1.1959 1.0520 0.7086 -0.0814* 0.1440* 0.4873* 0.3434 
       (-3.50) (5.10) (2.08) (1.62) 
       Mean diff.  -0.0537* -0.1100* -0.0803* -0.0356 0.0017      
  (-2.49) (-4.75) (-2.47) (-1.02) (0.02)         
Panel B. Discretionary operating expenses (DER) 
  B1. Year 2004                     
       CiviLaw mean  0.3030 0.2818 0.2771 0.3323 0.2765 0.0212* -0.0552* 0.0006 0.0557 
       (2.05) (-3.23) (0.01) (1.12) 
       ComLaw mean 0.4276 0.4072 0.4470 0.3917 0.4902 0.0204 0.0553* -0.0432 -0.0985 
       (1.14) (2.70) (-0.38) (-0.97) 
       Mean diff.  -0.1246* -0.1255* -0.1699* -0.0594* -0.2137*      
  (-8.16) (-8.83) (-8.13) (-2.45) (-3.10)      
  B2. Year 2005            
       CiviLaw mean  0.2944 0.2684 0.2622 0.3196 0.2743 0.0259* -0.0574* -0.0121 0.0453 
       (2.47) (-3.63) (-0.36) (0.85) 
       ComLaw mean 0.4179 0.3997 0.4423 0.3846 0.3219 0.0182 0.0577* 0.1203 0.0627 
       (0.98) (2.65) (0.49) (0.29) 
       Mean diff.  -0.1235* -0.1313* -0.1801* -0.0650* -0.0477      
   (-7.81) (-8.93) (-8.14) (-2.62) (-0.64)         
 This table reports univariate analysis by largest shareholder. Panel A presents analysis results for AUR, while Panel B contains test results for DER. The t-statistics for differences in 
mean ratios assume unequal variance.  * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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4.5 Multivariate Analysis  
 The above section has shown a number of differences in terms of the pattern of 
ownership and the type of the largest shareholder, and in the efficiency that a firm uses its 
assets and controls its spending. The main aim of this section is to answer two remaining 
questions. Can differences in firm agency costs, be linked to firm governance structure 
(i.e. corporate ownership, debt and dividend policy)? What is the extent of this link? In 
doing so, multivariate analysis is undertaken to test whether the largest shareholder and 
other governance mechanisms (debt financing and dividend policy) serve to mitigate 
agency costs, after controlling for confounding effects. Table 4.8 contains a summary of 
correlation coefficients for the variables included in the analysis. Generally speaking, most 
correlation coefficients are relatively small, though statistically significant at the 5%.81 
 
 
4.5.1 Largest shareholder and equity agency costs 
 Table 4.9 reports the results of the multivariate analysis for AUR for 2004 and 
2005. In Panel A of Table 4.9 (column (1)), the analysis starts with LargeOWN as the only 
governance mechanism, and reports that the coefficient for LargeOWN is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The same analysis is repeated including 
LargeOWN2, and shows that the coefficient for LargeOWN (LargeOWN2) is positive 
(negative), and that both coefficients are statistically significant (Column (2)). This 
suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between LargeOwn and AUR. When 
incorporating the other two governance mechanisms, debt financing and dividend policy, 
the analysis reports similar results for both LargeOWN and LargeOWN2 (Columns (3) and 
(4) of Table 4.9). Further, the results indicate that when replacing COUNTRY dummy 
variables with ComLaw, the non-linear relation between LargeOWN and AUR remains 
                                                 
81 Most of the coefficients are well below 0.5 and this suggests that multicollinearity should not be a major 
problem in the analysis that follows. 
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statistically significant (Column (5)). These findings are consistently observed for both 
years 2004 and 2005 (Panel B of Table 4.9).  
 The type of largest shareholder is also important in the agency relation. For both 
2004 and 2005, Table 4.9 suggests that firms with the largest shareholder, being an 
insider, are associated with higher levels of AUR whereas those with the largest 
shareholder being either a financial institution or state tend to have lower levels of AUR. It 
is possible that in a firm with large Large_INSD, the largest shareholder has direct 
involvement in operational management of the firm, however, this may not be true for 
firms with high values for Large_FIN and Large_STATE (Morck et al. 1988; Cronqvist 
and Nilsson 2003). Perhaps, because of this direct involvement, firms with Large_INSD 
tend to be more efficient in managing their assets.82 Further, the results show that when 
including interaction terms (LargeOWN*LargeTYPE), there is some impact for the largest 
shareholder type, particularly with Large_FIN.  
 The results also support the argument that debt financing acts as self-imposed 
discipline on firm management. There is a consistent positive (negative) and statistically 
significant coefficient for SDEBT (TDEBT) (Table 4.9). As SDEBT (TDEBT) increases 
(decreases), AUR increases, consistent with existing empirical studies (Singh and 
Davidson 2003). In addition, there is evidence that dividend policy plays an important role 
in controlling firm agency costs. Firms that paid out dividends in the past (lagged DivPay) 
tend to exhibit lower levels of efficiency in their use of firm assets, yet this efficiency is 
improved when firms increase their dividend payouts LagDivA (Table 4.9). Perhaps, one 
implication of this finding is that it may be costly for firms to pay dividends and raise 
capital simultaneously, particularly in the smaller and more costly financial markets that 
are included in this study (Easterbrook 1984). 
                                                 
82 For a theoretical analysis into the role that insiders (families and management) play, refer to Burkart, 
Panunzi and Shleifer (2003); and Stulz (1988).  
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 Firm size is also significantly correlated with the efficient use of firm assets (Table 
4.9). Across all specifications, larger firms (FSIZE) exhibit higher levels of AUR. Further, 
the results show that growth firms (LN_FMKB) tend to use their assets more efficiently, 
and this relation is statistically significant at the 5% level. There is also a positive and 
statistically coefficient for ComLaw. This suggests that firms operating in common law 
countries, where investor protection and law enforcement are high, better manage their 
assets. This may also reflect lower levels of agency conflicts that exist between managers 
and shareholders in countries where shareholder rights are vigorously protected. 
 Table 4.10 reports multivariate analysis for DER for 2004 and 2005. Across all 
specifications, the results suggest a non-linear relation between LargeOWN and DER. 
Specifically, as LargeOWN increases, DER decreases (incentive effect), however when 
LargeOWN becomes sufficiently large, DER begins to decline (entrenchment effects). 
Generally, the results also support expectations concerning the link between LargeTYPE 
and DER. Firms whose largest shareholder is an insider, Large_INSD, are associated with 
lower DER, yet those with Large_FIN tend to have higher DER. Further, there is some 
evidence that the relation between LargeOWN and DER is partly driven by LargeTYPE. 
For example, Panel A of Table 4.10 (columns (3), (4) and (5)) shows that the coefficient 
for LargeOWN*Large_INSD is positive and statistically significant across all 
specifications. This suggests that though increases in the shareholding of the largest 
shareholder help reduce discretionary expenses incurred by firm management, this effect 
seems to diminish when the largest shareholder is an insider.  
 Columns (4) and (9) of Table 4.10 show that the proxies for firm debt financing 
and dividend policy are largely connected to the level of discretionary expenses by firm 
management. For year 2004(2005), the coefficients for SDEBT/TDEBT are -
0.1108/0.2200 (-0.0704/0.2354) respectively, and these coefficients are statistically 
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significant. These results imply that short-term debt helps discipline firm management in 
controlling the firm’s non-sales expenses, and hence reduces agency conflicts. In addition, 
firms that paid out dividends exhibit lower levels of DER, consistent with the notion that 
dividend payments decrease free cash flows that firm management could otherwise divert 
for their private consumption (Jensen 1986).  
 Table 4.10 also reveals that that FSIZE is negatively linked to DER, whereas 
LN_FMKB is positively associated with DER, suggesting that small firms and high 
growth firms are less efficient in controlling their expenses. This reflects the literature 
where it is argued that information asymmetry problems that exist within high growth 
firms not only impede the monitoring of firm management, but also make this exercise 
more difficult and costly for shareholders (McConnell and Servaes 1995).   
 
4.5.2 Presence of the second largest shareholder 
 Concentrated shareholding by a small number of shareholders is common for firms 
located outside the US and UK (La Porta et al. 1999). Interestingly, it is evident that the 
shareholding of other large shareholders decreases rapidly when compared with that of the 
largest shareholder (Correia Da Silva et al. 2004). In this sample, it is reported that on 
average, the largest shareholder controls about 30% of total ownership in the firm, 
whereas the second largest shareholder controls about 12%, and the third largest 
shareholder about 6%.83 Despite this, the presence of the second largest shareholder may 
have implications for the analysis that have been undertaken so far. 
Empirical evidence on the effect of other large shareholders is limited. Faccio et al. 
(2001) investigate the effects of multiple large shareholders on dividend policy in a sample 
of 5,897 firms from East Asia and West Europe. Based on their analysis, they suggest that 
the presence of multiple large shareholders reduces expropriation  from outside minority 
                                                 
83 Refer to Appendix 4.2. 
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shareholders for West European firms (i.e. higher dividends paid), though it appears to 
exaggerate these problems for Asian firms (i.e. lower dividends paid). Further, studying 
the linkage between ownership and dividend payout for German firms, Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003) add that the presence of the second largest shareholder makes a crucial 
difference, at least in the governance of German firms, exerting considerable monitoring 
pressure on the largest shareholder.  
This section reports the results from a further examination of whether the presence 
of the second largest shareholder compromises the linkage between the largest shareholder 
and equity agency costs. To put it differently, this section is interested in seeing whether 
the linkage between the largest shareholder and the proxies for agency costs will change if 
there is a second largest shareholder. As a result, the full sample is split into two 
subsamples: checked and unchecked subsamples.84 The former includes all firms that 
report their second largest shareholder whose ownership exceeds 5% of ownership in the 
firm, while the latter is made up of all other firms. Further, the same multivariate analyses, 
as shown in Section 4.5.1, is repeated for both AUR and DER, for (i) the full sample with 
a dummy variable for the presence of the second largest shareholder, and (ii) for the two 
subsamples: checked and unchecked.   
Table 4.11 reports the results of this analysis for both AUR and DER. In columns 
(1) and (2) of Panel A, for both years 2004 and 2005, it is evident that most of the 
coefficients remain little changed in terms of their sign and statistical significance after 
including SecondOWN. Further, in both cases, the coefficient for SecondOWN is not 
statistically significant. For both subsample analyses, there are only minor changes in the 
relation between the largest shareholder and AUR, as well as the type of the largest 
shareholder and AUR (Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Table 4.11). Finally, the results of 
                                                 
84 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) split their full sample into “checked” and “unchecked” firm subsamples to 
test the impact of the second largest shareholder.   
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the analysis for DER, reported in Panel B of Table 4.11, are similar to that of AUR just 
discussed in the above sections.  
 
4.5.3 Other robustness tests 
 A number of other robustness tests are conducted and the results are reported in 
Table 4.12 (A and B). First, the final sample is largely made up of US firms, about 25% of 
total firms in the final sample, and hence the multivariate analysis is repeated using a 
sample of non-US firms for both AUR and DER in 2004 and 2005. Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 4.12 (A and B) suggest that the results are not driven by the prevalence of US firms. 
The analysis is also extended to countries which have enough data points to allow separate 
analysis, such as the US, UK, Canada, China, Japan and France, and it appears that the 
results are not dominated by any particular country or a group of countries.85 
 Second, some may question the choice of LargeOWN as a proxy for firm 
ownership concentration. Subsequently, the analysis is repeated with the two alternative 
ownership concentration proxies: ConOWN (calculated as a sum of squared shareholding 
of all shareholders reported) and IndepTYPE (provided by the OSIRIS) (See Table 4.2). 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.12 (A and B) indicate that the coefficient for ConOWN 
and ConOWN2 have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
implies a non-linear relation between ownership and agency costs, as is also observed 
when LargeOwn is used in the original analysis. This finding is also reinforced by a 
positive and statistically significant link between IndepTYPE (i.e. OSIRIS-based 
independence indicators) and equity agency costs (Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.12 (A 
and B)). 
                                                 
85 Refer to Appendix 4.4 and 4.5. 
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Table 4. 8:  Correlation coefficients 
 AUR DER LargeOwn SDEBT TDEBT LagDivPay FSIZE 
Panel A. Year 2004 
AUR  1       
DER -0.2430*  1      
LargeOwn  0.0106  -0.0858*  1     
SDEBT  0.0417* -0.1151*  0.2272*  1    
TDEBT -0.1870*  0.1141* -0.0027 -0.0949*  1   
LagDivPay  0.0487* -0.1765*  0.1060*  0.0194** -0.0899*  1  
FSIZE  0.0486* -0.0669* -0.0627* -0.0747*  0.0075  0.1485*  1  
FMKB  0.0334*  0.2165* -0.0974* -0.1451*  0.0183** -0.0315* -0.0124 
        
Panel B. Year 2005 
AUR  1       
DER -0.2457*  1       
LargeOwn  0.0104 -0.0781*  1     
SDEBT  0.0485* -0.1037*  0.1979*  1     
TDEBT -0.1925*  0.1364* -0.0077 -0.1059*  1   
LagDivPay  0.0584* -0.1702*  0.1010* -0.0299* -0.1051*  1  
FSIZE  0.0505* -0.0650*  0.0599* -0.0747* -0.0057* 0.1486* 1 
 0.0267* 0.2093* -0.1008* -0.1244* 0.0107 -0.0069 -0.0104 
 
This table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficients for both years 2004 and 2005.  * (**) indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.  
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Table 4. 9:  Multivariate analysis for asset utilization (AUR)  
  Panel A. Year 2004 Panel B. Year 2005 
N = 9,165 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept -2.2322* -2.3346* -2.3222* -2.3746* -2.2928* -2.2389* -2.3266* -2.3418* -2.3903* -2.2716* 
 (-22.51) (-22.74) (-22.06) (-22.24) (-21.64) (-22.24) (-22.32) (-22.13) (-22.20) (-21.09) 
LargeOWN 0.3803* 1.1276* 0.9940* 1.0817* 0.5050* 0.3622* 1.0051* 1.0047* 1.0507* 0.5631* 
 (8.14) (7.03) (5.26) (5.96) (2.67) (7.70) (6.18) (5.20) (5.61) (2.96) 
LargeOWN2  -0.0097* -0.0084* -0.0097* -0.0056*  -0.0082* -0.0080* -0.0089* -0.0053* 
  (-4.88) (-3.98) (-4.71) (-2.60)   (-4.11) (-3.65) (-4.17) (-2.40) 
Large_FIN -0.0939* -0.0742* -0.1467* -0.1232* -0.1078* -0.0959* -0.0823* -0.1081* -0.1000* -0.0902* 
 (-3.97) (-3.09) (-3.73) (-3.24) (-2.76) (-4.20) (-3.58) (-2.81) (-2.68) (-2.38) 
Large_INSD 0.1973* 0.1946* 0.2252* 0.2130* 0.2424* 0.2018* 0.1967* 0.2580* 0.2476* 0.2834* 
 (8.44) (8.32) (5.28) (5.17) (5.92) (9.05) (8.81) (6.40) (6.28) (7.21) 
Large_STATE -0.3274* -0.3338* -0.3164* -0.2840* -0.1796* -0.4971* -0.5058* -0.7553* -0.6920* -0.5737* 
 (-4.61) (-4.66) (-2.26) (-2.12) (-1.39) (-6.61) (-6.64) (-4.72) (-4.73) (-4.66) 
LargeOWN 
*Large_FIN   0.3539* 0.3092* 0.4031*    0.1554 0.1525 0.2421**
   (2.95) (2.61) (3.13)    (1.14) (1.14) (1.74) 
LargeOWN 
*Large_INSD   -0.1238 -0.1283 0.0944    -0.2104* -0.2263* -0.0806 
   (-1.12) (-1.22) (0.87)    (-2.01) (-2.20) (-0.77) 
LargeOWN 
*Large_STATE   -0.0712 -0.0765 -0.0978    0.6352* 0.5715** 0.5660* 
   (-0.22) (-0.25) (-0.33)    (1.86) (1.64) (2.14) 
SDEBT    0.4375* 0.2352*     0.4049* 0.2198* 
    (15.39) (8.89)     (15.03) (8.49) 
TDEBT    -0.6619* -0.8281*     -0.6118* -0.7980* 
    (-13.48) (-17.03)     (-12.27) (-16.25) 
LagDivPAY    -0.1036* -0.1434*     -0.1045* -0.1454* 
    (-5.26) (-7.61)     (-5.18) (-7.59) 
LagDivA    1.1299* 1.6197*     1.1558* 1.6693* 
    (3.61) (4.45)     (3.33) (4.45) 
FSIZE 0.1854* 0.1860* 0.1877* 0.2002* 0.2008* 0.1851* 0.1858* 0.1870* 0.1979* 0.1984* 
 (28.43) (28.54) (28.63) (29.27) (31.25) (28.17) (28.27) (28.33) (28.76) (30.31) 
LN_FMKB 0.0812* 0.0844* 0.0859* 0.0778* 0.0179 0.0861* 0.0889* 0.0896* 0.0842* 0.0623* 
 (4.20) (4.36) (4.45) (3.94) (0.94) (4.44) (4.59) (4.63) (4.23) (3.21) 
ComLaw     0.0962*      0.0478* 
     (4.90)      (2.48) 
Country Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 31.79 31.97 32.05 36.70 31.41 31.89 32.02 32.08 36.47 31.78 
F-statistics 77.28 76.55 73.06 84.00 183.46 77.63 76.73 73.13 83.21 186.63 
           
This table reports the results of multivariate analysis for LN_AUR using the OLS procedure. Panel A contains the results 
for year 2004 while Panel B presents the results for year 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White 
heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) 
level. 
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Table 4. 10:  Multivariate analysis for discretionary operating expenses (DER) 
  Panel A. Year 2004 Panel B. Year 2005 
N = 8,185 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept 0.9213* 1.0207* 1.0669* 1.0000* 1.0322* 1.0549* 1.1434* 1.1477* 1.0268* 1.0719* 
 (10.85) (11.55) (11.71) (10.59) (10.39) (11.89) (12.44) (12.14) (10.53) (10.52) 
LargeOWN -0.4044* -1.1101* -1.2925* -1.3161* -1.9817* -0.3967* -1.0352* -0.9687* -0.9849* -1.6782*
 (-7.45) (-5.97) (-6.09) (-6.23) (-8.78) (-6.94) (-5.51) (-4.45) (-4.55) (-7.41) 
LargeOWN2  0.0092* 0.0103* 0.0107* 0.0191*  0.0082* 0.0074* 0.0079* 0.0168* 
  (4.00) (4.27) (4.47) (7.50)   (3.58) (3.03) (3.24) (6.67) 
Large_FIN 0.0189 -0.0039 -0.0378 -0.0407 -0.0617 0.0254 0.0122 0.0613 0.0613 0.0506 
 (0.71) (-0.14) (-0.87) (-0.94) (-1.32) (0.98) (0.47) (1.42) (1.43) (1.10) 
Large_INSD -0.1027* -0.0995* -0.1795* -0.1724* -0.3047* -0.0847* -0.0789* -0.1173* -0.1102* -0.2151*
 (-4.05) (-3.93) (-4.11) (-3.96) (-6.61) (-3.40) (-3.15) (-2.66) (-2.51) (-4.61) 
Large_STATE 0.1702** 0.1781** 0.0831 0.0620 0.1589 0.2742* 0.2860* 0.0611 0.0425 0.2011 
 (1.72) (1.79) (0.48) (0.36) (0.87) (2.36) (2.45) (0.23) (0.16) (0.71) 
LargeOWN 
*Large_FIN   0.1004 0.0935 0.3295*    -0.2581** -0.2782** -0.0486 
   (0.69) (0.64) (2.01)    (-1.64) (-1.76) (-0.29) 
LargeOWN 
*Large_INSD   0.2563* 0.2576* 0.6633*    0.1369 0.1435 0.4889* 
   (2.23) (2.25) (5.33)    (1.12) (1.17) (3.72) 
LargeOWN 
*Large_STATE   0.2856 0.3090 0.6765    0.5674 0.5801 0.7989 
   (0.57) (0.63) (1.27)    (1.00) (1.02) (1.30) 
SDEBT    -0.1108* -0.4099*     -0.0704* -0.3639*
    (-3.57) (-13.77)     (-2.38) (-12.68) 
TDEBT    0.2200* 0.1130*     0.2354* 0.0798 
    (4.43) (2.17)     (4.64) (1.51) 
LagDivPAY    -0.0554* 0.0530*     -0.0701* 0.0435**
    (-2.32) (2.30)     (-2.77) (1.76) 
LagDivA    0.0158 0.0218     -0.6187 -0.6104 
    (0.05) (0.07)     (-1.18) (-1.16) 
FSIZE -0.2017* -0.2025* -0.2026* -0.1988* -0.1886* -0.2121* -0.2130* -0.2145* -0.2066* -0.2008*
 (-36.72) (-36.90) (-36.79) (-34.26) (-31.92) (-38.15) (-38.31) (-38.42) (-35.29) (-33.54) 
LN_FMKB 0.1643* 0.1613* 0.1613* 0.1606* 0.1956* 0.1581* 0.1552* 0.1542* 0.1630* 0.2635* 
 (8.74) (8.57) (8.56) (8.44) (10.14) (8.16) (8.00) (7.93) (8.14) (13.26) 
ComLaw     -0.0646*      -0.0324 
     (-2.60)      (-1.36) 
Country Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 35.20 35.32 35.33 35.69 24.18 35.64 35.74 35.78 36.23 26.27 
F-statistics 91.72 90.38 85.38 80.68 114.47 93.50 92.04 87.04 82.57 127.75 
           
This table reports the estimation results of model (4.1) for LN_DER. Panel A contains the results for year 2004 while 
Panel B presents the results for year 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity 
adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 4. 11:  Effect of the second largest shareholder on equity agency costs 
  Panel A. Asset utilisation (AUR) Panel B. Discretionary operating expenses (DER) 
 SecondOWN Checked firms Unchecked firms SecondOWN Checked firms Unchecked firms 
 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Intercept -2.2975* -2.3505* -2.4265* -2.4357* -2.3475*-2.2907* 1.0045* 1.0180* 1.0391* 1.0693* 0.9351* 0.9149*
 (-22.05) (-22.11) (-18.73) (-19.79) (-12.29) (-10.08) (10.60) (10.39) (9.12) (9.45) (5.40) (4.64) 
LargeOWN 1.1333* 1.1110* 0.9905* 0.8372* 1.1801* 1.4063* -1.3216*-1.0141* -1.1450* -0.8529* -1.2910* -1.0222*
 (6.17) (5.89) (4.33) (3.71) (3.67) (3.84) (-6.18) (-4.60) (-4.38) (-3.33) (-3.39) (-2.33) 
LargeOWN2 -0.0103* -0.0094* -0.0090* -0.0071* -0.0107*-0.0113* 0.0108* 0.0083* 0.0103* 0.0088* 0.0079* 0.0057*
 (-4.94) (-4.33) (-3.41) (-2.73) (-2.99) (-2.78) (4.39) (3.31) (3.36) (2.96) (1.90) (1.17) 
Large_FIN -0.1263* -0.1003* -0.1045* -0.0920* -0.1768*-0.0887 -0.0411 0.0615 -0.0551 0.0667 -0.0303 0.0507 
 (-3.32) (-2.70) (-2.25) (-2.09) (-2.61) (-1.21) (-0.95) (1.43) (-1.06) (1.32) (-0.36) (0.58) 
Large_INSD 0.1935* 0.2375* 0.1974* 0.2153* 0.2252* 0.3637* -0.1729*-0.1101* -0.1582* -0.0913** -0.1558**-0.0648 
 (4.72) (6.03) (4.13) (4.90) (2.66) (3.85) (-3.97) (-2.51) (-3.07) (-1.81) (-1.72) (-0.63) 
Large_STATE -0.3019* -0.6872* -0.2508 -0.7212**-0.3533 -0.5032** 0.0607 0.0436 0.1342 -0.1040 -0.1721 0.7845 
 (-2.27) (-4.74) (-1.62) (-4.19) (-1.37) (-1.92) (0.35) (0.16) (0.74) (-0.31) (-0.30) (1.42) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_FIN 0.2989* 0.1402 0.3271* 0.1350 0.2328 0.0778 0.0957 -0.2836**0.1025 -0.2878 0.1190 -0.3487 
 (2.51) (1.05) (2.22) (0.84) (1.12) (0.33) (0.66) (-1.80) (0.59) (-1.55) (0.45) (-1.15) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_INSD -0.1286 -0.2412* -0.0415 -0.1228 -0.2353 -0.4625* 0.2596* 0.1415 0.0902 0.0254 0.5215* 0.1451 
 (-1.22) (-2.34) (-0.34) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.95) (2.27) (1.16) (0.66) (0.18) (2.42) (0.61) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_STATE-0.0934 0.5074 -0.1687 0.6780** 0.0165 -0.1768 0.3224 0.5821 0.0575 0.8001 1.3581 -0.3476 
 (-0.30) (1.62) (-0.47) (1.81) (0.03) (-0.31) (0.65) (1.02) (0.10) (1.09) (1.12) (-0.32) 
SecondOwn -0.0125 0.0053     0.0009 0.0182     
 (-0.67) (0.27)     (0.03) (0.75)     
SDEBT 0.4421* 0.4059* 0.4617* 0.4306* 0.3546* 0.2783* -0.1109*-0.0697* -0.1138* -0.0692* -0.0767 -0.0424 
 (15.74) (15.20) (14.03) (14.49) (6.31) (4.48) (-3.57) (-2.36) (-3.17) (-2.10) (-1.26) (-0.65) 
TDEBT -0.6740* -0.6214* -0.7222* -0.6621* -0.4994*-0.4333* 0.2201* 0.2354* 0.2328* 0.2433* 0.1430 0.1160 
 (-13.69) (-12.41) (-12.70) (-11.98) (-5.25) (-3.76) (4.43) (4.64) (4.21) (4.39) (1.29) (0.96) 
LagDivPAY -0.0855* -0.0871* -0.0989* -0.1091* -0.1169*-0.0960* -0.0553*-0.0696* -0.0468** -0.0427 -0.0594 -0.1414*
 (-4.45) (-4.41) (-4.31) (-4.62) (-2.98) (-2.47) (-2.31) (-2.75) (-1.70) (-1.44) (-1.24) (-2.77) 
LagDivA 1.2408* 1.2312* 1.1180* 1.4465* 1.0860 0.5855 0.0169 -0.6152 -0.1910 -1.2539** 0.5425 0.9804 
 (3.85) (3.50) (3.47) (3.60) (1.41) (0.82) (0.06) (-1.17) (-0.57) (-1.93) (0.91) (1.37) 
FSIZE 0.1958* 0.1945* 0.2053* 0.2036* 0.1964* 0.1869* -0.1989*-0.2067* -0.1994* -0.2102* -0.2002* -0.2021*
 (29.22) (28.76) (24.52) (25.49) (16.44) (13.48) (-34.23) (-35.25) (-28.78) (-31.58) (-18.38) (-15.96)
LN_FMKB 0.0725* 0.0817* 0.0789* 0.0795* 0.0778* 0.1013* 0.1608* 0.1632* 0.1427* 0.1489* 0.1952* 0.2145*
 (3.69) (4.12) (3.50) (3.59) (1.95) (2.26) (8.44) (8.15) (6.55) (6.61) (5.00) (5.15) 
Country 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  36.35 36.29 37.03 36.43 35.71 36.46 35.69 36.23 34.40 35.60 37.62 38.43 
F-statistics 92.81 92.57 67.30 72.37 25.05 20.20 80.67 82.59 61.35 69.18 26.50 22.23 
             
N 9165 9165 6653 6653 2512 2512 8185 8185 5985 6416 2200 1769 
This table reports the results when the second largest shareholder is present. Panel A contains the results for year 2004 while 
Panel B presents the results for year 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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 Third, given the impact of the size variable, the analysis is also re-estimated with 
the log of total assets and the log of market capitalization as alternative firm size proxies 
to see how sensitive the results are to these alternative proxies (refer to Appendix 4.3). The 
results are generally similar to those obtained when using the log of total sales. In addition, 
the full sample is split into 2 subsamples: small firms (those with total sales below the 
median of the full sample) and large firms (those with total sales above the median). For 
each subsample, the same analysis is repeated for AUR and DER individually for both 
years, 2004 and 2005. The results are largely consistent with what is observed in the 
original analysis (Columns (7), (8), (9) and (10) of Table 4.12 (A and B)). 
 Fourth, early studies such as Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) point 
out that ownership is endogenous, and hence, the original analysis may produce spurious 
results in tests of the relation between ownership and agency costs. Though the largest 
shareholder wealth is most affected by decisions of firm management, investors normally 
have their say as to how much they want to invest in a firm. Thus, this ownership decision 
is rarely based on the extent to which agency conflicts exist (Holderness 2003). However, 
the multivariate regression is re-estimated using two stage least squares (2STLS) with 
lagged LargeOWN as an instrumental variable. The results remain essentially unchanged 
(Column (15) of Table 4.12 (A and B)). Finally, the analysis is undertaken for common 
law firms and for civil law firms separately and there is little change in the results 
(Columns (11), (12), (13) and (14) of Table 4.12 (A and B)). 
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4.6 Summary 
 Many firms in civil law countries are controlled by a single largest shareholder or a 
group of shareholders. This chapter has focused on the largest shareholder in attempt to 
investigate the potential relation that exists between this important shareholder class and 
agency costs that exist within a firm. With a large sample of 9,165 firms drawn from 43 
countries around the world, the results contribute to the rather limited literature dealing 
with largest shareholder impacts. 
For the agency cost analysis, two measures of agency costs, asset utilization and 
discretionary expenses, are adopted and this choice is consistent with the literature (Ang et 
al. 2000; Singh and Davidson 2003).86 There is some variation arising from analysis of 
these measures both across firms and across countries and, importantly, this variation is 
partly related to firm governance, particularly with respect to the largest shareholder (both 
shareholding and its types). Specifically, firms with high ownership concentration, high 
short-term debt, and large sales normally tend to exhibit lower agency costs in terms of 
better use of firm assets and lower levels of discretionary expenses. 
There is consistent evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relation 
between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and the agency cost proxies. This 
suggests that concentrated shareholding may induce greater monitoring, and thus results in 
better management of assets and expenses (Demsetz 1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
Further, the results indicate that the different largest shareholder classifications do not 
have the same impact in terms of solving agency conflicts. As the largest shareholder, 
insiders seem to be more effective in mitigating equity agency conflicts than financial 
institutions or the state, at least for the firms in the sample. This finding reflects a recently-
                                                 
86 While there are good reasons to use these variables, this choice also facilitates comparison with previous 
studies in the area. 
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emerging view in the literature concerning the role that financial institutions play as large 
monitoring shareholders, i.e. who monitors the monitor, (Gillan 2006). 
It is also found that short-term debt can serve to reduce equity agency costs (Stulz 
1988). A firm which issues high levels of short-term debt is likely to manage its assets and 
its expenses more efficiently. It is also apparent that dividend policy provides an important 
discipline mechanism for firm management, consistent with the existing literature (Rozeff 
1982; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). Finally, consistent with previous studies, the 
results also demonstrate that the extent of agency costs is partly attributed to the existing 
legal protection system (common law vs. civil law based system). Specifically, firms 
subject to a common law based legal system exhibit greater levels of asset utilization and 
lower levels of discretionary expenses than firms subject to a civil law based legal system. 
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Table 4. 12A:  Robustness tests for asset utilisation (AUR) 
  Excluding US ConOWN OSIRIS Indep Small firms Large firms ComLaw CiviLaw 2SLS 
 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Intercept -2.3252* -2.3568* -2.2312* -2.2774* -2.2369* -2.2426* -5.3398* -5.3474* 0.1153 0.1996** -2.3903* -2.4787* -2.9389* -2.7059* -2.5260* 
 (-16.35) (-16.03) (-22.08) (-22.17) (-22.33) (-21.96) (-31.10) (-31.12) (1.07) (1.83) (-17.74) (-17.96) (-17.79) (-16.65) (-21.51) 
LargeOWN 0.7469* 0.8847*     0.7221* 0.7763* 0.5711* 0.3143** 1.2682* 1.3465* 0.8162* 0.6720* 1.1650* 
 (3.65) (4.06)     (2.57) (2.77) (3.01) (1.66) (4.56) (5.01) (3.55) (2.68) (4.11) 
LargeOWN2 -0.0066* -0.0073*     -0.0063* -0.0068* -0.0060* -0.0026 -0.0127* -0.0127* -0.0065* -0.0047** -0.0103* 
 (-2.87) (-3.00)     (-2.01) (-2.15) (-2.70) (-1.19) (-3.94) (-3.95) (-2.52) (-1.67) (-3.40) 
ConOWN   0.6267* 0.8591*            
   (4.28) (5.64)            
ConOWN2   -0.0070* -0.0088*            
   (-3.79) (-4.55)            
Indep_B     0.1462* 0.1248*          
     (7.65) (6.59)          
Indep_C     0.1460* 0.1255*          
     (6.43) (5.45)          
Large_FIN -0.1135* -0.0536 -0.2043* -0.1499* -0.0940* -0.1021* -0.1479* -0.1425* -0.1027* -0.1193* -0.1440* -0.1330* -0.1058** -0.0445 -0.3032* 
 (-2.47) (-1.08) (-5.87) (-4.36) (-4.20) (-4.73) (-2.44) (-2.35) (-2.77) (-3.41) (-2.71) (-2.81) (-1.75) (-0.66) (-4.26) 
Large_INSD 0.1400* 0.1624* 0.1536* 0.2204* 0.1706* 0.1755* 0.2609* 0.2645* 0.0443 0.0995* 0.2403* 0.2938* 0.1393* 0.1375* 0.3747* 
 (2.94) (3.44) (3.87) (5.70) (7.56) (8.10) (4.59) (5.02) (0.94) (2.24) (3.94) (5.23) (2.70) (2.73) (6.16) 
Large_STATE -0.7892* -0.7204* -0.3393* -0.7100* -0.3027* -0.4684* -0.4036* -2.0498* -0.2841* -0.4330* -0.1000 -0.5995* -0.7417* -0.6555* -3.5139* 
 (-5.17) (-4.90) (-2.55) (-4.93) (-4.51) (-6.68) (-2.42) (-5.33) (-2.27) (-3.59) (-0.59) (-3.20) (-4.37) (-3.60) (-4.21) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_FIN 0.2106 -0.0109     0.2728 0.1771 0.3484* -0.0417* 0.4761* 0.3687* 0.1478 -0.1559 0.6879* 
 (1.54) (-0.07)     (1.49) (0.85) (2.83) (2.53) (2.70) (2.12) (0.85) (-0.69) (3.20) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_INSD 0.0901 0.0119     -0.2196 -0.2371** 0.1107 -0.2371 -0.2168 -0.4001* 0.0558 0.0484 -0.4186* 
 (0.78) (0.10)     (-1.41) (-1.64) (0.91) (-0.36) (-1.25) (-2.40) (0.46) (0.40) (-2.79) 
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  Excluding US ConOWN OSIRIS Indep Small firms Large firms ComLaw CiviLaw 2SLS 
 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_STATE 0.8163* 0.5951**     0.9909* 4.0230* 0.2757 0.5584* 0.2550 0.9035* 0.6299** 0.3444 5.9782* 
 (2.57) (1.91)     (2.73) (5.80) (1.00) (2.16) (0.60) (2.32) (1.75) (0.90) (3.40) 
SDEBT 0.4494* 0.4311* 0.4365* 0.4057* 0.4422* 0.4048* 0.3540* 0.3372* 0.3619* 0.3210* 0.4920* 0.4368* 0.3662* 0.3548* 0.3883* 
 (13.98) (14.41) (15.32) (15.03) (15.58) (14.99) (9.38) (9.47) (11.65) (10.26) (11.58) (10.82) (9.81) (10.48) (14.26) 
TDEBT -0.5641* -0.5142* -0.6613* -0.6107* -0.6629* -0.6114* -0.5101* -0.4777* -0.6702* -0.6589* -0.7141* -0.6825* -0.5213* -0.4338* -0.6103* 
 (-9.11) (-8.44) (-13.46) (-12.23) (-13.49) (-12.25) (-8.08) (-7.62) (-12.25) (-11.57) (-10.76) (-9.99) (-7.35) (-6.18) (-12.21) 
LagDivPAY -0.0152** -0.0654* -0.1026* -0.1068* -0.1091* -0.1096* -0.0808* -0.1345* -0.0953* -0.0958* -0.1275* -0.1348* -0.0795* -0.0545** -0.1060* 
 (-1.68) (-2.59) (-5.21) (-5.30) (-5.48) (-5.43) (-2.66) (-4.36) (-4.59) (-4.41) (-4.86) (-5.01) (-2.60) (-1.78) (-5.19) 
LagDivA 0.9807* 1.3084* 1.1367* 1.1739* 1.1548* 1.1892* 0.5051 0.3884 0.7475* 0.8396* 1.1441* 1.3628* 1.3019** 0.6588 1.1070* 
 (2.35) (3.06) (3.60) (3.39) (3.65) (3.43) (1.19) (0.89) (2.97) (2.39) (3.30) (3.23) (1.74) (1.07) (3.23) 
FSIZE 0.2023* 0.1991* 0.1998* 0.1972* 0.2000* 0.1967* 0.4793* 0.4732* 0.0323* 0.0304* 0.2102* 0.2123* 0.1818* 0.1693* 0.2110* 
 (23.40) (23.05) (29.16) (28.61) (29.16) (28.59) (34.93) (34.10) (5.00) (4.63) (24.34) (24.17) (16.51) (15.76) (29.44) 
LN_FMKB 0.1302* 0.1120* 0.0760* 0.0835* 0.0733* 0.0798* 0.2123* 0.2062* 0.0870* 0.0882* 0.0679* 0.0816* 0.0984* 0.0910* 0.0948* 
 (5.06) (4.28) (3.85) (4.19) (3.71) (4.01) (8.73) (8.57) (3.77) (3.69) (2.64) (3.17) (3.35) (2.96) (4.73) 
Country 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 38.83 38.01 36.52 36.41 36.44 36.22 48.30 48.80 33.08 31.72 36.52 37.68 38.70 36.31 34.26 
F-statistics 63.85 61.69 83.37 82.97 87.85 86.32 72.33 73.78 38.75 36.47 75.27 79.03 57.66 52.16 83.19 
                
N 6238 6238 9165 9165 9165 9165 4583 4583 4582 4582 5035 5035 4130 4130 9165 
This table reports the results of robustness tests for LN_AUR for 2004 & 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
* (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 4. 12B:  Robustness tests for discretionary operating expense (DER) 
  Excluding US ConOWN OSIRIS Indep Small firms Large firms ComLaw CiviLaw 2SLS 
 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Intercept 0.5973 0.0927 0.8401* 0.9182* 0.7936* 0.8810* 2.4429* 2.6486* -0.7002* -0.7037* 1.5554* 1.5233* 0.5437* 0.5692* 1.1807* 
 (1.03) (0.19) (9.49) (10.03) (9.09) (9.67) (4.75) (7.48) (-2.96) (-2.75) (11.71) (11.39) (3.92) (3.83) (10.64) 
LargeOWN -0.8689* -0.4768**     -0.9499* -0.7655* -1.0164* -0.5451** -1.9607* -1.5867* -0.6996* -0.3802 -1.5532* 
 (-3.38) (-1.77)     (-3.35) (-2.70) (-3.41) (-1.77) (-5.59) (-4.57) (-2.69) (-1.31) (-4.87) 
LargeOWN2 0.0054** 0.0019     0.0070* 0.0064* 0.0082* 0.0035 0.0193* 0.0169* 0.0033 0.0006 0.0130* 
 (1.89) (0.63)     (2.21) (2.03) (2.42) (1.00) (4.61) (4.01) (1.16) (0.21) (3.83) 
ConOWN   -1.0169* -0.9566*            
   (-6.07) (-6.41)            
ConOWN2   0.0098* 0.0092*            
   (4.83) (4.84)            
Indep_B     -0.0996* -0.1051*          
     (-4.36) (-4.57)          
Indep_C     -0.1789* -0.1563*          
     (-6.57) (-5.37)          
Large_FIN 0.0291 0.1162** 0.0354 0.0239 0.0330 0.0368 0.0330 0.0849 -0.0422 0.0996** -0.0493 0.0634 0.0690 0.1199** 0.1124 
 (0.49) (1.93) (0.90) (0.93) (1.27) (1.46) (0.54) (1.50) (-0.72) (1.65) (-0.76) (1.08) (1.07) (1.64) (1.41) 
Large_INSD -0.1052** 0.0124 -0.1234* -0.0734* -0.0859* -0.0664* -0.2184* -0.1537* -0.0244 0.0060 -0.1763* -0.1321* -0.1913* -0.0716 -0.1982* 
 (-1.85) (0.21) (-2.95) (-2.96) (-3.40) (-2.67) (-4.08) (-2.86) (-0.36) (0.09) (-2.70) (-2.12) (-3.07) (-1.11) (-2.96) 
Large_STATE 0.2762 0.0396 0.1022 0.2731* 0.1612** 0.2657* 0.2989 0.6041 -0.1208 -0.2181 -0.1962 0.6518 0.1085 -0.1007 1.6700* 
 (0.94) (0.15) (0.59) (2.35) (1.64) (2.28) (1.40) (1.17) (-0.43) (-0.67) (-0.92) (1.53) (0.34) (-0.34) (2.12) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_FIN -0.0697 -0.4373*     -0.0532 -0.2226 0.1493 -0.5413* 0.1525 -0.3135 -0.1081 -0.3594** -0.3906 
 (-0.38) (-2.20)     (-0.23) (-1.09) (0.84) (-2.30) (0.55) (-1.15) (-0.62) (-1.68) (-1.54) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_INSD 0.0097 -0.1741     0.2567** 0.1347 0.2372 0.1193 0.3562** 0.1508 0.2115 0.0770 0.3705* 
 (0.07) (-1.05)     (1.74) (0.86) (1.39) (0.64) (1.74) (0.70) (1.42) (0.49) (2.17) 
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  Excluding US ConOWN OSIRIS Indep Small firms Large firms ComLaw CiviLaw 2SLS 
 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2004 Y2005 Y2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_STATE -0.1426 0.5238     -1.4184** -2.0256* 0.4269 0.8043 1.5944** -0.5039 -0.0614 0.6786 -2.4962 
 (-0.22) (0.94)     (-1.88) (-2.38) (0.67) (1.24) (1.88) (-0.74) (-0.09) (1.09) (-1.53) 
SDEBT -0.1061* -0.0906* -0.1099* -0.0719* -0.1081* -0.0711* -0.0850* -0.0541 -0.0432 -0.0024 -0.1569* -0.0747** -0.0725** -0.0711** -0.0632* 
 (-2.91) (-2.61) (-3.54) (-2.43) (-3.48) (-2.40) (-2.28) (-1.52) (-0.87) (-0.05) (-3.23) (-1.70) (-1.82) (-1.80) (-2.12) 
TDEBT 0.0906 0.0938 0.2196* 0.2311* 0.2200* 0.2328* 0.1694* 0.2396* 0.0542 0.0763 0.2426* 0.2672* 0.0886 0.1018 0.2298* 
 (1.33) (1.36) (4.42) (4.54) (4.43) (4.57) (2.99) (4.19) (0.67) (0.91) (3.71) (3.98) (1.16) (1.28) (4.51) 
LagDivPAY -0.1273* -0.1472* -0.0553* -0.0659* -0.0514* -0.0630* -0.1477* -0.1310* -0.0136 -0.0279 -0.0261 -0.0362 -0.0738* -0.1119* -0.0697* 
 (-4.27) (-5.03) (-2.31) (-2.60) (-2.15) (-2.48) (-4.22) (-4.05) (-0.42) (-0.75) (-0.71) (-0.95) (-2.39) (-3.55) (-2.75) 
LagDivA 0.0858 -0.1784 0.0124 -0.6596 0.0129 -0.6772 0.1039 0.0793 0.5428** -1.0341 0.1540 -0.5719 -0.2039 -0.5583 -0.5546 
 (0.20) (-0.39) (0.04) (-1.25) (0.04) (-1.28) (0.22) (0.21) (1.81) (-0.98) (0.47) (-0.73) (-0.32) (-1.00) (-1.06) 
FSIZE -0.1758* -0.1824* -0.1980* -0.2038* -0.1981* -0.2047* -0.3855* -0.3819* -0.0771* -0.0922* -0.2336* -0.2407* -0.1488* -0.1574* -0.2135* 
 (-23.02) (-24.04) (-34.10) (-34.90) (-34.16) (-34.93) (-37.93) (-36.11) (-7.14) (-8.64) (-29.39) (-30.83) (-18.40) (-18.28) (-35.51) 
LN_FMKB 0.1215* 0.1365* 0.1625* 0.1659* 0.1646* 0.1679* 0.0472* 0.0488* 0.1639* 0.2153* 0.1885* 0.1782* 0.1092* 0.1504* 0.1554* 
 (4.56) (4.95) (8.54) (8.30) (8.65) (8.39) (2.08) (2.09) (5.48) (6.16) (7.64) (6.89) (3.71) (4.91) (7.73) 
Country 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummy 
(Yes/No) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 36.40 36.46 35.55 36.09 35.47 35.97 48.76 47.10 22.39 22.91 34.03 35.12 38.77 37.52 35.65 
F-statistics 54.72 54.86 80.21 86.59 84.29 86.12 71.68 67.16 22.50 23.13 68.46 71.78 56.03 53.19 82.78 
                
N 5350 5350 8185 8185 8185 8185 4086 4088 4099 4097 4186 4186 3999 3999 8185 
This table reports the results of robustness tests for LN_DER for 2004 & 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
* (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
LARGEST SHAREHOLDER AND DIVIDEND POLICY:  
AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 87 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Berle and Means (1932) claimed that ownership structure was widely dispersed. 
This is not the case, particularly for firms located outside the US and the UK. There is 
increasing evidence of concentrated shareholding, with the majority of equity in a firm 
held by one shareholder or a shareholder group (La Porta et al. 1999 for developed country 
firms; Becht and Mayer 2000 for European firms; Claessens et al. 2000 for East Asian 
developing firms). Indeed, it is observed that at least 50% of the firms in our sample, 
drawn from 37 countries, have one shareholder or a shareholder group owning at least 
25% of the equity in the firm,88 with the largest shareholder holding more than 30% of 
total voting shares on average.   
The largest shareholder is a quite distinctive class of shareholder. Their investment 
is sensitive to firm decisions and there are costs associated with maintaining such a large 
investment in a firm, particularly the cost of under-diversification. But, there are also 
benefits arising from the influence that such shareholders exercise over the firm 
(Claessens et al. 2002). While the ownership literature is substantial, there are some gaps 
in this literature and the role of large shareholders, especially the largest shareholder, is 
not well developed (Holderness 2003). Thus, this chapter focuses on the impact of the 
largest shareholder on firm dividend policy in an effort to gain a better understanding of 
                                                 
87 This chapter is substantially based on the paper, entitled “Largest shareholder and dividend policy around 
the world”, presented at the 56th Midwestern Finance Annual Meeting, and accepted for publication in 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.    
88 These firms are rated with the OSIRIS independence indicator B or C, meaning that they have at least one 
shareholder whose shareholding exceeds 25% of the firm. Refer to Appendix 4.1. 
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what role the largest shareholder might play in setting dividend policy.89 Large 
shareholders could exert pressure on a firm to adopt a dividend policy that reduces private 
consumption by firm management yet they could also enforce a dividend policy that 
maximizes private benefits for them at the expense of minority shareholders. It is 
important to analyse the relationship that exists between large shareholders and dividend 
policy in order to better understand the dividend policy decision. 
Few studies have examined the effect of the largest shareholder on dividend policy, 
and these studies are largely single country-based, including Gugler (2003) for Austrian 
firms and Correia Da Silva et al  (2004) for German firms. Research dealing with the 
relation between management ownership and dividend policy (Rozeff 1982; Jensen et al. 
1992) is more apparent as is analysis of the relation that exists between institutional 
ownership and dividend policy (Short et al. 2002; Grinstein and Michaely 2005; Barclay et 
al. 2006). Agency theory suggests that the largest shareholder and dividend policy might 
be viewed as substitute monitoring devices (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986).  
In examining firm dividend policy, there are two key decisions, (i) whether or not 
to pay dividends, and (ii) how much to pay.  Following Fama and French (2002), we 
extend the model of Lintner (1956) assuming that the so-called “target” dividend payout 
rate is a function of firm leverage and investment opportunities. Unlike previous studies, 
we also examine the potential effects of heterogeneity in the largest shareholder on 
dividend policy. Different types of the largest shareholder (insider, financial institution or 
state) differ in terms of their preferences and desires as well as in their ability to influence 
firm management and hence dividend policy (Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003; Renneboog and 
Trojanowski 2005).   
                                                 
89 There is still considerable controversy over the question of just why firms pay dividends.  For example, 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005 p.2) note that “the controversy about why firms should pay dividends 
has not been satisfactorily resolved”.  
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Dividend policy is observed to vary across countries and legal systems (La Porta et 
al. 2000b) and so this study chooses cross-sectional data for 8,279 large firms drawn from 
37 countries around the world, with annual reports available in 2004. This chapter 
essentially examines cross-sectional variations in dividend policy, and the impact of 
largest shareholder on this policy choice. The analysis is split between dividend paying 
and non dividend paying firms, as well as specifically allows for different legal systems 
(common law vs. civil law). Further, it is possible that while the largest shareholder could 
influence dividend policy, it is also feasible that dividend policy affects the ownership 
level that the largest shareholder chooses. For example, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
argue that dividend payout may affect firm ownership and there is good reason to expect 
firm management to design a dividend policy that induces the largest shareholder to 
maintain their ownership stake in the firm. 
The results from this analysis demonstrate that firms are more likely to pay 
dividends when profits are high, debt is low or where investment opportunities are low. 
This finding is generally consistent with the literature (Fama and French 2001). It is also 
found that for firms that choose to pay dividends, the magnitude of the dividend payment 
is increasing in profitability and investment opportunities, and decreasing in debt, also 
consistent with previous findings (Jensen et al. 1992; Fama and French 2002). There is 
evidence of the existence of a non linear relation between the largest shareholding and 
dividend payout ratios. It is observed that the shareholding of the largest shareholder is 
negatively related to dividend payout at low levels of shareholding, yet as the shareholding 
increases, this relation becomes positive. Where the largest shareholder has a 
comparatively small interest in the company, there will be a tendency for them to more 
actively monitor the firm’s management, and so there is less need for the use of dividends 
in controlling agency costs. This is largely consistent with traditional agency theory where 
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it is argued that ownership and dividends provide substitute monitoring devices (Rozeff 
1982; Easterbrook 1984). Yet, as ownership levels of the largest shareholder increase, this 
creates its own set of agency problems, resulting in the need for higher dividend levels and 
the external monitoring activity that accompanies them.90 Further, consistent with 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005), the results suggest that the largest shareholding is a 
function of dividend policy.  
There is also strong support for the argument that the decision to pay dividends is 
linked to the identity of the largest shareholder. Firms tend to pay dividends when the 
largest shareholder is a financial institution, but this is not the case for firms where the 
largest shareholder is an insider. There is also evidence that dividend payout ratios are 
lower when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution.  Finally, 
consistent with La Porta et al. (2000b), the results suggest that that legal origin (common 
law or civil law) does matter in dividend policy decisions. While common law firms are 
less likely to pay dividends, those that pay dividends tend to pay higher dividends 
compared to those in civil law countries. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature dealing with 
the linkage that exists between the largest shareholder and dividend policy. Section 5.3 
describes the data, while Section 5.4 outlines the empirical models used in the analysis. 
Section 5.5 reports and discusses the empirical results. A summary with some remarks is 
presented in Section 5.6. 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Faccio et al. (2001 p. 71) argue that “investors appear alert to the greater exposure to expropriation within 
tightly controlled groups; to offset their concerns, higher dividends are paid by corporations affiliated to 
such groups” 
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5.2 Theoretical Framework 
Agency theory provides one explanation for the interaction between ownership and 
dividend policy.91 To mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
Rozeff (1982 p. 250) suggests that “a wealth maximizing firm adopts an optimal 
“monitoring/bonding” package which acts to reduce agency costs”. Jensen (1986) argues 
that a firm is likely to share more of its profits with its investors when it faces lower 
monitoring costs. Essentially, dividend policy is a manifestation of the extent to which 
agency conflicts between existing shareholders, managers, lenders and new investors exist 
within the firm (Easterbrook 1984). Further, minority shareholders exert pressure on firm 
management to “disgorge cash” in situations where they are likely to be exploited, 
particularly where firm ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few large shareholders 
or where legal protection of minority shareholders is weak (La Porta et al. 2000b).  
The interaction between ownership and dividend policy is the focus of many 
empirical studies. Rozeff (1982) provides evidence that firms pay more dividends when 
individual shareholding is relatively low (also see Moh'd et al. 1995). Short et al. (2002) 
and  Barclay et al. (2006) note that large shareholders, especially institutions, have a 
preference for cash dividends over retained earnings. It is also argued that firms are valued 
less when they are controlled by large shareholders and do not pay dividends (Thomsen et 
al. 2006). In this case, it is also found that the presence of large shareholders adversely 
affects firm value as well as dividend payouts in continental European firms. Similarly, 
Gugler and Yortoglu (2003 p. 733) state that “dividends signal the severity of the conflict 
between the large, controlling owner and small, outside shareholders”, however, their 
results suggest that dividend payouts rise as the holding of the largest shareholder 
increases. Recently, Crutchley et al. (1999), Correia Da Silva et al. (2004) and Khan 
                                                 
91 Refer to EasterBrook (1984). Taxation may affect dividend policy (Allen et al. 2000). Yet, La Porta et al. 
(2000b) find little evidence of tax impact on dividends in their cross-country investigation. For a more recent 
review of dividend literature, refer to Allen and Michaely (2002).  
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(2006) have discovered that  the relation between large shareholding and dividend policy 
is non linear.92 
It is clear that among large shareholders, the largest shareholder may face high 
costs of monitoring. It may also be important for them to maintain their reputation for not 
expropriating wealth from minority shareholders as their wealth will be adversely affected 
by such actions if it results in decreased firm value (Claessens et al. 2002). As Grinstein 
and Michaely (2005) note, the largest shareholder should have a strong incentive to 
monitor, or have the ability to coordinate several governance mechanisms to improve their 
effectiveness in monitoring. Even if the level of monitoring by the largest shareholder is 
inadequate or if the firm suffers from agency conflicts existing between the largest 
shareholder and minority shareholders, dividends may provide a partial remedy as a 
substitute monitoring device (Rozeff 1982). As a result, it is hypothesized that, all else 
equal, firms with higher levels of shareholding by the largest shareholder are likely to pay 
dividends, and they will pay more dividends the greater their shareholding in the firm.93  
The question of whether this relationship is a linear relationship focuses on the 
ability of the largest shareholder to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and the 
incentive to monitor the firm’s management. For relatively low levels of shareholding, the 
largest shareholder is more likely to focus on protecting the value of their investment 
through greater levels of monitoring. With more active largest shareholder monitoring, the 
need for dividends as a monitoring device becomes less important and so, at least initially, 
dividends may fall with increases in the shareholding of the largest shareholder. But, as 
the level of shareholding increases, the largest shareholder is eventually able to influence 
the operations of the firm and to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Thus as 
                                                 
92 This is consistent with the relationship observed in the sample data.   
93 It has been argued that dividends reduce levels of informational asymmetry that exist among shareholders. 
For example, firms with concentrated ownership is likely to pay out dividends to “signal” information of 
their growth prospects to outside shareholders who have limited access to such information (Frankfurter and 
Wood 2003). 
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the shareholding of the largest shareholder continues to increase, the level of dividends is 
likely to increase in order to ensure that effective monitoring is maintained. This suggests 
a non linear relationship between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and dividend 
policy as observed by Crutchley et al. (1999) and Khan (2006).  
The identity of the largest shareholder, whether the largest shareholder is an insider 
or a financial institution or a state, may be important (Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003). Some 
shareholders may be able to influence firm policy and performance more easily than 
others. For example, large insiders may have a preference for retained earnings over 
dividends for rent extraction (Grossman and Hart 1988). High dividend payouts result in 
more frequent external capital raising and thus, greater levels of market monitoring 
(Easterbrook 1984).  It is also evident that financial institutions may find cash dividends 
attractive for taxation reasons (Allen et al. 2000), for survivability (Barclay et al. 2006) or 
in meeting “prudent man” rules (Grinstein and Michaely 2005). Thus, it is also 
hypothesized that firms are less likely to pay dividends and will actually pay less 
dividends when the largest shareholder is an insider. The reverse is predicted for firms 
with a financial institution as their largest shareholder.  
The ability to monitor firm management and the rights of shareholders vary across 
countries and legal systems, and hence affect the severity of conflicts of interests (La Porta 
et al. 2000a).  In countries where legal protection is weak, the largest shareholders may 
provide an important control device by exerting pressure on firm management to pay out 
excess cash, and thus reduce potential agency costs. In contrast, in countries where legal 
protection is strong, minority shareholders are more effective in exercising their right to 
protect themselves from potential expropriation. Hence, it seems that the interaction 
between the largest shareholder and dividend policy is subject to the level of legal 
protection provided to minority shareholders in the country where the firm operates. 
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5.3 Data and Sample 
5.3.1 Data 
In 2005, Bureau van Dijk94 began to provide information on major shareholders in 
their OSIRIS database in terms of broad classifications such as institution, state, publicly 
listed, individual employee and manager. As a result, this chapter focuses on the data for 
the year 2004, provided in the OSIRIS September 2005 data disk though some firm 
specific information is required from the year 2003 for use as instruments in later analysis. 
There is a maximum of 17,619 firms listed worldwide for the year 2004 though a number 
of firms are excluded from analysis. Exclusions include all financial firms whose SIC code 
falls in the range, 6000 and 6900,  firms that only report unconsolidated balance sheet 
data, or that do not provide ownership or dividends information, and firms whose total 
sales, total assets or total market capitalization is less than US$2.5 million. As a result of 
this filtering process95, the final sample consists of 8,279 listed firms drawn from 37 
countries around the world, of which 3,770 firms report non-zero dividends.  
The largest shareholder is identified in terms of their total direct and indirect 
ordinary voting shares as reported in the year 2004, and largest shareholders must hold at 
least 5% of total shares in the firm. The largest shareholders are then categorised into 3 
types. The first category is the inside largest shareholder category (Large_INSD). These 
shareholders are closely tied to the firm and include employees, managers, directors, 
individuals or families. The second category is for the financial institutional largest 
shareholder (Large_FIN). This category includes all financial institutions (banks, financial 
companies, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds and the like). The third 
                                                 
94 http://www.bvdep.com/en/companyInformationHome.html.   
95 Though this filtering process also reduces the span of countries from 110 to 37 countries in the final 
sample, there is still a wider coverage of firms and countries than La Porta et al. (2000b) who focused on 
those firms with non-zero dividends domiciled in countries which are neither socialist nor ex-socialist. 
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and final category covers state largest shareholder (Large_STATE) and this category 
includes government and state-owned entities.  
 
5.3.2 Sample 
Table 5.1 reports the distribution of the largest shareholder for the final sample for 
the year 2004. The final sample includes a large group of US firms (36.61%) as well as 
Chinese firms (11.67%) and UK firms (8.33%). The largest shareholder is often a financial 
institution (25.18%) with the largest shareholder being an institution (Large_FIN) in 
20.40% (31.46%) of the cases in civil law (common law) countries, which exceeds the 
percentage attributed to the remaining two types, Large_INSD and Large_STATE. 
Further, common law country firm largest shareholders have a lower average shareholding 
(34.20% of total shares) than their civil law country counterparts (40.54%). This suggests 
that ownership structure is more dispersed in common law countries than in civil law 
countries, consistent with the literature (La Porta et al. 1999). 
Total cash dividends paid to ordinary shares is also collected for each of the firms 
in the sample. Accounting variables, collected for each firm, include total assets, total 
sales, total shareholder equity, market capitalization, net income after tax before 
extraordinary items, short-term debt and long-term debt. These variables are defined in 
Table 5.2.96 It should be noted that all variables are measured in US dollars. Following 
Lins (2003), the accounting data is truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles, replacing all 
observations that lie outside the 1st and 99th percentile range with the 1st and 99th 
percentiles respectively.   
 
                                                 
96 Note that data are also collected for these accounting variables for the year 2003 for use as instruments in 
latter multivariate analysis. 
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Table 5. 1:  Distribution of largest shareholder 
 %Firms Large_INSD 
(%) 
Large_FIN 
(%) 
Large_ STATE 
(%) 
LargeOwn 
(%) 
AUSTRIA 0.36 16.67 10.00 0.00 52.90 
BELGIUM 0.85 5.71 21.43 0.00 42.73 
BRAZIL 0.18 0.00 40.00 6.67 49.71 
CHILE 0.27 4.55 22.73 0.00 43.48 
CHINA 11.67 0.00 9.52 0.10 42.86 
DENMARK 0.83 14.49 36.23 1.45 33.44 
FINLAND 1.09 18.89 22.22 6.67 29.84 
FRANCE 4.78 25.25 12.12 0.25 48.08 
GERMANY 3.65 25.83 7.62 0.99 52.09 
GREECE 0.43 50.00 2.78 5.56 40.53 
INDONESIA 0.25 9.52 4.76 0.00 52.85 
ITALY 1.68 35.97 9.35 8.63 45.33 
JAPAN 5.87 4.12 32.10 0.41 24.99 
MEXICO 0.24 35.00 10.00 0.00 50.57 
NETHERLANDS 1.14 10.64 37.23 2.13 29.43 
NORWAY 1.00 10.84 27.71 10.84 26.54 
PHILIPPINES 0.25 4.76 28.57 0.00 48.76 
PORTUGAL 0.40 3.03 30.30 0.00 43.48 
SPAIN 1.05 8.05 21.84 0.00 28.91 
SWEDEN 1.67 18.12 21.01 0.72 27.94 
SWITZERLAND 1.22 22.77 20.79 4.95 36.95 
CiviLaw mean  15.44 20.40 2.35 40.54 
AUSTRALIA 3.18 5.32 54.37 0.00 19.89 
BERMUDA 1.20 16.16 27.27 0.00 46.55 
CANADA 2.96 22.45 26.12 0.00 38.27 
CAYMAN ISLANDS 0.29 8.33 25.00 0.00 39.60 
HONG KONG 0.66 21.82 20.00 0.00 49.42 
INDIA 1.30 9.26 22.22 2.78 36.31 
IRELAND 0.30 12.00 60.00 0.00 19.29 
ISRAEL 0.33 14.81 25.93 3.70 37.03 
LUXEMBOURG 0.14 0.00 8.33 8.33 38.15 
MALAYSIA 2.17 22.78 25.56 1.11 33.18 
NEW ZEALAND 0.24 15.00 45.00 5.00 40.05 
SINGAPORE 1.91 22.15 35.44 0.00 30.23 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.79 4.62 20.00 1.54 44.13 
THAILAND 0.70 8.62 12.07 0.00 37.20 
UNITED KINGDOM 8.33 19.28 50.29 0.14 17.91 
UNITED STATES 36.61 33.49 45.73 0.86 20.01 
ComLaw mean  14.76 31.46 1.47 34.20 
All country mean   15.14 25.18 1.91 37.80  
This table reports the distribution of the largest shareholding for the final sample of 8,279 firms in the year 
2004. %Firms is the number of firms in the country as a percentage of the total of firms in the sample. 
Large_FIN (%) is the percentage of equity held by a financial institution as the largest shareholder. 
Large_INSD (%) is the percentage of equity held by an insider as the largest shareholder. Large_STATE (%) 
is the percentage of equity held by a state or government institution as the largest shareholder. LargeOwn 
(%) is the total shareholding (direct and indirect shareholding) held by the largest shareholder as a 
percentage of the total large shareholding.   
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Table 5. 2:  Variable definition 
ComLaw dummy variable equal to 1 for countries that have common law origin and 0 
otherwise. 
Debt03 and 
Debt04 
ratio of total debt to total assets as at the end of the years 2003 and 2004 
respectively.  
TDiv  total cash dividends paid to common shares (thousands US$) 
DivI ratio of total dividends to net earnings after tax before extraordinary items.  
DivS ratio of total dividends to Net Sales. 
DivPayer dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that have non-zero dividends and 0 
otherwise. 
FNI04 ratio of net earnings after tax before extraordinary items to total assets in year 
2004. 
Large_FIN dummy variable equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is a financial 
institution. 
Large_INSD dummy variable equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is an insider. 
Large_STATE dummy variable equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is a state or 
government. 
Large_TYPE j either Large_INSD, Large_FIN or Large_STATE for j = 1, 2 or 3 respectively 
LargeOwn total ownership (direct and indirect ownership) held by the largest shareholder. 
LargeOwn2 LargeOwn raised to the power 2 
Mkb03 and 
Mkb04 
ratio of the book value of total assets less shareholder equity plus the market 
value of equity to the book value of total assets as at the end of the years 2003 
and 2004 respectively. 
Rosh03 return on shareholders’ funds as at the end of the year 2003. 
TA04 book value of assets at the end of the year 2004  
 
Table 5.3 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample for the year 2004. It 
should be noted that firms in common law countries exhibit lower levels of dividend 
payout than those in civil law countries. This appears inconsistent with recent analysis (La 
Porta et al. 2000b) though this result is reversed when re-calculating descriptive statistics 
using only firms that pay dividends.97 Generally speaking, firms in common law countries 
are more profitable (2.58%), and have a higher market-to-book value (1.76), and are less 
reliant on debt financing (16.91%) than civil law firms (2.54%, 1.45, and 24.03% 
                                                 
97 For the dividend-paying firm sample, we also notice that firms in common law countries tend to have 
higher dividend payouts (about 0.5% higher) than firms in civil law countries. While small in terms of basis 
points, this difference is economically large when expressed in dollar terms, around US$20 million for the 
average firm. In addition, it is increasingly evident that Canadian firms, like US firms, increased their shares 
buy-back activities in the recent time. Despite the small impact of Canadian firms on the overall analysis, i.e. 
accounting for less 1% of the total number of firms included, I find that the analysis results for Canadian 
firms are similar to that of existing studies such as LaPorta et al. (2000b). 
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respectively). All differences across the two legal systems, except for FNI04 and DivS, are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
5.4 Multivariate Models 
Dividend policy involves two decisions, (i) whether or not to pay dividends, and 
(ii) how much to pay. It is sensible to incorporate both decisions in a two-stage analysis in 
our investigation of the links that exist between the largest shareholder and dividend 
policy.98 Specifically, the first stage examines the effect of the largest shareholder on the 
likelihood that a firm pays dividends. The second stage then models the extent to which 
the largest shareholder explains the magnitude of dividend payout. There are two scenarios 
for the second stage of the analysis, (a) where both dividend-paying firms (payers) and 
non-dividend paying firms (non-payers) are included, and (b) where only dividend payers 
are examined.  
Stage 1. The general model for the decision whether or not to pay dividends 
follows Fama and French (2001). In this model, the debt and market to book variables 
from the year 2003 are used as proxies for leverage and investment opportunities in these 
models. The model also includes industry dummy variables to control for industry effects 
across the sample.    
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98 For a review of theoretical models underlying dividend policy refer to Frankfurter and Wood (2003). 
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Stage 2. The interaction between the largest shareholder and dividend policy can 
be tested in the context of the Lintner (1956) model.99 In this model, the total target 
dividends that a firm pays out in 2004 ( targetiTDiv ) is the product of the firm’s target 
dividend payout rate ( targetiDivR ) and net earnings in 2004 ( iFNI 04 ) as follows: 
 
iii FNIDivRTDiv 04*
targettarget =    (5.2) 
 
Model (2) is then expanded as follows: 
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Following Fama and French (2002), targetiDivR  is assumed to be a function of the 
firm’s leverage and investment opportunities. Equation (5.3) is augmented with the largest 
shareholder variables as follows: 
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Substituting (5.4) into (5.3), then: 
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99 It is claimed that this model provides a good description of the dividend setting process (Allen and 
Michaely 2002). 
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Table 5. 3:  Descriptive statistics 
N=8,279 # of 
firms 
DivI 
(%) 
DivS 
(%) 
FNI04 
(%) 
Debt04 
(%) 
Mkb04 TA04 
(US$ 000) 
AUSTRIA 30 26.04 1.12 2.21 20.45 1.61    1,432,112 
BELGIUM 70 33.62 2.89 4.22 21.06 1.56     1,952,831 
BRAZIL 15 54.80 5.27 6.83 27.47 1.81     6,714,781 
CHILE 22 46.78 7.37 7.28 25.60 1.60     1,859,530 
CHINA      966 25.65 1.81 1.82 32.54 1.48        433,136 
DENMARK 69 36.68 2.30 4.62 22.73 1.65 1,505,706 
FINLAND 90 43.95 3.05 5.21 20.63 1.59 1,878,345 
FRANCE      396 28.76 1.43 2.35 18.98 1.48 3,350,099 
GERMANY      302 24.27 1.23 0.90 18.03 1.41 4,899,233 
GREECE 36 46.57 2.63 4.62 28.57 1.33 1,755,054 
INDONESIA 21 37.29 3.27 10.13 21.29 1.83 853,791 
ITALY      139 29.61 1.73 0.07 24.67 1.33 5,400,346 
JAPAN      486 24.93 0.87 2.81 18.74 1.23 6,325,915 
MEXICO 20 32.11 3.70 6.29 20.94 1.32 5,207,246 
NETHERLANDS 94 43.24 1.70 2.96 18.10 1.44 3,240,809 
NORWAY 83 45.07 3.89 3.31 23.29 1.83 1,581,374 
PHILIPPINES 21 23.23 2.03 4.06 28.24 1.03 1,084,215 
PORTUGAL 33 19.11 1.04 2.66 36.32 1.26 2,787,577 
SPAIN 87 18.38 1.88 5.02 27.22 1.59 5,980,373 
SWEDEN      138 35.98 2.76 2.31 16.96 1.78 1,832,719 
SWITZERLAND      101 29.04 2.13 4.19 18.69 1.46 2,687,879 
CiviLaw mean  28.81 1.81 2.54 24.03 1.45 2,927,768 
AUSTRALIA      263 34.81 3.28 4.21 17.44 1.74 880,392 
BERMUDA 99 35.83 4.69 4.88 18.40 1.38 1,027,878 
CANADA      245 9.14 1.07 2.40 18.06 1.49 2,215,796 
CAYMAN ISLANDS 24 32.42 5.28 4.69 16.95 1.39 1,133,627 
HONG KONG 55 32.91 7.26 6.33 16.25 1.44 3,899,394 
INDIA      108 28.30 2.94 8.83 22.70 2.06 721,101 
IRELAND 25 24.02 1.90 3.91 22.26 1.83 1,595,595 
ISRAEL 27 26.37 2.73 2.30 10.97 1.94 685,871 
LUXEMBOURG 12 36.69 3.36 1.30 19.78 1.16 6,062,885 
MALAYSIA      180 32.74 3.32 4.36 21.46 1.26 569,743 
NEW ZEALAND 20 54.67 7.51 5.95 30.62 1.84 1,106,946 
SINGAPORE      158 31.15 2.94 4.53 15.82 1.33 613,622 
SOUTH AFRICA 65 31.31 3.03 8.41 9.48 1.60 1,208,799 
THAILAND 58 38.15 4.54 8.38 23.87 1.31 551,403 
UNITED KINGDOM      690 37.52 2.24 2.54 16.33 1.71 2,437,388 
UNITED STATES     3031 11.89 0.96 1.62 16.38 1.88 2,686,108 
ComLaw mean  19.85 1.72 2.58 16.91 1.76 2,269,264 
Mean diff+  8.96* 0.09 -0.04 7.12* -0.31* 658,504* 
  (8.44) (0.92) (-0.24) (18.73) (-13.7) (2.46) 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the final sample of 8,279 firms for the year 2004. Refer to Table 5.2 for 
variable definition. + tests mean differences across subgroups of common law firms and civil law firms. *(**) 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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5.5 Analysis Results 
5.5.1 Decision whether or not to pay dividends 
As outlined in Section 5.4, model (5.1) examines the influence of the largest 
shareholder on the decision of whether or not to pay dividends. It is expected that the 
monitoring behaviour of the largest shareholder will have some influence on this decision. 
The results of Logit estimation of model (5.1) are reported in Table 5.4.  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.4 suggest that firms are more likely to pay dividends 
the greater the profits and the lower the level of  investment opportunities, consistent with  
Fama and French (2001). Model (5.1) is also estimated for common law firms and for civil 
law firms, and similar results are obtained (Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5.4). While Fama 
and French (2002) argue that dividend payout and leverage are jointly determined by 
growth options and profitability, leverage is also included as an additional control variable 
in the analysis. The estimated leverage coefficient is generally negative and statistically 
significant in the analysis of all firms, though it is positive and statistically significant for 
firms in common law countries (Column (4) Table 5.4). Given the results for the full 
sample, Ex US and Civil law sub samples, the positive coefficient might well be a US firm 
effect, consistent with some of the empirical results reported by Fama and French (2001). 
The variation in the book leverage coefficient sign is unexpected and may reflect more 
fundamental legal system based effects on the decision to pay dividends. 
A non linear relationship is hypothesised between largest shareholder and dividend 
payout, and there is some support for this hypothesis in the full period analysis (Columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 5.4). Essentially, the relation between largest shareholding and the 
likelihood of paying dividends is decreasing at lower levels of shareholding and increasing 
at higher levels of largest shareholding, with a turning point when largest shareholding 
approaches 30% of the equity in a firm. This result is sensitive to legal system, with only 
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the common law country sub sample providing strong statistical support for the existence 
of this relationship.   
 
Table 5. 4:  Largest shareholder and dividend decision  
 Full Sample Ex-US ComLaw CiviLaw 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.9137* 1.8184* 1.7480* -0.0331 1.2498* 
 (3.47) (3.35) (3.20) (-0.15) (2.01) 
FNI04 6.2594* 6.2613* 7.0859* 5.4637* 8.2867* 
 (18.97) (18.90) (14.59) (15.65) (11.02) 
Debt03 -0.3068* -0.3436* -0.9544* 0.4021* -1.3637* 
 (-2.94) (-3.29) (-7.09) (2.99) (-8.02) 
Mkb03 -0.1800* -0.1800* -0.2002* -0.1429* -0.2436* 
 (-9.52) (-9.45) (-7.72) (-6.79) (-6.37) 
Large_INSD  -0.1028* -0.1070** -0.0061 -0.1450** 
  (-2.25) (-1.77) (-0.11) (-1.68) 
Large_FIN  0.1076* 0.0906** 0.1798* -0.0269 
  (2.55) (1.70) (3.45) (-0.36) 
Large_STATE  0.0209 0.5156* -0.6781* 0.4870** 
  (0.13) (2.29) (-2.69) (1.86) 
LargeOwn -0.0099* -0.0066* -0.1058 -0.0163* 0.0084** 
 (-3.65) (-2.35) (-0.60) (-4.36) (1.81) 
LargeOwn2 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0342 0.0002* -0.0001 
 (4.16) (3.17) (1.20) (4.48) (-1.12) 
ComLaw -1.6888* -1.6819* -0.6143*   
 (-20.18) (-19.84) (-6.17)   
      
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
McFadden R-squared 24.45 24.63 22.96 23.99 24.68 
LR statistics 2803.96* 2824.66* 1547.32* 1669.74* 1052.48* 
N 8279 8279 5248 5060 3219 
This table reports the results obtained from the Logit estimation of model (5.1) for the full sample of 
8,279 firms for the year 2004. The dependent variable is DivPayer. Full Sample refers to analysis based 
on all available firms. Ex-US refers to analysis using all firms other than US firms. Common Law and 
Civil Law refer to the sub samples of firms from common law countries or civil law countries 
respectively. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. The values reported in parentheses are t-statistics.  
*(**) denotes a statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.  
 
The dividend decision is also related to the identity of the largest shareholder. The 
coefficient for Large_INSD is statistically significant and negative in the full sample 
analysis. Essentially, firms with an inside largest shareholder are less likely to pay 
dividends (Column (2) of Table 5.4).  The coefficient for Large_INSD is also negative in 
the sub-sample analysis though the level of statistical significance is lower. The 
Large_FIN coefficients are statistically significant and positive at either the 10% level or 
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the 5% level for the full sample, the ex US sub-sample and the common law sub-sample 
though the coefficient is statistically insignificant for the civil law firm sub-sample. This 
suggests that, at least for firms in common law countries, a firm is more likely to pay 
dividends where there is a large financial institution shareholder.  It seems that financial 
institution shareholders have little direct impact on the likelihood of dividend payments 
for firms operating in civil law countries. Finally, the Large_STATE coefficient suggests 
that dividends are more (less) likely to be paid by firms listed in civil law (common law) 
countries when there is a large state shareholder.   
In Table 5.4, the coefficient for ComLaw is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This suggests that in common law countries, where legal protection of 
shareholders especially for minority shareholders is strong and expropriating minority 
shareholder wealth by large shareholders is generally more costly, there is less pressure for 
common law firms to distribute profits (dividends) to shareholders. Overall, it should be 
noted that the greater the largest shareholding, or the stronger the legal protection (i.e. 
common law), the less likely firms are to pay dividends.  
 
5.5.2 How much to pay 
5.5.2.1 Univariate analysis 
This section compares dividend payout ratios (both DivI and DivS) across 
subgroups: high vs. low largest shareholding (above and below the median largest 
shareholding respectively), and different types of the largest shareholder. The results 
generated from this analysis are reported in Table 5.5.100 First, it is shown that dividends 
are paid differently depending on the identity of the largest shareholder. In columns (1) 
and (2) of Panel A, firms with high largest shareholding have higher average dividend 
                                                 
100 The analysis is repeated for the other two dividend payout proxies (DivA and DivM), and for OSIRIS 
independence indicator. Refer to Appendix 5.1 and 5.2.  
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payout ratios than those with low largest shareholding. In addition, common law firms, 
especially in the high largest shareholding group, pay more dividends than civil law firms. 
For example, in terms of DivS, for high (low) shareholding group, the mean difference is 
1.65% (1.19%), and these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that in countries with strong legal protection, the greater the largest shareholding, 
the higher the dividend payout ratio. Essentially, in high legal protection countries, largest 
shareholder ownership and legal protection may be complementary in mitigating agency 
problems through higher payout dividend ratios.   
Panel A (columns (3), (4) and (5)) of Table 5.5 also demonstrates that dividend 
payout ratios vary across different types of largest shareholder in both common and civil 
law regimes. Specifically, firms with the largest shareholder being the state pay the highest 
average dividend payout ratio followed by those where the largest shareholder is a 
financial institution. Further, Panel B (column (6)) shows that dividend payout ratios are 
higher for firms with high largest shareholding, with the mean differences between high 
and low largest shareholding being statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5. 5: Univariate analysis - largest shareholder and dividend payout  
  Panel A. Legal protection and dividend payout Panel B. Largest shareholder and dividend payout 
  
High 
LargeOwn 
Low 
LargeOwn Large_INSD Large_FIN Large_STATE 
High LargeOwn vs. 
Low LargeOwn 
Large_INSD 
vs. _FIN  
Large_INSD 
vs. _STATE 
Large_FIN 
 vs. _STATE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(a) Dividend to net income (DivI) 
CiviLaw mean 50.1338 44.2329 47.5248 45.1829 57.4501 5.9009* 2.3419 -9.9253 -12.2672** 
      (2.99) (0.68) (-1.32) (-1.69) 
ComLaw mean 50.4953 50.9801 45.4283 50.5171 48.4163 -0.4848 -5.0888 -2.988 2.1008 
      (-0.23) (-1.99) (-0.27) (0.19) 
Mean difference -0.3615 -6.7472* 2.0965 -5.3342* 9.0338      
  (-0.18) (-3.28) (0.61) (-2.07) (0.69)         
(b) Dividend to net sales (DivS) 
CiviLaw mean 3.06 2.15 2.37 2.43 4.23 0.91* -0.06 -1.86* -1.8* 
      (4.92) (-0.21) (-2.48) (-2.36) 
ComLaw mean 4.71 3.34 3.30 3.34 3.61 1.37* -0.04 -0.31 -0.27 
      (5.37) (-0.15) (-0.46) (-0.42) 
Mean difference -1.65* -1.19* -0.93* -0.91* 0.62      
 (-6.41) (-6.68) (-3.17) (-3.45) (0.65)         
This table compares differences in mean dividend payout across firms. The values reported in parentheses are t-statistics. * (**) denotes a statistical significance at the 5% 
(10%) level.  
 
 144 
5.5.2.2 Multivariate analysis 
This section investigates the determinants of dividend payout with particular 
emphasis on the largest shareholder. The notion that corporate ownership is endogenous to 
the firm can be traced back to the work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and so it is important 
to account for this possibility in this study. First, there is some cares taken in the choice of 
the independent variables included in model (5.5). Second, for the full sample, the model 
(5.5) is estimated using Tobit with endogenous regressors to specifically adjust for the 
endogeneity problem.101 This choice not only accounts for endogeneity in the ownership 
relationship, but also adjusts for potential biases that may be caused by the prevalence of 
zero-dividend observations in the sample (Heckman 1979).  
As discussed previously, dividend payouts are a function of LargeOWN and 
several control variables. For this analysis, LargeType is assumed to be exogenously 
determined. Yet, as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) note, ownership may also be determined by 
firm characteristics, including performance, the asset risk, business risk and contracting 
environment. Thus, in estimating model (5.5) using Tobit with endogenous regressors, 
Rosh03, Debt03, Mkb03, LargeType, ComLaw and the industry dummy variables are 
employed as instruments. These instrumental variables capture both the benefits and the 
costs of large shareholding and they are selected on the basis of previous studies including 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen et al. (1992) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
Control of a firm by the largest shareholder may add value when firm-specific risk is 
relatively high. This risk is often observed in firms that have high levels of investment 
opportunities because of increased uncertainty and informational asymmetry (i.e. Mbk03).  
Debt (Debt03), while having a direct impact on firm financial risk, also has an impact on 
the level of management monitoring that takes place (McConnell and Servaes 1995). This 
                                                 
101 For more information, see Green (2003). Model (5.5) is also estimated using OLS procedure, and the 
results, reported in Appendix 5.3 and 5.4, are generally similar to those reported in both Tables 5.6 and 5.7 
respectively. 
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affects the incentive for the largest shareholder to monitor firm management. Finally, the 
weaker the legal protection, the more attention the largest shareholder should pay to firm 
management (i.e. ComLaw).   
The results from the estimation of model (5.5), using the full sample, are reported 
in Table 5.6. Panel A of Table 5.5 shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
for FNI04. Further, the coefficient for F_NI04*Debt03 is positive and the coefficient for 
F_NI04*Mkb03 is negative with both of these coefficients being statistically significant at 
the 5% level. These results are consistent with the prediction that higher dividend payouts 
are associated with firms with high profitability and low investment opportunities. Further, 
the coefficients for LargeOwn and LargeOwn2 are negative and positive respectively, and 
both coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. Recent studies by Crutchley et 
al. (1999), Correia Da Silva et al  (2004) and Khan (2006) also discover a non-linear 
relation between large shareholding and dividend policy, and the results are consistent 
with their work. Further, model (5.5) is re-estimated without LargeOwn2, and the results 
show that the coefficient for LargeOwn is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level, while the remaining coefficients are little changed. Further, both coefficients for the 
interaction terms, FNI04*Large_INSD and FNI04*Large_FIN, are negative though only 
the coefficient for FNI04*Large_INSD is statistically significant in the analysis. The 
coefficient on the ComLaw dummy variable is statistically significant as are the 
coefficients on the ComLaw interaction terms with FNI04 and LargeOwn.102 The results 
for the second dividend proxy, DivS, (reported in Panel B of Table 5.6) are generally 
consistent with the results reported for DivI above. 
                                                 
102 Non-dividend paying firms in our sample may account for this effect.   
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Model (5.5) is also re-estimated for the sub-sample of dividend-paying firms using 
the two stage least squares method (2SLS) procedure103 to adjust for endogeneity in the 
ownership variable, and the estimation results are reported in Table 5.7. Broadly speaking, 
the results are little changed from those reported in Table 5.6. However, for the sub-
sample analysis, the results indicate that the sign of the interaction term coefficients for 
FNI04*Debt03 and F_NI04*F_MKB03 change, though they still remain statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Further, the ComLaw dummy variable coefficient is now 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Overall, the results are consistent with the literature. Fama and French (2002) 
report that US firms pay more dividends when they are profitable and have less debt. 
Further, they argue that there is greater need for monitoring firms with high levels of 
investment opportunities in order to control agency conflicts that may arise. The empirical 
results reported above also reflect these findings, but in this case for a sample of firms 
drawn from around the world.  
                                                 
103 The same instrumental variables are used in estimation of this model as were used in the Tobit with 
endogenous regressors, as discussed above. 
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Table 5. 6:  Largest shareholder and dividend payout - all firms 
  Panel A. Dividend to net income (DivI) Panel B. Dividend to net sales (DivS) 
 All firms Ex-US All firms Ex-US 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Intercept 1.4764* 1.7712* 1.8083* 0.1499* 0.1776* 0.1793* 
 (3.87) (4.31) (4.33) (5.49) (6.03) (5.99) 
FNI04 4.7253* 5.0433* 4.5629* 0.3830* 0.4636* 0.4258* 
 (17.10) (14.93) (13.02) (20.11) (18.84) (16.87) 
FNI04*Debt03 2.0424* 1.8904* 0.7611 0.1387* 0.0943 -0.0222 
 (2.48) (2.28) (0.82) (2.35) (1.59) (-0.33) 
FNI04*Mkb03 -1.7213* -1.6782* -1.3577* -0.0378* -0.0329* 0.0140 
 (-9.64) (-9.35) (-6.04) (-2.82) (-2.48) (0.85) 
FNI04 
*Large_INSD -0.5455** -0.4681 0.6776** -0.1289* -0.1127* -0.0228 
 (-1.92) (-1.63) (1.76) (-6.02) (-5.24) (-0.80) 
FNI04 
*Large_FIN -0.1517 -0.0192 0.3677 -0.0819* -0.0539* -0.0204 
 (-0.57) (-0.07) (1.17) (-4.22) (-2.71) (-0.89) 
FNI04 
*Large_STATE -0.2550 -0.2963 1.1315 -0.0200 -0.0312 0.0806 
 (-0.23) (-0.27) (0.89) (-0.24) (-0.39) (0.87) 
LargeOwn -0.9741* -1.1245* -1.2710* -0.0694* -0.0846* -0.0951* 
 (-6.23) (-6.32) (-6.29) (-6.00) (-6.43) (-6.38) 
LargeOwn2 0.1614* 0.1769* 0.2012* 0.0118* 0.0134* 0.0151* 
 (6.27) (6.40) (6.31) (6.21) (6.54) (6.42) 
ComLaw -0.2198* -0.5034* -0.1303 -0.0080* -0.0351* -0.0195* 
 (-10.43) (-5.46) (-1.36) (-5.16) (-5.17) (-2.78) 
ComLaw 
*FNI04  -0.5560+ -1.2176*   -0.1266* -0.1210* 
  (-1.75) (-3.65)   (-5.39) (-4.93) 
ComLaw 
*LargeOwn  0.0964* 0.0643*   0.0102* 0.0107* 
  (3.38) (2.21)   (4.85) (5.02) 
Industry 
Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Chi square (16) 911.95* 919.35* 530.19* 1423.08* 1468.87* 1184.33* 
N 8279 8279 5248 8279 8279 5248 
This table reports the results of Tobit estimation (with endogenous regressors) of model (5.5) for the full 
sample of firms including both the dividend-paying and the non-dividend paying firms (All firms) and for the 
non-US firms (Ex-US). The values reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. 
*(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.    
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Table 5. 7:  Largest shareholder and dividend payout - dividend-paying firms 
  Panel A. Dividend to net income (DivI) Panel B. Dividend to net sales (DivS) 
 All firms Ex-US All firms Ex-US 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Intercept -0.2785 0.3784 -0.2431 -3.2010* -2.6867* -1.8515* 
 (-0.56) (0.62) (-0.45) (-5.09) (-3.49) (-2.57) 
FNI04 -6.4955* -6.5038* -6.9208* 4.7727* 6.7912* 7.1851* 
 (-15.76) (-13.11) (-14.01) (9.19) (10.94) (11.02) 
FNI04*Debt03 -5.0600* -4.9046* -3.9014* -2.8721** -3.1015* -3.9735* 
 (-4.26) (-4.10) (-3.01) (-1.92) (-2.07) (-2.32) 
FNI04*Mkb03 2.9316* 2.9569* 3.1742* 2.3890* 2.6066* 2.0316* 
 (10.29) (10.30) (10.28) (6.65) (7.26) (4.99) 
FNI04 
*Large_INSD -0.3768 -0.3632 -0.2192 -0.5381 -0.1944 0.2281 
 (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.43) (-0.89) (-0.33) (0.34) 
FNI04 
*Large_FIN -0.7175* -0.6340** 0.2851 -1.3804* -0.6345 -0.0053 
 (-1.96) (-1.65) (0.72) (-2.99) (-1.32) (-0.01) 
FNI04 
*Large_STATE -0.6828 -0.6438 -0.3889 -0.5891 -1.1264 -0.5364 
 (-0.48) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-0.33) (-0.63) (-0.30) 
LargeOwn -0.6340* -1.0435* -0.6461* -0.8009* -1.1659* -1.7204* 
 (-2.31) (-2.98) (-2.06) (-2.32) (-2.66) (-4.16) 
LargeOwn2 0.1012* 0.1527* 0.0985* 0.1182* 0.1587* 0.2352* 
 (2.33) (3.02) (2.11) (2.16) (2.51) (3.81) 
ComLaw 1.0555* 0.6669* 0.7132* 1.3922* 0.9893* 0.5423* 
 (14.27) (3.36) (4.42) (14.94) (3.99) (2.55) 
ComLaw  
*FNI04  -0.1166 0.7349   -3.6886* -3.1905* 
  (-0.24) (1.50)   (-6.00) (-4.94) 
ComLaw 
*LargeOwn  0.1500* 0.0888   0.2106* 0.3622* 
  (2.07) (1.56)   (2.32) (4.83) 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj R2     25.63     24.70    25.60       32.55    32.72     34.56 
F-statistic 26.21* 25.01* 20.36* 36.13* 35.52* 32.94* 
N 3770 3770 2930 3770 3770 2930 
This table reports the results from 2SLS estimation of model (5.5) for dividend-paying firms only. The values 
reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Consistent with previous discussions, the results demonstrate that the greater the 
shareholding of the largest shareholder, the greater the dividend payout.104 There is a non 
linear relation between LargeOwn and dividend payout (using either DivI or DivS) across 
all specifications, consistent with recent studies (Allen and Michaely 2002). This may be 
explained by the argument that at low levels of shareholding, rises in the largest 
shareholding implies that the private benefits of control that the largest shareholder 
forgoes outweigh the dividends that they receive. Further, at low levels of shareholding, 
the increased monitoring provided by the largest shareholder may decrease the need for 
dividends as a monitoring device. Hence, initially dividend payments may fall as the 
largest shareholding increases. However, as the largest holding increases, the costs of 
entrenchment increase and the monitoring benefits of dividends become more important.  
It also should be noted that minority shareholders seek higher dividend payouts, not only 
to maximize their return, but also to compensate large shareholders for their economies of 
scale in monitoring. This provides a further explanation for the positive relation that is 
observed as largest shareholding continues to increase (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  
The results also provide support for the argument that dividend payout ratios are 
lower when the largest shareholder is an insider or a financial institution. This suggests 
that powerful insiders may impose low dividend policies upon the firm in order to increase 
the cash flow at their discretion whereas financial institutions, because of their monitoring 
ability, may act as a substitute for dividends.105 This is partly reflected in previous studies. 
Jensen et al. (1992) document that US firms with high insider ownership choose lower 
levels of dividends while Gugler (2003) claims that Austrian firms exhibit significantly 
                                                 
104 For robustness, the analysis is repeated using the OSIRIS independence indicator to capture different 
levels of ownership concentration. The results are similar to those obtained with the share holding of the 
largest shareholder. For more information, refer to Appendix 5.6. 
105 Given their expertise in monitoring firm performance, financial institutions in the position of the largest 
shareholder may provide a positive signal to shareholders. Thus, firms may not need to distribute profits (i.e. 
increasing retained earnings), where financial institution monitoring is in place.  
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lower target dividend payout rates when as family is the largest shareholder in a firm. It is 
also evident in the literature that the existence of institutional largest shareholders is not 
positively related with dividend payout. For example, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) 
report a negative association between holdings by financial institutions and dividend 
payouts. Further, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find no evidence to suggest that 
institutional shareholding results in firms paying greater levels of dividends. Indeed, Brav 
et al. (2005) note that financial executives who participated in their survey claim that 
dividends do not attract institutions. Rather, it seems that retail investors prefer dividends 
in spite of tax implications. 
 
5.5.3 Effect of dividend policy on largest shareholder 
Ownership and dividend policy may be endogenous to the firm (Jensen et al. 
1992). Thus so far, Section 5.5.2 demonstrates that the largest shareholding has a non-
linear influence on dividend payouts. Yet, if the largest shareholder in fact provides 
valuable monitoring services, firm management may alter dividend policy in order to 
induce the shareholder to maintain, or even increase, their shareholding in the firm 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986).106 Further, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argue that 
institutions, particularly those that have relative tax advantages (pension funds) or stricter 
prudent-man rules (pension funds and bank trusts) prefer dividends over retained earnings. 
They claim that US firm payout policy affects shareholdings.  
This section also covers the question of whether dividend policy affects the largest 
shareholding. To examine this question, a system of equations is developed including two 
separate equations, one for ownership and the other for dividend policy.107 The first 
                                                 
106 For example, Allen et al. (2000) develop a theoretical model of the impact of dividend policy on 
institutional holdings with a particular focus on tax implications. 
107 Each of the two equations is also estimated separately using 2SLS, and the results are similar to those 
reported for the system of equations based analysis. Refer to Appendix 5.7. 
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equation is similar to equation (5.5) as outlined in Section 5.4. The second one assumes 
that dividend policy is a function of the largest shareholding and firm investment 
opportunities after controlling for industry and legal origin effects. Following Lins (2003), 
we model endogeneity within a cross-sectional framework. In estimating this system of 
equations, this analysis uses the following variables as instrumental variables: DivI03 (or 
DivS03), Rosh03, Debt03, Mkb03, LargeType, ComLaw dummy variable and industry 
dummy variables. Further, this system is estimated using both 2SLS and 3SLS in order to 
explicitly adjust for endogeneity in both ownership and dividend payout and to take into 
account of cross-equation covariances.108 
The estimation results for the full sample are reported in Table 5.8. Again, the 
results are similar to those discussed in Table 5.6. Most of the coefficients for the 
ownership equation remain little changed. Further, the results not only confirm the 
statistically significant effect of largest shareholding on dividend payout, but also show 
that this is part of a two-way effect. It appears that while largest shareholding explains 
dividend payout, it is also apparent that dividend payout explains largest shareholding. 
The former relation is not only consistent with agency theory (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 
1984), but also generally in line with existing empirical studies. For example, Jensen et 
al.(1992) conclude that firms with high levels of insider ownership are likely to pay lower 
dividends. Similarly, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) also find evidence of a significant 
impact of the largest shareholding on dividend payout. Yet, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
find that dividend payout affects institutional ownership though they do not find evidence 
to support the argument that institutional ownership affects payout. While our two-way 
results are inconsistent with those of Grinstein and Michaely (2005), they are consistent 
                                                 
108 See Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998); Green (2003). Note that one shortcoming of this technique is that it 
requires the identification of exogenous variables (Lins 2003).  
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with Allen et al. (2000). There is evidence that higher dividends induce increased 
shareholding, particularly for the largest shareholder.  
Finally, there is a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the ComLaw 
dummy variable across each of the estimated models explaining largest shareholding. This 
is consistent with existing evidence that ownership structure for common law firms is less 
concentrated than it is for civil law firms (La Porta et al. 1999). This has implications for 
our understanding of the relation that exists between corporate ownership and dividend 
policy. 
 
5.5.4 Other robustness tests 
A number of robustness checks are conducted. First, the results may be affected by the 
fact that the sample is largely made up of US firms representing about 36% of the sample. 
Multivariate analysis is also repeated for all firms excluding the US firms. The results 
generally show little change. There may also be a bias arising from the equal weighting of 
the firms in the analysis. Model (5.5) is re-estimated for those countries which have 
sufficient firm observations for meaningful cross-sectional analysis, including the US, the 
UK, Japan, China and France (refer to Appendix 5.5). The multivariate analysis is also 
repeated for sub samples of common law firms and civil law firms separately (refer to 
Appendix 5.6). The results suggest that the findings are not solely explained by either 
country or legal origin. 
Second, it is important to note that the choice of DivI as a dividend proxy is 
subject to some criticism. As Fama and French (2002) note, this ratio can take on very 
large values when earnings are close to zero. As a result, all multivariate analyses are 
replicated using other common dividend proxies such as dividends to total assets and 
dividends to market capitalization. These alternative dividend based specifications do not 
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alter the conclusions (refer to Appendix 5.8). Further, model (5.5) is re-estimated using the 
growth rate of firm sales as a proxy for investment opportunities consistent with La Porta 
et al. (2000b). The results are little changed with this choice. Third, the use of LargeOwn 
as a proxy for ownership concentration might be questioned. Thus, model (5.5) is 
estimated using the OSIRIS independence indicator proxying for ownership concentration, 
and the results generally confirm our findings with respect to both sign and significance 
(see Appendix 5.6).  
 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter provides an empirical examination on the interaction between the 
largest shareholder and dividend policy across 8,279 firms from 37 countries around the 
world. Unlike previous studies, this analysis focuses both on the decision whether or not to 
pay dividends and on the decision concerning how much to pay. The results show that 
firms in the sample choose to pay dividends and are inclined to pay more dividends when 
they have high levels of profitability and low levels of investment opportunities, consistent 
with previous studies such as Fama and French (2001; 2002) based on US firms. This is 
also found to be the case where firms have lower levels of debt.  
It is evident that the largest shareholder, a distinctive class of large shareholders, 
has some influence on the dividend policy that firm management adopts. There is evidence 
of a non linear relation between the largest shareholding and dividend payout, and this 
finding is robust even after controlling for endogeneity in ownership variables. This 
reflects the classical agency view that the largest shareholder may act as a substitute for 
dividends in mitigating agency costs.  
Dividend policy is also linked to the identity of the largest shareholder. Firms are 
more prone to pay dividends when the largest shareholder is not an insider, however once 
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the decision to pay dividends is made, they tend to pay fewer dividends when the largest 
shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. It should be noted that the relation 
between the largest shareholding and dividend payout is a two-way relation. Indeed, there 
is evidence that shareholding can be partly explained by dividend payout as well as 
explaining the dividend payout policy. Finally, consistent with La Porta et al. (2000b), the 
results suggest that dividend policy is also an outcome of legal origin (common law vs. 
civil law). While common law firms are less likely to pay dividends, they tend to pay 
higher dividends compared to those in civil law countries once the decision is made to pay 
dividends. 
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Table 5. 8:  Interaction between largest shareholder and dividend payout 
  Panel A. 2SLS system estimation Panel B. 3STLS system estimation 
 DivI LargeOwn DivS LargeOwn DivI LargeOwn DivS LargeOwn 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)    (8) 
Intercept 0.9096* 4.1936* 0.1542* 4.0960* 0.4306 4.1170* 0.1333* 3.9654* 
 (2.97) (12.63) (6.32) (12.53) (1.42) (12.41) (5.49) (12.14) 
FNI04 0.9927*  0.1239*   0.9380*  0.1214*  
 (8.60)  (13.45)  (8.26)  (13.26)  
FNI04*Debt03 0.1149  -0.0051  0.1052   -0.0051  
 (0.44)  (-0.25)  (0.41)  (-0.25)  
FNI04*Mkb03 -0.1639*  0.0089**  -0.1479*  0.0090**  
 (-2.64)  (1.79)  (-2.42)  (1.83)  
FNI04 
*Large_INSD -0.1529  -0.0471*  -0.1433  -0.0460*  
 (-1.37)  (-5.31)  (-1.31)  (-5.22)  
FNI04 
*Large_FIN -0.0984  -0.0248*  -0.0904   -0.0241*  
 (-0.95)  (-3.01)  (-0.89)  (-2.94)  
FNI04 
*Large_STATE 0.0688  -0.0085  0.0697  -0.0081  
 (0.16)  (-0.24)  (0.16)  (-0.23)  
LargeOwn -0.4341*  -0.0604*  -0.3009*  -0.0543*  
 (-2.91)  (-5.08)  (-2.05)  (-4.61)  
LargeOwn2 0.0687*  0.0094*  0.0640*   0.0091*  
 (3.23)  (5.55)  (3.06)  (5.44)  
DivI/DivS  0.3529*  3.1930*   0.5804*  4.9557* 
  (6.20)  (9.38)   (10.34)  (14.63) 
Mkb04  -0.0464*  -0.0604*   -0.0480*  -0.0612* 
  (-5.04)  (-6.61)   (-5.31)  (-6.73) 
ComLaw -0.1792** -0.5647* -0.0235* -0.5882* -0.1070 -0.5452*  -0.0201* -0.5868* 
 (-1.80) (-29.11) (-2.98) (-31.74) (-1.10) (-28.16) (-2.56) (-31.69) 
ComLaw  
*FNI04 -0.3114*  -0.0465*  -0.2963*   -0.0456*  
 (-2.77)  (-5.18)  (-2.68)  (-5.11)  
ComLaw 
*LargeOwn 0.0367  0.0083*  0.0333   0.0080*  
 (1.21)  (3.41)  (1.11)  (3.33)  
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj R2 3.84 9.60 9.00     12.46  1.50  3.75 9.00 10.72 
F statistic 20.13* 106.78* 53.01* 114.66* 641.30* 1249.33* 1154.87* 1382.83* 
This table reports the results from the estimation of the system of equations. The values reported in parenthesis are White 
heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.   
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has primarily considered corporate ownership and its relation with 
equity agency costs as well as dividend policy. It is commonly held that the manager of a 
modern firm, who is not the owner and often holds relatively little equity in the firm, may 
choose to act in a way that does not maximize the value of the firm. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) note that this may subsequently give rise to costly agency problems. Typical 
examples include excessive perquisite consumption and misappropriation of a firm’s 
surplus by firm management (Shleifer and Vishny 1989).109  
Agency theory is used to explain the conflicts that arise from agency relationships 
that exist between corporate owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Demsetz 
1983; Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Jensen 1986). This thesis furnishes recent evidence 
concerning the relation between corporate ownership and equity agency costs. It also 
provides an empirical investigation into the interaction that exists between corporate 
ownership and the firm’s dividend policy decision with an emphasis on the largest 
shareholder.  
Large shareholders play an important role in corporate governance, with some 
evidence of value-increasing effects as well as value decreasing effects (Short 1994). 
Large shareholders have incentive and/or the ability to monitor management, and thus 
ensuring that firm value is maximized (Jensen and Meckling 1976).110 Apart from 
                                                 
109 For a definition of perquisite consumption (or “perks”), refer to Hart (2001). Firm managers enjoy perks 
because perks are often hard to observe by shareholders, and the value of perks is rarely reported to 
shareholders. For evidence of the impact of perquisite consumption on firm value, refer to Yermack (2004) 
and Rajan and Wulf (2006).  
110 Even if large blockholders are a priori willing to perform a monitoring role, institutional and other 
constraints may act as inhibiting forces to limit their activism (Black 1998)). 
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monitoring, these shareholders can be beneficial to the firm through moderating the free-
rider problem in takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986), or by competing against outside 
raiders for an improved takeover premium (Burkart 1995). Large ownership, however, can 
be costly. Large shareholders have incentive to acquire enough shares in the firm so that 
they are able to extract firm resources for their private benefit111 or to expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983b; Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Further, 
managerial initiatives and non-contractible investment that are important to the growth of 
the firm may be limited when large shareholders exert too much interference (or over-
monitoring) on management decisions (Burkart et al. 1997). It should be noted that the 
incentive of large shareholders, i.e. whether to increase monitoring or to redistribute or to 
expropriate firm wealth, are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the net effect of large 
shareholder ownership depends on the net effect of these conflicting incentives. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 outlines key findings generated 
from the empirical analysis pertaining to the two main themes of research. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the first theme of research reflects the relation between corporate ownership 
and equity agency costs that exist within a firm. The second theme focuses on the relation 
between corporate ownership and dividend policy that the firm adopts. Finally, Section 6.3 
provides a summary, and also identifies limitations of the thesis and directions for future 
research. 
                                                 
111 Thomsen et al. (2006) argue that the risk facing large shareholders may increase as their shareholdings 
increase. Further, Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) postulate that large shareholdings may inhibit the production 
of information in the market.  
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6.2 Key Findings 
6.2.1 Corporate ownership and equity agency costs. 
6.2.1.1 Corporate ownership and equity agency costs: Australian evidence. 
(i) The results based on the analysis of the top 500 Australian listed firms for two 
years 2004 and 2005 are generally consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003). 
In this thesis, two efficiency measures are adopted to proxy for equity agency 
costs: the ratio of annual sales to total asset (AUR) and the ratio of discretionary 
operating expense ratios to annual sales (DER). Both ratios vary considerably 
across these sample firms, and they are generally lower than those reported for 
large US or for UK listed firms. 
(ii) There is strong support for the relation that exists between corporate ownership 
and equity agency costs. Specifically, there is evidence of a significant non-
linear relation between inside ownership and both proxies for equity agency 
costs (AUR and DER). With small or no holdings in the firm, insiders may 
deploy corporate assets for their personal benefit including shirking, perquisite 
consumption, or the pursuit of wealth-reducing investment.  
(iii) There is also support for the view that other governance mechanisms may be at 
work. It is found that the board of directors (particularly board size and board 
leadership) and the level of short-term debt financing are effective in improving 
the use of firm assets (i.e. higher AUR) though they do not seem to restrain firm 
management from incurring excessive discretionary operating expenses in this 
Australian context. 
(iv) There is some evidence of a significant non-linear relation between board size 
and equity agency costs. This finding reflects the “board cohesiveness” 
argument of Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996). 
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(v) There is also evidence that agency costs are linked to firm characteristics such as 
the level of investment opportunities and the level of diversification.  
 
6.2.1.2 Largest shareholder and equity agency costs. 
(i) The results from this analysis reveal large variations in the level of efficiency 
that firms achieve in the use of their assets (AUR) and in the management of 
their discretionary expenses (DER) within a large sample consisting of 9,165 
listed firms drawn from 43 countries for two years 2004 and 2005. 
(ii) Such cross-sectional variation in both these efficiency measures (AUR and 
DER) can be attributed to firm ownership. Specifically, firms with substantial 
ownership by the largest shareholder are not only more efficient in the use of 
their assets, but are also more effective in curbing discretionary expenses. 
(iii) There is support for a recent observation noted in the literature that firms around 
the world are predominately owned by a single shareholder or a shareholder 
group, rather than a dispersed shareholder group along the lines considered by 
Berle and Means (1932). In the sample, the largest shareholder, on average, 
holds more than 30% of total equity in their firms. It also appears that the power 
of the largest shareholder is largely unchecked by other large shareholders.  
(iv) There is evidence of a significant non-linear relation between the shareholding 
of the largest shareholder and both proxies for equity agency costs (AUR and 
DER). Initially, rises in the shareholding give the largest shareholder more 
incentive to control conflicts that exist between managers and shareholders, and 
thereby reduce agency costs. This positive effect, however, starts to diminish as 
the largest shareholding continues to increase beyond a certain threshold. These 
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results are generally consistent with previous studies such as Morck et al.(1988), 
Jensen et al. (1992), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), and Khan (2006). 
(v) There is evidence that the extent of equity agency costs is partly related to the 
type of the largest shareholder. Firms have lower levels of equity agency costs in 
terms of higher AUR and lower DER when the largest shareholder is an insider. 
The opposite result is found for firms where the largest shareholder is either a 
financial institution or the state. 
(vi) Debt financing, particularly short-term debt financing, plays an important role in 
reducing equity agency costs (Stulz 1990). Specifically, firms with higher levels 
of short-term debt are associated with lower agency costs (i.e. higher AUR and 
lower DER). 
(vii) Dividend policy may serve as another governance mechanism over agency 
conflicts, reflecting the argument of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984). 
(viii) There is also evidence of a significant negative relation between legal protection 
and equity agency costs, consistent with previous studies such as La Porta et al. 
(2000a), La Porta et al.(2002), Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003). Firms 
that operate in the common law based countries tend to have higher AUR and 
lower DER than those of civil law based countries. 
(ix) Finally, it is shown that the extent of equity agency costs depends on firm-
specific factors such as firm size and the level of investment opportunities. 
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6.2.2 Largest shareholder and dividend policy 
(i) The results from this analysis show that dividend payout varies across firms 
drawn from 37 countries around the world. 
(ii) Agency theory suggests that the largest shareholder and dividend policy might 
be viewed as substitute monitoring devices and, across all specifications, the 
analysis undertaken in this thesis largely supports this view. 
(iii) There is evidence of a significant non-linear relation between the shareholding 
of the largest shareholder and dividend payout. Specifically, the shareholding of 
the largest shareholder is negatively related to dividend payout at low levels of 
shareholding, yet as the shareholding increases, this relation becomes positive.  
This is consistent with a shift from monitoring to entrenchment behaviour as the 
largest shareholding increases.  
(iv) There is also evidence that different types of the largest shareholders exert 
different influence on the dividend policy decisions that the firm adopts. In 
particular, firms are more likely to pay dividends when the largest shareholder is 
not an insider. Further, the magnitude of dividend payout tends to be smaller 
when the largest shareholder is either an insider or a financial institution. 
(v) There is international support for the traditional view that firms are more likely 
to pay dividends when profits are high, debt is low or where investment 
opportunities are low (Fama and French 2001). Consistent with previous studies, 
the results from this analysis suggest that for firms that choose to pay dividends, 
the magnitude of dividend payment is increasing in profitability and investment 
opportunities, and decreasing in debt. 
(vi) The results also suggest that firm management could design a dividend policy 
that induces the largest shareholder to maintain their ownership stake in the firm 
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(Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Jensen et al. 1992; Grinstein and Michaely 2005). 
There is evidence that increased dividend payout attracts greater shareholding of 
the largest shareholder. 
(vii) There is also evidence that legal protection does matter in dividend policy 
decisions taken by the firm (La Porta et al. 2000b). While common law firms are 
less likely to pay dividends, they tend to pay higher dividends compared to those 
in civil law countries once the decision to pay dividends is made. 
 
6.3 Summary 
The separation of ownership and control essentially renders a widely dispersed 
group of shareholders powerless to constrain management.  It also undermines the role of 
profit maximization as a guide to the efficient allocation of firm resources (Demsetz 
1983).112 Thus, the key objective of this thesis is to provide an empirical investigation into 
the relation that exists between corporate ownership and equity agency conflicts that arise 
from separation of ownership and control both in Australia and internationally. 
Specifically, this thesis advances our understanding of agency problems by demonstrating 
the existence of (i) the relation between corporate ownership and equity agency costs, and 
(ii) the relation between corporate ownership and dividend policy decisions, with a 
particular focus on the largest shareholder.  
This thesis also contributes to the ongoing debate pertaining to policy responses to 
many governance problems in the current corporate environment. Perhaps, with internal 
control mechanisms failing and hostile takeover pressure increasing, the largest 
shareholder is ideally placed to combat growing agency problems. It is apparent that the 
largest shareholder plays an important role in improving the efficiency of a firm, and 
                                                 
112 It is also argued that a large number of small shareholders simply cannot coordinate to design and/or 
negotiate managerial incentives. 
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thereby mitigates the level of equity agency costs that exist within the firm. Apart from 
this role, they also have significant influence on two key dividend decisions: whether or 
not to pay dividends and how much to pay. It is observed that firms are more prone to pay 
dividends in the presence of a largest shareholder, and the magnitude of dividend payment 
is increasing in the shareholding of the largest shareholder. Yet, this effect is not the same 
for different types of the largest shareholder, which essentially adds to recent studies 
focusing on large inside shareholders (Burkart et al. 2003; Maury 2007) as well as large 
financial institution shareholders (Li et al. 2006).  Further, there is evidence that other 
governance mechanisms, particularly short-term debt financing, are important to the 
analysis of this relation.  
Finally, this thesis also establishes an empirical link between legal protection and 
equity agency problems. The better the legal protection (i.e. common law vs. civil law 
legal based system), the smaller the equity agency costs and the less likely that firms pay 
dividends. This highlights another benefit of strong shareholder protection in addition to 
those already documented in La Porta et al. (1998) and La Porta et al. (1999; 2000a).  
 Like any major thesis, many difficult decisions have been made in order to keep 
this investigation to a manageable size. As such, some suggestions for the future research 
arising from the current thesis include: 
(i) The relation between corporate ownership and equity agency costs could be 
further examined taking into account emerging trends documented in the 
corporate governance literature including the impact of the board of directors 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 2003); executive compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 
2003; Aggarwal and Samwick 2006) and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002 (Agrawal and Chadha 2006). Specifically, Hermalin (2005 p.2) raises 
the question, “how do the various trends in governance relate to each other? 
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What trends may plausibly be causing other trends?” Perhaps, a further 
examination of the corporate ownership and agency costs relation is warranted.  
(ii) Prior studies suggest the existence of a relation between corporate ownership 
and agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). Large 
shareholders have incentive to expropriate wealth from debtholders by investing 
in risky, high expected return projects (“asset substitution”). Debtholders, on the 
other hand, anticipate such incentives and subsequently demand higher rents, 
which eventually result in higher costs of debt financing (Anderson, Mansi and 
Reeb 2003). Further, it is important to settle the traditional agency cost question 
as to whether it is shareholders or debtholders who bear the agency costs of debt 
(Barnea, Haugen and Senbet 1981). This provides another venue for future 
research. 
(iii) One may ask why firms pay dividends at all, rather than repurchase shares, since 
the latter may constitute a cheaper way to return cash to shareholders (Fama and 
French 2001). Brav et al. (2005) note that widely-divergent views exist among 
firm executives on whether to distribute firm profits via dividends or repurchases 
or both (also see Grinstein and Michaely 2005). The analysis would have been 
more complete if the effect of repurchases was considered though this possibility 
was not feasible at an international level with currently available commercial 
data sets.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Year 2004 (N = 388) 
AUR 0.9948 0.7215 5.7667 0.0003 1.5819 2.9649 
DER 0.1815 0.1250 0.8416 0.0010 1.6203 2.5559 
INSOWN (%) 17.5261 9.2847 91.1058 0.0001 1.1928 0.6984 
BLOCK (%) 42.7904 42.6550 99.7180 0.0000 0.0673 -0.4297 
BSIZE 6.3187 6.0000 15.0000 3.0000 1.0013 1.2718 
IODIR 0.5994 0.6202 1.0000 0.0000 -0.7188 0.2766 
TDEBT 0.1897 0.1685 1.0738 0.0000 1.4267 3.2299 
SDEBT 0.3601 0.2564 1.0000 0.0000 0.7392 -0.7409 
MKB 2.3036 1.6140 23.1403 0.7231 4.2777 28.4802 
Annual Sales (AUD' million) 918 111 29,692 0.005 7 52 
Total Assets (AUD' million) 1,130 124 43,774 4 8 65 
Market Capitalisation (AUD' million) 1,030 157 47,100 37 9 99 
ROA  0.01 0.06 0.44 -2.06 -3.75 24.87 
Panel B. Year 2005 (N = 388) 
AUR 0.9675 0.7100 4.6683 0.0000 1.6446 2.8293 
DER 0.2194 0.1486 0.8935 0.0012 1.4141 1.4960 
INSOWN (%) 18.2747 4.4982 219.9209 0.0000 3.1223 13.2860 
BLOCK (%) 42.7094 41.9750 99.7200 0.0000 0.0889 -0.3842 
BSIZE 6.5492 6.0000 16.0000 3.0000 1.1104 1.7256 
IODIR 0.6265 0.6667 1.0000 0.0000 -0.6229 0.1372 
TDEBT 0.2266 0.2088 1.3474 0.0000 1.4817 4.3102 
SDEBT 0.3475 0.2319 1.0000 0.0000 0.8088 -0.7312 
MKB 2.1833 1.6560 14.9797 0.4292 3.8486 20.6268 
Annual Sales (AUD' million) 979 123 33,223 0.002 7 56 
Total Assets (AUD' million) 1,363 161 55,139 6 8 74 
Market Capitalisation (AUD' million) 1,812 189 109,919 9 10 113 
ROA  -0.01 0.06 0.64 -2.35 -3.59 17.96 
This table contains descriptive statistics for variables of interest that are used in the analysis of the largest Australian 
listed non-financial firms only for both years 2004 & 2005.  
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Appendix 4. 1:  OSIRIS independence indicator 
OSIRIS independence indicator provides a measure of the independence of the company 
with respect to the shareholders. There are eight categories: A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C and 
U. The U category is allocated where the level of independence is unknown. All 
companies with a missing independence indicator or an independence indicator with a 
value of U are excluded from the analysis.   
(i) Indicator A+, A, A- 
This code is allocated to companies where no recorded shareholder has an 
ownership percentage exceeding 24.99%. The sub categories of A+, A and A- refer to the 
level of certainty associated with this allocation. Essentially, it is assumed that the more 
specifically identified the shareholding the greater the chance that the 24.99% hurdle 
reflects the actual maximum individual ownership level. If the company has 6 or more 
identified shareholders whose ownership percentage is known then A+ is allocated to the 
company. If the company has 4 or 5 identified shareholders whose ownership percentage 
is known then A is allocated to the company. If the company has 1 to 3 identified 
shareholders whose ownership percentage is known then A- is allocated to the company.  
In this thesis, A+, A and A- are ranked as A.   
(ii) Indicator B+, B, B- 
This code is allocated to companies where no recorded shareholder has share 
ownership exceeding 49.99% but having one or more shareholders with an ownership 
percentage of at least 24.99%. The sub categories of B+, B and B- refer to the level of 
certainty associated with this allocation. If the company has 6 or more identified 
shareholders whose ownership percentage is known then B+ is allocated to the company.  
If the company has 4 or 5 identified shareholders whose ownership percentage is known 
then B is allocated to the company. If the company has 1 to 3 identified shareholders 
whose ownership percentage is known then B- is allocated to the company. In this thesis, 
B+, B and B- are ranked as B.   
 
(iii) Indicator C 
This is allocated to companies with a recorded shareholder who has share 
ownership exceeding 49.99%. This is also allocated to companies that are classified as 
having an ultimate owner.     
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Appendix 4. 2:  Largest ownership distribution 
Country LargeOWN SecondOWN ThirdOWN LargeOWN SecondOWN ThirdOWN 
  Year 2004 Year 2005 
Argentina 53.45 19.43 2.04 45.08 17.04 4.63 
Austria 46.06 16.85 7.81 45.88 16.19 7.88 
Belgium 41.77 18.50 7.56 42.71 18.97 9.01 
Brazil 49.02 17.54 8.61 42.04 17.81 9.67 
Chile 41.77 15.37 6.03 38.38 16.08 8.39 
China 42.59 9.21 3.51 42.40 10.13 4.08 
Denmark 31.39 12.47 6.89 31.60 12.58 7.62 
Finland 29.04 11.61 6.64 30.56 12.78 7.39 
France 46.07 21.74 10.17 46.98 20.09 9.92 
Germany 46.61 18.09 7.59 46.12 17.70 7.76 
Greece 42.10 15.38 5.75 41.58 17.11 6.19 
Indonesia 57.51 17.20 1.17 59.33 18.09 2.46 
Italy 43.30 22.18 7.32 44.53 19.97 7.59 
Japan 27.03 4.42 2.47 27.39 5.53 2.95 
South Korea 25.50 9.73 4.60 26.11 11.35 6.16 
Mexico 45.78 11.78 4.13 41.02 11.97 4.57 
Netherlands 25.67 10.84 5.22 25.03 12.66 6.79 
Norway 25.55 11.38 5.92 26.48 13.43 8.60 
Philippines 50.37 14.26 4.11 48.99 17.68 4.87 
Poland 29.03 15.86 7.56 37.61 14.07 7.99 
Portugal 40.03 14.54 6.57 35.34 18.07 8.64 
Russia 38.88 23.43 12.61 41.45 25.02 10.81 
Spain 27.15 13.40 8.68 29.46 16.21 9.89 
Sweden 28.18 11.85 6.07 28.20 13.03 7.41 
Switzerland  33.09 10.75 4.87 33.19 12.08 6.17 
CiviLaw mean 36.17 12.46 5.52 36.39 13.17 6.34 
        
Australia 18.59 7.26 4.21 23.24 12.38 8.01 
Bermuda 44.24 17.88 8.43 44.06 21.09 10.98 
Canada 29.84 9.22 2.34 28.80 11.35 6.09 
Cayman Islands 40.43 11.19 9.35 41.69 19.49 11.66 
Hong Kong 49.88 24.29 9.57 48.47 29.58 17.06 
India 34.09 13.01 6.66 32.57 12.81 6.77 
Ireland 16.62 6.66 4.48 16.50 9.15 7.26 
Israel 36.94 11.08 3.40 34.01 10.38 5.68 
Luxembourg 36.14 12.53 4.00 33.06 17.24 6.57 
Malaysia 30.15 11.05 5.99 30.65 12.12 6.68 
New Zealand 33.52 15.84 6.06 34.21 14.52 5.36 
Peru 52.06 13.42 7.04 41.23 10.85 4.43 
Singapore 30.05 8.90 3.44 31.66 11.15 4.59 
South Africa 38.17 16.02 8.61 40.94 18.54 7.94 
Taiwan 22.16 4.46 1.96 22.82 8.95 5.74 
Thailand 32.06 6.07 3.09 33.66 7.53 4.29 
United Kingdom 16.98 8.23 5.30 17.64 10.67 7.81 
United States 18.95 9.68 6.37 18.96 10.12 6.71 
ComLaw mean 21.67 9.80 5.88 22.06 11.16 7.08 
        
Mean diff. -14.50* -2.67* 0.36* -14.32* -2.01* 0.74* 
t-stats (-35.93) (-11.55) (2.86) (-35.35) (-8.66) (5.87) 
This table reports the mean distribution of largest shareholder ownership. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) 
level. 
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Appendix 4. 3:  Firm size proxy effect 
  Total assets Market capitalisation 
 LN_AUR LN_DER LN_AUR LN_DER 
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Intercept 0.1413 0.1555 0.1028 0.0626 0.4126* 0.4490* -0.1355 -0.1746** 
 (1.48) (1.63) (1.01) (0.61) (4.42) (4.84) (-1.34) (-1.70) 
LargeOWN 0.0108* 0.0104* -0.0146* -0.0109* 0.0105* 0.0101* -0.0145* -0.0109* 
 (5.28) (4.88) (-6.48) (-4.73) (5.14) (4.74) (-6.40) (-4.67) 
LargeOWN2 -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 
 (-3.86) (-3.40) (4.59) (3.31) (-3.73) (-3.27) (4.52) (3.25) 
Large_FIN 0.0595 0.0837* -0.1231* -0.0182 0.0795** 0.1043* -0.1364* -0.0309 
 (1.37) (1.98) (-2.65) (-0.39) (1.82) (2.47) (-2.92) (-0.66) 
Large_INSD 0.0704 0.0866** -0.1400* -0.0602 0.0521 0.0652 -0.1302* -0.0454 
 (1.52) (1.95) (-2.95) (-1.27) (1.12) (1.46) (-2.72) (-0.95) 
Large_STATE -0.2133 -0.3293* 0.0338 -0.0784 -0.1960 -0.2724** 0.0326 -0.1059 
 (-1.37) (-2.02) (0.19) (-0.28) (-1.25) (-1.64) (0.18) (-0.37) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_FIN -0.0007 -0.0030 0.0026** -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0035* 0.0028** -0.0002 
 (-0.51) (-1.95) (1.73) (-0.29) (-0.82) (-2.28) (1.89) (-0.10) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_INSD -0.0007 -0.0013 0.0026* 0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0011 0.0026* 0.0011 
 (-0.58) (-1.07) (2.10) (0.87) (-0.47) (-0.93) (2.15) (0.82) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_STATE 0.0025 0.0046 0.0020 0.0059 0.0028 0.0042 0.0017 0.0060 
 (0.73) (1.35) (0.42) (1.04) (0.79) (1.22) (0.36) (1.06) 
SDEBT 0.3527* 0.3220* -0.1229* -0.0774* 0.3295* 0.2982* -0.1328* -0.0886* 
 (10.63) (10.50) (-3.63) (-2.40) (9.86) (9.70) (-3.87) (-2.71) 
TDEBT -0.6146* -0.6243* 0.3062* 0.3475* -0.6208* -0.6389* 0.2026* 0.2426* 
 (-10.18) (-10.31) (5.41) (6.02) (-10.43) (-10.67) (3.53) (4.11) 
LagDivPAY 0.2599* 0.2782* -0.2121* -0.2429* 0.2958* 0.3186* -0.2357* -0.2668* 
 (11.76) (12.41) (-8.44) (-9.14) (13.36) (14.15) (-9.27) (-9.90) 
LagDivA 0.5174 0.3424 0.2000 -0.2996 0.4610 0.2570 0.3768 -0.1299 
 (1.37) (0.86) (0.59) (-0.53) (1.22) (0.65) (1.11) (-0.23) 
FSIZE -0.0063 -0.0078 -0.1261* -0.1305* -0.0302* -0.0331* -0.1123* -0.1166* 
 (-1.13) (-1.43) (-20.25) (-21.04) (-5.43) (-6.16) (-17.60) (-18.17) 
LN_FMKB 0.0156 0.0269 0.1807* 0.1792* 0.0540* 0.0698* 0.3572* 0.3630* 
 (0.69) (1.14) (8.45) (7.89) (2.16) (2.72) (15.17) (14.55) 
Country Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 21.36 21.44 27.15 27.18 21.62 21.74 26.08 26.07 
F-statistics 39.90 40.08 54.51 54.59 40.49 40.78 51.66 51.62 
         
N 9165 9165 8185 8185 9165 9165 8185 8185 
This table reports the results of robustness tests for both LN_AUR and LN_DER for 2004 & 2005. Refer to 
Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * 
(**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 4. 4:  Country analysis – asset utilisation (AUR) 
  US UK Canada China Japan France 
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Intercept -3.0202* -2.0941* -2.7706* -3.0700* -3.5281* -3.3075* -6.8493* -6.6876* -0.6942* -0.4447 -1.6693* -2.1827* 
 (-16.98) (-11.79) (-9.40) (-8.87) (-6.24) (-5.23) (-23.41) (-24.68) (-1.73) (-1.27) (-3.02) (-3.39) 
LargeOWN 0.0192* 0.0135* 0.0151* 0.0243* 0.0192 0.0184 0.0149* 0.0093* 0.0031 0.0020 0.0046 0.0167* 
 (4.66) (3.45) (1.96) (3.06) (1.63) (1.35) (3.04) (2.01) (0.29) (0.29) (0.66) (1.98) 
LargeOWN2 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
 (-3.09) (-1.96) (-2.09) (-2.39) (-0.92) (-1.09) (-3.55) (-2.61) (0.15) (0.69) (-0.23) (-1.53) 
Large_FIN -0.0339 -0.1293* -0.2360* 0.0620 0.1199 -0.1916 -0.1275 -0.1825 -0.1019 0.0053 -0.1547 0.3382 
 (-0.41) (-2.07) (-1.89) (0.49) (0.56) (-0.86) (-1.07) (-1.52) (-0.75) (0.05) (-0.50) (1.08) 
Large_INSD 0.4030* 0.3612* 0.0620 0.3128** 0.5935* 0.4062**   0.7182* -0.6705* 0.0446 0.4451* 
 (4.53) (4.92) (0.40) (1.76) (2.35) (1.67)   (2.29) (-4.46) (0.23) (2.56) 
Large_STATE -0.1623      0.3230* -0.4317** -2.3037* -1.3867* -0.1983 -0.3719 
 (-0.41)      (4.77) (-1.84) (-3.92) (-3.51) (-0.29) (-0.99) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_FIN 0.0028 0.0034 0.0092** -0.0003 0.0059 0.0072 0.0010 0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0087** 0.0027 -0.0096 
 (0.97) (1.19) (1.65) (-0.05) (1.03) (1.13) (0.30) (1.23) (-0.54) (-1.68) (0.43) (-1.26) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_INSD -0.0084* -0.0074* 0.0062 -0.0040 -0.0160* -0.0146*   -0.1240* 0.1363* 0.0027 -0.0042 
 (-3.05) (-2.85) (1.27) (-0.66) (-2.32) (-2.15)   (-4.77) (13.80) (0.72) (-1.34) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_STATE 0.0144       0.0131* 0.0337* 0.0198* -0.0159 -0.0169 
 (0.56)       (3.22) (3.41) (3.18) (-0.78) (-1.42) 
SDEBT 0.4971* 0.3532* 0.5768* 0.4849* 0.8803* 0.8222* 0.4612* 0.5137* 0.1546** 0.1362 0.3719* 0.4368* 
 (7.92) (6.03) (5.49) (5.18) (4.57) (4.64) (6.21) (6.04) (1.79) (1.56) (2.75) (3.10) 
TDEBT -0.8452* -0.7159* -0.8192* -0.8380* -0.3369 -0.3125 -0.3369* -0.1809** -0.7721* -0.6381* -0.8624* -0.6856* 
 (-10.42) (-8.36) (-4.22) (-4.48) (-0.71) (-0.97) (-3.08) (-1.71) (-4.38) (-3.55) (-2.30) (-2.00) 
LagDivPAY -0.2104* -0.1421* 0.0562 -0.0202 -0.3053* -0.1880 -0.0532 -0.0235 -0.1403** -0.0122 -0.1313 -0.3964* 
 (-6.12) (-4.26) (0.76) (-0.23) (-2.42) (-1.56) (-1.43) (-0.64) (-1.84) (-0.15) (-1.02) (-3.58) 
LagDivA 1.4139* 0.7789 1.1437 1.3146 5.9893* 4.1260* 0.5543 0.5039 3.1687** -2.8684 -4.4632 1.7165 
 (3.33) (1.32) (1.47) (0.77) (2.80) (2.03) (0.58) (0.85) (1.79) (-0.93) (-0.64) (0.89) 
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  US UK Canada China Japan France 
  2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 
FSIZE 0.1979* 0.1928* 0.2217* 0.2213* 0.2442* 0.2189* 0.4875* 0.4707* 0.0815* 0.0540* 0.1349* 0.1559* 
 (17.40) (16.99) (10.79) (10.07) (5.64) (6.29) (27.01) (25.56) (4.39) (3.11) (3.60) (3.70) 
LN_FMKB 0.0149 0.0437 0.1616* 0.1498* -0.3041** -0.0639 0.3943* 0.3744* 0.0535 0.0613 0.3058** 0.1664 
 (0.47) (1.36) (2.30) (1.98) (-1.90) (-0.50) (9.23) (7.36) (0.53) (0.58) (1.86) (1.39) 
Industry Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 31.45 35.08 42.69 40.00 55.24 56.41 65.10 63.34 27.28 25.46 18.52 19.88 
F-statistics 68.12 84.20 29.97 28.30 12.17 13.37 101.73 89.38 6.93 6.40 5.95 6.41 
             
N 2927 2927 779 779 173 173 973 973 317 317 437 437 
This table reports the results of robustness tests for LN_AUR for 2004 & 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 4. 5:  Country analysis – discretionary operating expenses (DER) 
  US UK Canada China Japan France 
 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Intercept 1.5602* 1.5668* 1.3265* 1.0860* 3.3015* 2.9130* 1.9770* 2.3670* -0.1680 -0.2481 -0.6351* -0.3693 
 (10.15) (10.08) (4.88) (3.88) (3.02) (2.79) (6.29) (6.55) (-0.27) (-0.40) (-2.06) (-1.04) 
LargeOWN -0.0224* -0.0195* -0.0156** -0.0075 -0.0252 -0.0175 -0.0171* -0.0188* -0.0391* -0.0220 -0.0003 0.0056 
 (-5.97) (-5.25) (-1.71) (-0.87) (-0.99) (-0.62) (-2.47) (-2.55) (-2.46) (-1.36) (-0.04) (0.82) 
LargeOWN2 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0005* 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 
 (5.71) (5.12) (1.41) (0.67) (1.31) (0.92) (2.29) (2.23) (2.26) (1.23) (-0.28) (-0.92) 
Large_FIN -0.1031 0.0092 -0.1107 -0.0844 0.4041 0.8944* 0.1544 -0.1763 -0.0793 0.0418 0.3894** -0.0522 
 (-1.46) (0.14) (-0.76) (-0.64) (0.86) (2.13) (0.77) (-0.75) (-0.30) (0.13) (1.74) (-0.23) 
Large_INSD -0.2375* -0.2085* 0.0566 0.1616 0.7324 1.2969*   -3.6199** 2.6860* -0.1006 0.1625 
 (-3.17) (-2.92) (0.37) (0.99) (1.42) (2.14)   (-7.52) (6.42) (-0.58) (0.87) 
Large_STATE -0.6068        6.3549* 5.7691* -1.4716* -2.1008* 
 (-1.13)        (5.47) (4.61) (-4.25) (-6.53) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_FIN 0.0032 -0.0004 0.0092 0.0060 -0.0205 -0.0317** -0.0024 0.0018 -0.0020 0.0058 -0.0044 0.0002 
 (1.19) (-0.14) (1.53) (1.03) (-1.15) (-1.73) (-0.44) (0.27) (-0.19) (0.54) (-1.03) (0.05) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_INSD 0.0050* 0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0081 -0.0269** -0.0426*   0.3100* -0.4561* 0.0019 -0.0033 
 (2.09) (1.31) (-0.79) (-1.28) (-1.74) (-2.09)   (8.35) (-17.41) (0.53) (-0.91) 
LargeOWN  
*Large_STATE 0.0393        -0.0927* -0.0828* 0.0575* 0.0612* 
 (1.23)        (-5.21) (-4.44) (4.15) (5.42) 
SDEBT -0.1649* -0.0358 -0.1529** -0.1221 -0.1018 -0.4205 0.2672* 0.2620* -0.0671 -0.1700 -0.2285* -0.2295* 
 (-2.79) (-0.64) (-1.66) (-1.34) (-0.22) (-1.18) (2.60) (2.37) (-0.46) (-1.14) (-2.03) (-2.07) 
TDEBT 0.3159* 0.3713* 0.1902 0.2373 0.6952 0.0153 0.2498 0.2830** -0.2349 -0.5054 -0.2093 -0.1842 
 (4.27) (4.82) (1.15) (1.42) (1.12) (0.02) (1.43) (1.67) (-0.80) (-1.42) (-0.82) (-0.79) 
LagDivPAY 0.0667 0.0524 -0.2151* -0.2456* -0.2162 -0.2899 -0.0943** -0.0946** -0.0655 -0.0991 -0.0883 -0.0721 
 (1.62) (1.15) (-2.23) (-2.86) (-0.60) (-0.95) (-1.73) (-1.87) (-0.57) (-0.70) (-0.95) (-0.84) 
LagDivA -0.0156 -1.2801 2.5255* 2.2250 -8.1481 -7.4487 0.4437 -0.2010 5.4920** 1.0506 0.1666 -1.3275 
 (-0.04) (-1.24) (1.91) (1.48) (-1.00) (-1.58) (0.27) (-0.30) (1.68) (0.14) (0.05) (-1.02) 
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  US UK Canada China Japan France 
 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 
FSIZE -0.2346* -0.2438* -0.1977* -0.1886* -0.3492* -0.3246* -0.3459* -0.3566* -0.0991* -0.1032* -0.0533* -0.0730* 
 (-26.46) (-27.14) (-10.34) (-10.47) (-5.89) (-5.65) (-15.83) (-13.66) (-3.04) (-2.79) (-2.45) (-3.04) 
LN_FMKB 0.2091* 0.1917* 0.1052** 0.1073** 0.4270* 0.1624 -0.1914* -0.1705* 0.3652* 0.3948* -0.0353 0.0017 
 (7.51) (6.62) (1.91) (1.72) (2.06) (0.72) (-3.42) (-2.68) (2.94) (2.26) (-0.33) (0.02) 
Industry Dummy 
(Yes/No) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 34.74 36.12 32.49 33.30 32.50 33.21 34.12 37.01 24.18 21.58 20.92 21.63 
F-statistics 72.84 85.35 19.59 20.29 4.98 5.34 30.46 36.51 5.91 5.24 6.69 6.93 
             
N 2835 2835 735 735 158 158 968 968 309 309 431 431 
This table reports the results of robustness tests for LN_DER for 2004 & 2005. Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definition. White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 4.6 Univariate Analysis 
  Year 2004 Year 2005 
Panel A. Dividend payers vs. non-dividend payers 
 Agency costs DivPay Non-
DivPay 
Mean diff. Diff. t-
statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
DivPay Non-
DivPay 
Mean diff. Diff. t-
statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
 
AUR 1.0614 0.9886 0.0728 4.67* 1.0991 1.0107 0.0884 5.60* 
    (-7.13)    (-8.12) 
 
DER 0.2607 0.4302 -0.1695 -16.22* 0.2556 0.4240 -0.1684 -15.63* 
 
   (-12.24)    (-12.81) 
Panel B. Common Law vs. Civil Law 
  ComLaw CiviLaw Mean diff. Diff. t-
statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
ComLaw CiviLaw Mean diff. Diff. t-
statistics 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
 
AUR 1.0695 0.9623 0.1072 6.89* 1.0891 1.0072 0.0819 5.17* 
    (-12.24)    (-12.81) 
 
DER 0.4178 0.2923 0.1255 12.02* 0.4092 0.2813 0.1279 11.83* 
        (-11.38)       (-11.97) 
This table reports univariate analysis for subgroups. Panel A presents analysis results for subgroups of 
dividend payers and non-dividend payers, while Panel B contains test results for subgroups of common law 
firms and civil law firms. The t-statistics for differences in mean ratios assume unequal variance. The Mann-
Whitney U-test is reported in parentheses. Negative Mann-Whitney U-test statistics indicate that the rank 
sums are lower than their expected values. * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 5. 1:  Largest shareholder and dividend payout 
  Panel A. Dividend and legal origin Panel B. Dividend and ownership structure 
  
High 
LargeOwn 
Low 
LargeOwn Large_INSD Large_FIN Large_STATE 
High 
LargeOwn 
vs. Low 
LargeOwn 
Large_INSD 
vs. _FIN 
Large_INSD 
vs. _STATE 
Large_FIN 
vs. _STATE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(a) Dividend to total assets (DivA) 
CiviLaw mean 2.32 1.91 2.48 1.98 2.78 0.41* 0.5* -0.3 -0.8 
      (3.12) (2.17) (-0.55) (-1.56) 
ComLaw mean 3.44 2.81 2.88 2.75 2.93 0.63* 0.13 -0.05 -0.18 
      (4.23) (0.73) (-0.64) (-0.24) 
Mean difference -1.12* -0.91* -0.46** -0.77* -0.15      
 (-7.42) (-6.62) (-1.64) (-4.71) (-0.18)         
(b) Dividend to market capitalisation (DivM) 
CiviLaw mean 3.06 2.55 2.80 2.93 3.48 0.51* -0.13 -0.68** -0.55 
      (3.39) (-0.52) (-1.74) (-1.33) 
ComLaw mean 3.51 2.81 2.70 2.71 4.11 0.7* -0.01 -1.41 -1.4 
      (5.19) (-0.07) (-1.05) (-1.04) 
Mean difference -0.45* -0.26** 0.1 0.22 -0.63      
  (-2.94) (-1.81) (0.54) (1.08) (-0.45)         
This table compares differences in mean dividend payout across firms. The values reported in parentheses are t-statistics. * (**) denotes a statistical significance 
at the 5% (10%).  
 
 175 
Appendix 5. 2:  OSIRIS independence indicators and dividend payout 
  Panel A. Dividend and legal origin Panel B. Dividend and ownership structure 
 Indep_A Indep_B Indep_C Indep_A vs. _B Indep_A vs. _C Indep_B vs. _C 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(a) Dividend to net income (DivI) 
CiviLaw mean 45.10 52.17 49.00 -7.06* -3.90** 3.16 
     (-2.97) (-1.86) (1.31) 
ComLaw mean 51.44 46.53 52.41 4.91** -0.96 -5.87** 
     (1.86) (-0.33) (-1.67) 
Mean difference -6.34* 5.63** -3.40    
  (-3.36) (1.87) (-1.12)       
(b) Dividend to net sales (DivS) 
CiviLaw mean 2.23 3.12 3.16 -0.89* -0.93* -0.04 
     (-3.76) (-4.45) (-0.14) 
ComLaw mean 3.41 5.03 4.66 -1.62* -1.25* 0.37 
     (-3.95) (-3.67) (0.73) 
Mean difference -1.18* -1.91* -1.5*    
 (-7.12) (-4.31) (-4.14)    
(c) Dividend to total assets (DivA) 
CiviLaw mean 1.96 2.32 2.41 -0.36* -0.45* -0.09 
     (-2.79) (-3.41) (-0.54) 
ComLaw mean 2.82 3.51 3.53 -0.69* -0.71* -0.02 
     (-3.15) (-3.09) (-0.08) 
Mean difference -0.86* -1.19* -1.12*    
 (-7.76) (-5.01) (-4.56)    
(d) Dividend to market capitalisation (DivM) 
CiviLaw mean 2.61 3.17 3.05 -0.56* -0.44* 0.12 
     (-3.07) (-2.85) (0.59) 
ComLaw mean 2.84 3.40 3.74 -0.56* -0.9* -0.34 
     (-3.04) (-4.08) (-1.23) 
Mean difference -0.23* -0.23 -0.69*    
  (-1.98) (-0.98) (-2.79)       
This table compares differences in mean dividend payout by OSIRIS independence indicator. Panel A reports tests 
of the mean difference between civil versus common law origin, while. Panel B compares mean differences among 
the OSIRIS independence indicators. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. *(**) denotes a statistical 
significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 5. 3:  Largest shareholder and dividend payout - all firms 
  All firms Ex-US  ComLaw  CiviLaw  
  DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS 
Intercept 0.7381* 0.1050* 0.1745 0.0605* 0.7453** 0.1361* 0.1141 -0.0001 
 (2.15) (4.33) (0.53) (2.64) (1.69) (4.10) (0.20) (0.10) 
FNI04 5.1083* 0.4699* 4.6997* 0.4377* 4.7077* 0.3392* 5.2698* 0.5307* 
 (15.72) (19.67) (13.72) (17.75) (13.17) (13.53) (11.91) (18.10) 
FNI04*Debt03 0.6698 -0.0005 -0.2249 -0.1142** 1.8800** 0.1711* -1.8320 -0.3941* 
 (0.91) (-0.01) (-0.26) (-1.84) (1.92) (2.30) (-1.56) (-5.04) 
FNI04*Mkb03 -1.6692* -0.0365* -1.4043* 0.0078 -1.5947* -0.0275** -2.0162* -0.0826* 
 (-9.79) (-2.85) (-6.35) (0.48) (-7.47) (-1.66) (-6.10) (-3.59) 
FNI04 *Large_INSD -0.4313 -0.1079* 0.5962 -0.0256 -0.6842** -0.1125* 0.2039 -0.0950* 
 (-1.53) (-5.10) (1.59) (-0.91) (-1.91) (-3.99) (0.37) (-2.64) 
FNI04 *Large_FIN 0.1025 -0.0422* 0.4233 -0.0167 0.0496 -0.0324 0.2933 -0.0724* 
 (0.38) (-2.16) (1.37) (-0.75) (0.15) (-1.26) (0.55) (-2.05) 
FNI04 *Large_STATE -0.0566 -0.0108 1.0804 0.0810 -0.8926 -0.1301 0.8263 0.1222 
 (-0.05) (-0.13) (0.87) (0.89) (-0.55) (-1.06) (0.61) (1.37) 
LargeOwn -0.3905* -0.0332* -0.0856 -0.0094 -0.4566* -0.0404* -0.2115** -0.0115 
 (-4.84) (-5.63) (-0.97) (-1.46) (-4.22) (-4.83) (-1.88) (-1.55) 
LargeOwn2 0.0639* 0.0055* 0.0149 0.0016 0.0785* 0.0075* 0.0355** 0.0020** 
 (4.96) (5.78) (1.06) (1.57) (4.26) (5.27) (1.95) (1.64) 
ComLaw -0.2688* -0.0183* 0.1515** 0.0010     
 (-3.45) (-3.20) (1.78) (0.16)     
ComLaw*FNI04 -0.5547** -0.1282* -1.1692* -0.1204*     
 (-1.77) (-5.56) (-3.59) (-5.03)     
ComLaw*LargeOwn 0.0184 0.0046* -0.0255 0.0042*     
 (0.78) (2.68) (-1.00) (2.26)     
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi square (16) 1406.76 1878.33 724.22 1354.67 814.10 1030.07 451.74 898.42 
N 8,279 8,279 5,248 5,248 5,060 5,060 3,219 3,219 
This table reports the results of Tobit estimation of model (5.5) for the full sample of firms including both the dividend-paying and the 
non-dividend paying firms (All firms) and for the non-US firms (Ex-US). ComLaw and CiviLaw refer to the subsamples of firms from 
common law countries or civil law countries respectively. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. The values reported in parenthesis 
are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 5. 4:  Largest shareholder and dividend payout - dividend-paying firms 
  Dividend payers  (N=3,770)  Ex-US (N=2,930)  ComLaw (N=2,050) CiviLaw  (N=1,720) 
 DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS 
Intercept -0.7517* -3.8341* -0.8857* -4.0888* -0.5758 -3.1981* -1.1463 -4.6020* 
 (-2.07) (-8.43) (-2.56) (-9.16) (-1.34) (-5.98) (-1.56) (-4.96) 
FNI04 -6.5108* 6.8321* -6.7357* 7.4343* -6.3771* 2.7868* -6.1392* 9.2658* 
 (-13.52) (11.33) (-13.82) (11.81) (-12.29) (4.31) (-8.91) (10.64) 
FNI04*Debt03 -4.3573* -2.9053* -4.2960* -4.8382* -3.1667* 0.7508 -6.7902* -12.8180* 
 (-3.83) (-2.04) (-3.36) (-2.93) (-2.24) (0.43) (-3.30) (-4.93) 
FNI04*Mkb03 2.9956* 2.5901* 3.1151* 1.9617* 3.0004* 2.7797* 2.8419* 1.2699** 
 (10.80) (7.45) (10.14) (4.94) (8.94) (6.64) (5.29) (1.87) 
FNI04*Large_INSD -0.6675 -0.4496 -0.4036 -0.2154 -0.8413 -0.3961 -0.3881 -0.5357 
 (-1.49) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.33) (-1.49) (-0.56) (-0.49) (-0.54) 
FNI04*Large_FIN -0.8695* -0.8379** 0.0933 -0.1621 -1.2109* -1.0074** 0.3120 -0.1208 
 (-2.37) (-1.82) (0.24) (-0.32) (-2.66) (-1.77) (0.45) (-0.14) 
FNI04 *Large_STATE -0.9241 -1.3574 -0.5206 -0.8342 0.0224 -2.5388 -0.7396 0.3135 
 (-0.65) (-0.76) (-0.39) (-0.48) (0.01) (-0.64) (-0.48) (0.16) 
LargeOwn -0.2644* -0.4105* -0.1770 -0.2333** -0.2149 -0.3990* -0.2139 -0.1927 
 (-2.51) (-3.11) (-1.59) (-1.653) (-1.58) (-2.35) (-1.41) (-1.00) 
LargeOwn2 0.0401* 0.0544* 0.0270 0.0263 0.0354 0.0639* 0.0348 0.0227 
 (2.38) (2.58) (1.51) (1.14) (1.52) (2.19) (1.42) (0.73) 
ComLaw 0.9824* 1.3798* 0.8434* 1.3878*     
 (8.41) (9.44) (7.14) (3.24)     
ComLaw*FNI04 0.0070 -3.6004* 0.7203 -3.1319*     
 (0.01) (-5.93) (1.48) (-4.98)     
ComLaw*LargeOWN 0.0197 0.0556 0.0347 0.0960*     
 (0.60) (1.34) (0.99) (2.13)     
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 25.70 33.30 26.05 37.39 28.28 26.32 22.88 38.40 
F statistics 25.26 35.86 20.47 34.01 27.07 24.61 15.58 31.74 
This table reports the results of model (5.5) for dividend-paying firms only using OLS procedure. ComLaw and CiviLaw refer to the 
subsamples of firms from common law countries or civil law countries respectively. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. The values 
reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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Appendix 5. 5:  Largest shareholder and dividend payout – country analysis 
  US UK Japan France China 
  DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS 
Intercept -0.0020 0.0243 -0.7632 -0.0150 0.6410 0.0258 -2.9278** 0.0045 2.0244 0.1572** 
 (-0.10) (0.56) (-0.79) (-0.37) (1.55) (1.60) (-1.64) (0.06) (1.32) (1.65) 
FNI04 0.1286* 0.2060* 3.8769* 0.2115* 2.7902* 0.1659* 5.7301* 0.3512* 6.3281* 0.6188* 
 (4.53) (4.93) (4.07) (5.12) (2.52) (3.99) (4.32) (5.55) (4.75) (7.78) 
FNI04*FDEBT03 0.3141* 0.4304* 3.1306 0.0195 -2.7716 -0.3007* -2.4423 -0.2225 2.3966 -0.6399* 
 (3.65) (3.48) (1.02) (0.18) (-1.07) (-3.11) (-0.54) (-1.06) (0.64) (-3.23) 
FNI04*FMKB03 -0.0030 -0.0221 -1.3860* 0.0180 -4.0099* -0.0963* -2.4386** 0.0358 -2.0672* -0.0284 
 (-0.17) (-0.91) (-2.07) (0.62) (-3.44) (-2.75) (-1.83) (0.58) (-2.05) (-0.50) 
FNI04*Large_INSD 0.0641* 0.0407 0.8706 -0.0315 1.8752 0.0773 -0.1635 -0.0349   
 (2.19) (0.95) (0.75) (-0.60) (0.67) (0.72) (-0.12) (-0.56)   
FNI04*Large_FIN 0.0497** 0.0311 0.8054 -0.0614 0.6432 0.0659** 0.7480 0.0206 0.1639 0.1621 
 (1.78) (0.76) (0.88) (-1.48) (0.60) (1.65) (0.38) (0.21) (0.08) (1.37) 
FNI04*Large_STATE -0.0374 -0.0699 21.6860 -0.0098 -1.9814 -0.0636 3.5566 -0.1167 3.0029 0.4039 
 (-0.37) (-0.48) (0.49) (-0.01) (-0.18) (-0.15) (0.09) (-0.06) (0.26) (0.55) 
LargeOWN -0.0250** -0.0520** 0.6469 0.0662* -0.4500 -0.0113 1.9119** 0.0517 -1.6659** -0.1220* 
 (-1.80) (-1.70) (1.22) (2.34) (-1.54) (-0.98) (1.91) (1.03) (-1.82) (-2.14) 
LargeOWN2 0.0038 0.0077 -0.1438 -0.0134* 0.0798 0.0019 -0.2780** -0.0081 0.2633* 0.0194* 
 (1.58) (1.47) (-1.50) (-2.63) (1.61) (0.99) (-1.70) (-1.10) (1.97) (2.34) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Chi square (16) 302.59 344.33 84.95 131.93 26.80 42.66 52.53 123.21 88.69 233.78 
N 2986 2986 684 684 484 484 394 394 945 945 
This table reports the results of Tobit estimation (with endogenous regressors) of model (5.5) by country including the US, the UK, Japan, France and 
China. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. The values reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.    
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Appendix 5. 6:  Other robustness tests 
  ComLaw CiviLaw All firms ComLaw CiviLaw 
 DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI DivS 
Intercept 1.1000* 0.1462* 1.2292** 0.0847* 0.1884 0.0597* 0.1055 0.0850* -0.1880 -0.0185 
 (2.25) (3.94) (1.95) (2.03) (0.58) (2.63) (0.25) (2.71) (-0.35) (-0.52) 
FNI04 4.5853* 0.3299* 5.1494* 0.5251* 4.8466* 0.3947* 4.8266* 0.3516* 5.2602* 0.5285* 
 (12.47) (12.95) (11.49) (17.57) (18.17) (21.28) (13.45) (14.00) (11.91) (18.09) 
FNI04*Debt03 3.4649* 0.2998* -0.6808 -0.3202* 0.8575 0.0409 2.0200* 0.1806* -1.7668 -0.3872* 
 (3.13) (3.64) (-0.53) (-3.77) (1.17) (0.76) (2.06) (2.42) (-1.51) (-4.94) 
FNI04*Mkb03 -1.5744* -0.0215 -2.0086* -0.0826* -1.7122* -0.0424* -1.5954* -0.0273** -2.0174* -0.0834* 
 (-6.98) (-1.25) (-6.06) (-3.54) (-10.10) (-3.26) (-7.44) (-1.64) (-6.11) (-3.62) 
FNI04 *Large_INSD -0.7292* -0.1175* 0.3105 -0.0914* -0.6193* -0.1353* -0.8217* -0.1276* 0.1294 -0.0997* 
 (-2.01) (-4.14) (0.56) (-2.49) (-2.24) (-6.45) (-2.30) (-4.55) (0.24) (-2.78) 
FNI04 *Large_FIN 0.0030 -0.0379 -0.0141 -0.0969* -0.1165 -0.0778* -0.1335 -0.0498* 0.2972 -0.0676** 
 (0.01) (-1.46) (-0.03) (-2.69) (-0.45) (-4.11) (-0.40) (-1.96) (0.56) (-1.94) 
FNI04 *Large_STATE -0.9773 -0.1360 0.8837 0.1259 -0.1350 -0.0104 -0.9940 -0.1392 0.7924 0.1229 
 (-0.60) (-1.12) (0.65) (1.39) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.61) (-1.14) (0.59) (1.38) 
LargeOwn -0.7428* -0.0488* -1.0340* -0.0740*       
 (-3.69) (-3.11) (-4.45) (-4.86)       
LargeOwn2 0.1270* 0.0090* 0.1667* 0.0119*       
 (3.75) (3.40) (4.48) (4.90)       
Indep_B     -0.0543* 0.0005 -0.0680** 0.0029 -0.0367 -0.0013 
     (-2.24) (0.26) (-1.85) (1.04) (-1.14) (-0.61) 
Indep_C     0.0658* 0.0086* 0.1043* 0.0130* 0.0474 0.0050* 
     (2.64) (4.69) (2.59) (4.21) (1.50) (2.42) 
ComLaw     -0.2352* -0.0088*     
     (-11.26) (-5.77)     
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi square (16) 501.20 767.61 326.88 788.94 1398.89 1834.12 808.85 1013.89 454.95 905.95 
N 5,060 5,060 3,219 3,219 8,279 8,279 5,060 5,060 3,219 3,219 
This table reports the results of Tobit estimation of model (5.5) for the full sample of firms including both the dividend-paying and the non-dividend paying 
firms (All firms). ComLaw and CiviLaw refer to the subsamples of firms from common law countries or civil law countries respectively. Refer to Table 5.2 
for variable definition. The values reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
(10%) level. 
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Appendix 5. 7:  Interaction between dividend payout and largest shareholder 
  Panel A.  Single 2STLS Panel B. System of equation - dividend paying firms only 
 All firms Dividend payers 2STLS system 3STLS system 2STLS system 3STLS system 
 DivI DivS DivI DivS DivI LargeOwn DivI LargeOwn DivS LargeOwn DivS LargeOwn 
Intercept 4.1546* 4.1212* 4.2155* 4.5466* 0.0957 4.2120* 0.1207 4.2103* 0.7223 4.5311* 0.9445 4.2103* 
 (12.36) (12.63) (11.02) (11.79) (0.16) (11.04) (0.20) (11.05) (0.89) (11.79) (1.17) (11.05) 
FNI04     -6.4890*  -6.4898*  6.6169*  6.6408*  
     (-13.13)  (-13.22)  (9.91)  (10.03)  
FNI04*Debt03     -4.9239*  -4.9243*  -2.8691**  -2.8820**  
     (-4.13)  (-4.16)  (-1.78)  (-1.80)  
FNI04*Mkb03     2.9575*  2.9583*  2.5991*  2.5944*  
     (10.34)  (10.42)  (6.73)  (6.77)  
FNI04 *Large_INSD     -0.4287  -0.4287  0.5919  0.5938  
     (-0.92)  (-0.92)  (0.94)  (0.95)  
FNI04 *Large_FIN     -0.6715**  -0.6716**  -0.1871  -0.1873  
     (-1.76)  (-1.77)  (-0.36)  (-0.37)  
FNI04 *Large_STATE     -0.6978  -0.6979  -0.4781  -0.4790  
     (-0.49)  (-0.49)  (-0.25)  (-0.25)  
LargeOwn     -0.8561*  -0.8622*  -3.4229*  -3.4845*  
     (-2.51)  (-2.55)  (-7.47)  (-7.66)  
LargeOwn2     0.1266*  0.1266*  0.4724*  0.4740*  
     (2.57)  (2.59)  (7.14)  (7.22)  
LagDivPay 0.4595* 2.8055* 0.0430** 0.0921*   0.0219  0.0182  0.0975*  0.0718* 
 (7.40) (8.18) (1.56) (5.69)   (0.92)  (0.76)  (6.05)  (4.47) 
FMKB04 -0.0448* -0.0576* 0.0085 -0.0329**   0.0154  0.0150  -0.0620**  -0.0482 
 (-4.89) (-6.42) (0.50) (-1.85)   (0.47)  (0.45)  (-1.77)  (-1.38) 
ComLaw -0.5563* -0.5892* -0.5793* -0.5990* -0.7588* -0.5785* -0.7554* -0.5784* -0.4299 -0.5994* -0.4603 -0.5931* 
 (-28.32) (-32.00) (-20.21) (-20.86) (-3.90) (-20.28) (-3.91) (-20.31) (-0.88) (-20.91) (-0.95) (-20.73) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 7.10 12.56 10.02 10.79 26.30 10.40 26.28 10.41 23.25 10.92 22.14 11.02 
F statistics 107.07 114.54 39.83 43.39 25.14 39.74 1377.78 438.20 31.70 43.22 1722.16 460.07 
This table reports the results from the analysis of the interaction between dividend payout and largest shareholder as outlined in Section 5.5.3. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. The 
values reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%) level.   
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Appendix 5. 8:  Alternative dividend payout proxies – DivA and DivM 
  All firms  Ex-US  ComLaw  CiviLaw  
  DivA DivM DivA DivM DivA DivM DivA DivM 
Intercept 0.0798* 0.1064* 0.0734* 0.1021* 0.0571* 0.0755* 0.0521* 0.0691* 
 (4.18) (5.05) (4.09) (4.74) (2.35) (3.16) (2.06) (2.02) 
FNI04 0.3673* 0.3219* 0.3207* 0.3248* 0.2421* 0.2133* 0.4039* 0.4472* 
 (22.60) (19.26) (20.86) (18.66) (14.22) (13.42) (21.82) (18.64) 
FNI04*Debt03 -0.0356 0.0757** -0.1692* -0.0054 0.1608* 0.2010* -0.4302* -0.2620* 
 (-0.93) (1.87) (-4.26) (-0.12) (2.95) (3.88) (-8.50) (-3.96) 
FNI04*Mkb03 0.0168** -0.1036* 0.0850* -0.1222* 0.0203** -0.0677* 0.0057 -0.2375* 
 (1.92) (-12.29) (8.49) (-11.48) (1.75) (-6.74) (0.40) (-14.07) 
FNI04  
*Large_INSD -0.0695* -0.0411* 0.0065 0.0244 -0.0881* -0.0579* 0.0048 -0.0382 
 (-4.91) (-2.88) (0.38) (1.26) (-4.63) (-3.36) (0.21) (-1.31) 
FNI04 
*Large_FIN -0.0339* -0.0195 -0.0101 0.0104 -0.0287** -0.0273** -0.0546* 0.0095 
 (-2.61) (-1.46) (-0.73) (0.67) (-1.66) (-1.71) (-2.46) (0.35) 
FNI04 
*Large_STATE 0.0076 0.0265 0.1196* 0.1152** -0.0958 -0.0343 0.1510* 0.1079 
 (0.14) (0.46) (2.12) (1.72) (-1.15) (-0.43) (2.67) (1.46) 
LargeOwn -0.0488* -0.0663* -0.0500* -0.0711* -0.0342* -0.0466* -0.0380* -0.0616* 
 (-5.83) (-7.09) (-5.69) (-6.65) (-3.36) (-4.66) (-4.05) (-4.85) 
LargeOwn2 0.0077* 0.0105* 0.0079* 0.0113* 0.0062* 0.0083* 0.0061* 0.0100* 
 (5.91) (7.24) (5.69) (6.72) (3.63) (4.95) (4.06) (4.92) 
ComLaw -0.0198* -0.0286* -0.0019 -0.0086**     
 (-4.54) (-5.97) (-0.45) (-1.74)     
ComLaw 
*FNI04 -0.1241* -0.0807* -0.0891* -0.1056*     
 (-7.99) (-5.13) (-5.95) (-6.44)     
ComLaw 
*LargeOwn 0.0061* 0.0072* 0.0039* 0.0060*     
 (4.50) (4.88) (3.04) (3.97)     
         
Industry 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi square (16) 1743.96 1318.34 1951.49 944.59 831.03 676.87 1193.74 664.29 
N 8,279 8,279 5,248 5,248 5,060 5,060 3,219 3,219 
This table reports the results of Tobit estimation (with endogenous regressors) of model (5.5) for the full sample of 
firms including both the dividend-paying and the non-dividend paying firms (All firms), and for the non-US firms 
(Ex-US). ComLaw and CiviLaw refer to the subsamples of firms from common law countries or civil law countries 
respectively. The dependent variable is DivA and DivM. DivA is the ratio of total dividend to total assets, while 
DivM is the ratio of total dividend to total market capitalisation. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definition. The 
values reported in parenthesis are White heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics. *(**) denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% (10%) level.   
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